662.00/10–451: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State 1
215. Eyes only for Secretary and Byroade. Kirkpatrick (chairman) opened discussions of Washington proposals at Wed mtg2 between Chancellor and HICOM’s by proposing that following topics, which had been raised by Chancellor on Mon, be dealt with before reverting to question of supreme authority:
- 1.
- German unification. He explained that para 2, Art 2 of draft3 had been inspired by allied desire to proceed in close touch with Gers on all questions relating to unification and Ger as a whole. Chancellor said he had been pressed by Schumacher to ascertain whether Ger wld be required to abstain from independent action re unification or be precluded from independent negots with USSR on this subj. He was told that as allies had undertaken not to talk to Sovs about Ger behind [Page 1545] her back we wld expect that Ger as member of Western community wld not talk to Sovs behind our backs. We must also preserve possibility of preventing another govt in Ger from making deal with Sov Union which wld threaten peace of Europe. Chancellor agreed to this interpretation.
- 2.
- Representation of Ger interests abroad. As regards this question which Chancellor had on Mon linked with foregoing, it emerged that he feared Fed Rep might be prevented from joining certain organizations or dealing direct with other countries because of limitations to be imposed in contract. It was pointed out, however, that this clause had only been inserted as an indication of allied willingness to assist Fed Rep where it was unable because of attitude of Sov Union or satellites to take care of its own interests. We agreed not to press this clause if Chancellor found it objectionable.
- 3.
- Stationing of troops. Chancellor has just recd note from Canadian Govt announcing the stationing of troops here as part of NATO forces. He said that if US and UK forces were stationed in Ger on basis of declaration of June 1945, while Fr, Dutch and Belgian troops were to be here as part of EDC forces and Canadians and others as part of NATO , complete confusion wld ensue and that a formula must be found to cover all of these forces. He was particularly concerned that Fr shld claim right to station troops here by exercise of supreme auth, whereas at same time its forces form part of Eur Army. It was agreed to revert to this question later.
- 4.
- Reparations. Subj matter has been referred to experts.
- 5.
- Deconcentration. On Mon Chancellor had objected to statement that implementation of Law 27 was essential condition for fulfillment of Schuman Plan. He added that continuation of coal and steel control groups under allied control wld be contrary to Schuman’s letter of Apr 184 which had said HICOM, including control groups, wld cease to exercise functions taken over by high auth. I explained that principal difficulty in field of deconcentration had been occasioned by Ger delay in executing present programs. It had been assumed deconcentration wld be substantially completed before high authority assumed its powers, which do not include auth to carry out deconcentration program. As this was now being done by control groups they must continue their task until it was concluded. Chancellor agreed with us that it was important that work of deconcentration shld be carried out as quickly as possible and said that best solution wld be its completion before entry into force of treaty. Shld it not be possible to complete this work by then other arrangements wld have to be made. HICOM’s pointed out that only way to eliminate necessity for contractual provisions concerning deconcentration wld be to finish work of control groups by effective date of treaty. In any event deconcentration provisions wld not be linked with Schuman Plan.
- 6.
- Security guarantee. Chairman explained that FonMin’s had shown great understanding for problems facing Chancellor in this connection and were prepared to go as far as they cld to meet this difficulty, having in mind their own constitutional limitations. He briefly reviewed problems involved in NATO guarantee and pointed out difficulties of giving Ger a treaty guarantee which went further than that given NATO powers. He said declaration which was recognition [Page 1546] of existing state of affairs shld provide adequate protection. I then outlined US difficulties in this connection but pointed out that we had accepted the Sept guarantee which we were prepared to reaffirm. It might also be possible for us to declare our intention to station troops in Ger in substantial force but we cld not agree to any commitment to station any specific number. Chancellor appeared satisfied with these explanations and thought that declaration might suffice, depending upon its content and how it was issued.
