Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762A.00/10–251: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Frankfurt , October 2, 1951—7 p. m.

2894. Eyes only for Secretary and Byroade. Prior to Monday’s mtg between Chancellor and High Commission Hallstein had informed me that Chancellor was very discouraged as he considered decisions communicated to him last week were not consistent with Washington communiqué and declaration. It appeared to him that Ger had not been granted equal partnership since Allies were reserving supreme authority, including right to intervene in case of an emergency. Hallstein further argued that emergencies should be limited to external attack and that all reserve rights should be subject to arbitration.

When Chancellor appeared for Monday’s mtg it was evident that he had gone over tripartite memo and proposed draft convention with very critical eye. No doubt he also had been influenced by his recent conversation with Schumacher,¹ who continues to take a negative position and by the political situation which encourages him to ask for further concessions in order to make integration more attractive than unification. He said that Schumacher had stated that neither his nor SPD attitude was in any degree altered as result of Washington decisions. Schumacher still argues that just as Schuman Plan places Ger economy at disposal of France, so wld Pleven Plan place Ger manpower at France’s disposal.

Chancellor declared that documents recd last week were not compatible with Washington decisions which had promised complete transformation of Allied-Ger relations, integration of Ger as an equal partner, abolition of occupation statute and of rights to interfere in domestic affairs. He then mentioned five points in Allied position which seemed inconsistent with these principles:

1. Retention of supreme authority. Whereas he was prepared to admit that special rights with respect to Berlin and unification of Ger were necessary, he insisted that these should be derived from agreement with FedRep and not from declaration of 5 June 1945, which was infringement on full sovereignty. Reserved right to protect the security of troops was no longer necessary since troops wld henceforth not be occupation forces but allies associated in a common defense effort. Consequently their rights in Ger would be based on agreements. He argued that it wld be dangerous to base retention of powers on agreement with Sovs and furthermore, the ‘45 declaration had become obsolete by Allied termination of state of war.² Allied proposal meant to him that we had not renounced supreme authority. Since in his concept no retention of supreme authority was required, it wld not be necessary to retain the Council of ambassadors and no special control or inspection authority should be tolerated. It wld be for the Paris negotiations³ to determine what control organizations should be established and restrictions agreed there should equally apply to the European defense organization. Furthermore, arbitration provisions should be [approached as?] reserved rights including right to declare a state of emergency. Circumstances might arise in which emergency action might be required without waiting any arbitral decision but in these cases action should later be reviewed by the court.

2. Ger unification. He asked whether the reservation of Allied special rights in this field meant that FedRep could not itself decide upon the conditions for unification but must submit to Allied direction. There was also connection between this and provision for Allied representation of Ger interests (para 4(2) of draft convention). He did not explain this in detail and subject was left for further consideration.

3. Reparations. Chancellor repeated his previous objection to recognition by FedRep of agreements relating to disposal of Ger assets abroad but agreed to have matter studied further by experts.

4. Deconcentration. Chancellor objected to Allied statement that execution of Law 27 was essential to realization of Schuman Plan. He said that if Law 27 was now linked to Schuman Plan it strengthened opposition’s argument that purpose of this plan is merely to weaken Ger industry. He had evidently been influenced by recent article in Le Monde which stated that Schuman Plan wld secure for France Ger’s war potential which was more important than her manpower.

5. Security guarantee. Chancellor said he did not understand why a reiteration of the security guarantee in the treaty form wld give rise to any more difficulties on American side than did the original guarantee. Furthermore, he considered that since Eisenhower’s mission was to defend Eur, including Ger, this mission had in some way superseded the guarantee. It was difficult to follow his reasoning on this point and it has been left for later discussion.

In conclusion, Chancellor argued that situation in Ger required careful handling, particularly in view of Sov efforts to impede integration of Ger in West defense system. He was confident he could handle Sov approach provided we could assist him in matter of restoring Ger’s sovereignty. He argued at some length that opinion in France in particular should be brought to realize importance of this problem. He seemed to feel that reply to recent Sov note⁴ implied that France’s sole interest in integration was in order to prevent Ger from having its own defense forces and to fear that France was prepared to make deal with Sov Union at Ger’s expense. Was not entirely reassured by our insistence that these agreements represented united Allied desire for integration of Ger.

Upon conclusion of Chancellor’s declaration, Kirkpatrick asked whether this meant that Chancellor was no longer prepared to accept his own draft which had granted Allies special rights, including power to intervene in an emergency.⁵ Chancellor claimed his draft was still valid but suggested that articles 3, 4(2) and 7 be included in a separate treaty since main convention should contain only the essentials. Kirkpatrick pointed out that these rights were essentials, not only for Allies, but in Ger’s interest as well. In demonstrating, that there was no contradiction between Washington communiqué and draft treaty, we said we had always made clear to Clancellor that we had to retain special rights in limited fields. Furthermore, these had apparently been accepted by Gers since they were included in Chancellor’s draft and Hallstein had told French in Aug that Gers agreed to these limited powers.