After brief recess discussions were resumed with respect to problem of supreme auth. Chairman explained that there were two aspects to this problem, juridical and practical. The latter was more important but it shld also be made clear that we based our right to maintain troops in Ger on the supreme authority assumed by us in declaration of June 1945 and that same constitution concept applied to our auth in Berlin. This concept had been used as basis of our dealings with Sovs and had justified retention of our troops there. As regards practical aspect, the UK, which was stationing bulk of its forces in Ger, leaving its own territory relatively unprotected, must have guarantee that maintenance of these troops in Ger and protection of their security was adequately assured. For this reason emphasis must be placed upon retention of such rights as will protect security of our troops in any eventuality.
I pointed to unprecedented character of steps US has taken in stationing troops here and said that it was inconceivable at this stage of development of Eur defense that we could keep our troops here unless our rights were unequivocable from point of view of security. Our retention of supreme auth for this purpose did not mean that we were endeavoring to restore our entire auth as regards Ger since we were prepared to grant it full practical sovereignty in domestic and foreign affairs but we cld not exchange our present firm legal basis for an untested legal theory. Furthermore, our proposal meant that our rights vis-à-vis Russia were clear and these shld be of deep concern to Gers as well as to allies.
Along discussion of basis for exercise of supreme authority in these fields ensued, the Chancellor continuing to argue that retention by allies in any field was incompatible with Ger partnership in Eur defense community. He also insisted that rights granted by treaty with Fed Rep provided a more unequivocable basis than if they were derived from declaration validity of which under international law was not only questionable but cld be challenged by Russians since we had already granted Fed Rep many of the powers reserved to us under it. We insisted upon the importance of preserving rights set forth in Art 2 of allied draft since they were necessary to provide adequate protection for our troops and basis for dealing with Russians. It was doubtful whether these cld be preserved vis-à-vis Russians if they were derived from agreement with Fed Rep. Adenauer offered to give us by [Page 1547] treaty all that was required in respect of unification of Germany, Berlin, and security of our troops and also to work out something which wld answer our needs in event of unfavorable evolution in Germany or to prevent another “ruination of democracy” in Germany since Germany, too, had a lively interest in preservation of democracy. He was convinced that agreement with Fed Rep wld give us better basis for intervention in this respect than declaration of June 1945 and that majority of Bundestag wld grant this.
It finally emerged that Chancellor might be prepared to agree, if specific reference to declaration of June 1945 were eliminated, that rights of allies re Germany as a whole and Berlin cld be safeguarded by providing that nothing in this agreement wld affect rights of allies in these particular fields which had been derived from international agreements. It wld be understood that although declaration of June 1945 was not mentioned it wld remain in effect in these fields. It was questionable whether such formula wld cover rights to station troops in Germany or to protect them. These might have to be spelled out in some other way.
Chancellor suggested clause stating agreement wld not affect rights which three Western allies have in Germany as between themselves or with respect to a third party, but objected to any formula which implied that Fr troops might be in Germany on a different status than other contingents of Eur Army. It was agreed that we wld all examine possibility of rephrasing provisions relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole and determined further specific mention of declaration of June 1945 cld be omitted. Discussions on these points will be resumed at next mtg Oct 10. Chancellor will be in Berlin at end of this week and Kirkpatrick in London on 8th and 9th. Meanwhile mtgs between experts on other phases of problem, including programs and arbitration tribunal, etc, will be held as soon as possible.
In my opinion some real progress was made in yesterday’s mtg by the elimination of misunderstandings in Chancellor’s mind concerning certain of the problems. On subj of supreme authority he seemed disposed to seek solution and is apparently sincerely desirous of giving us rights we need if we can find an appropriate formula re sovereignty.
- Repeated to Frankfurt.↩
- October 3.↩
-
This paragraph of the general agreement read:
“2. The three powers declare that they will consult with the Federal Republic in regard to exercise of this authority with respect to questions relating to the discharge of their responsibilities regarding Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement, and with respect to questions relating to Berlin.”
For the full text of the draft general agreement, see p. 1197.
↩ - For text see volume iv .↩