Kirkpatrick then said it seemed the principal difficulty was not that certain Allied rights should be preserved but whether these should be derived from ‘45 declaration or obtained by agreement with FedRep. Chancellor stated categorically that FedRep was prepared to grant Allies by contract those rights which they now claimed through the exercise of supreme authority derived from the ‘45 declaration, and agreed difference related primarily to source of rights. A long discussion ensued in which High Commissioners pointed out that we could not surrender the rights vis-à-vis the Sovs which we now had in return for some uncertain legal theory, and that our right to be in Berlin was derived from the ‘45 declaration and to abandon it now wld mean risking the basis for our position there. Chancellor continued to insist that reservation of exercise of supreme authority in this field was contrary to principle that Ger wld be accepted as an equal partner and that it wld be useless, if not damaging, to invoke the ‘45 declaration as the source of our authority. He declared such wld be clear indication that Allies have not yet abandoned role of victors in Ger and therefore psychologically difficult for Gers to accept. He furthermore argued that supreme authority is by its very nature indivisible and that whereas its possessor may renounce its exercise in specified fields he can nevertheless resume full powers.

In discussing status of troops, Chancellor argued that as all forces of the Eur army wld have equal status, there was no ground for giving any special rights or powers to French forces in Ger which was not conferred on all other Eur contingents, including Gers. He admitted this was a problem, particularly since US and UK will not be members of EDF.

Although Chancellor had previously agreed that Allies wld be granted all their special rights by contract, it became clear in discussing the declaration of a state of emergency Chancellor was not prepared to confer this right upon Council of Ambassadors and only to give milit commanders the powers to deal with attacks from abroad or to protect their troops in event of disorder. He said that Article 77 of draft convention for the Eur Defense Community had now superseded the proposal in his draft convention giving Allies right to declare a state of emergency. As we were not informed of this new proposal we reserved comment until we could examine draft. As regards internal developments in Ger and possibility of a putsch, he felt that joint measures could be worked out to meet this danger. Kirkpatrick argued, however, that best protection against such internal dangers wld be to make clear in advance to prospective putsch leaders that machinery to deal with them existed.

In referring to Chancellor’s insistence that arbitration provisions apply to Allied right to take measures for protection of security of their forces, I pointed out that wld be impossible for US to agree to subject the security of our troops to arbitration or to place our commanders in a position where they might later be called to account by a neutral arbiter.

Although Chancellor at first inisted that contract should grant special rights in Berlin and in respect to unification of Ger, he admitted that vis-à-vis [Berlin?] these rights could also be derived from internal agreements other than declaration of June ‘45. HICOMs doubted that those rights could be protected unless based upon such declaration but agree to study matter further. Dept views in this respect wld be appreciated. Chancellor, however, appears reluctant to grant full rights with respect to security of our troops or the declaration of a state of emergency. This represents a change in position he took prior to Washington mtg. Any mention of retention of supreme authority apparently raises psychological problems for him which are difficult to concede at this stage. It is too early in our negotiations to determine whether he has adopted this attitude merely for its tactical value or whether this represents his present estimate of what the Bundestag will accept. It may be that he believes we will have to modify our original position because of the lure of unification and is sounding us out. I believe we must make it quite clear to him that there are certain basic principles which must be respected and which we cannot abandon, although we should be fully prepared to discuss different methods of presentation.

A further mtg is scheduled for Wed. Experts’ negotiations have been postponed pending further progress on the main issues.

Chancellor has urged us to avoid any press statements and to try to prevent leaks to press or other Ger officials.

McCloy

1. No report on Adenauer’s conversation with Schumacher on September 25 has been found in Department of State files.
2. On July 9, President Truman had addressed letters to Vice President Barkley and Speaker Rayburn proposing that Congress end the state of war still existing with Germany. On the same day Morrison announced in the House of Commons that the United Kingdom was also preparing to terminate the state of war with Germany. For the text of President Truman’s letter which included a draft resolution and the statement by Morrison, see Folliot, Documents on International Affairs, 1951, pp. 129–133.
3. For documentation on the work of the European Army Talks at Paris, see pp. 755 ff.
4. Presumably a reference to the Soviet note of June 20, p. 1159, and the French reply made at the last meeting of the Four-Power Exploratory Talks at Paris on June 22. Regarding the latter, see telegram 7987 June 22, p. 1161.
5. For the text of Adenauer’s draft, see telegram 2026, August 31, p. 1520.