762.00/9–2751: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

2803. Eyes only for the Secretary and Byroade from McCloy. I consider yesterday’s Bundestag action as favorable. It seems clear that Chancellor sought to find conditions which were unacceptable to Sovs and at same time sound. Union between Schumacher and coalition force in voting also helpful though Schumacher probably inclined more toward unification than Adenauer.

Commies (Reimann) make the issue clearly between unification and integration, each precluding the other. Hallstein immed afted debate stated govt was pleased with Bundestag action adding, however, that Schumacher was seeking support for his anti-integration program on ground Adenauer program impaired effective exploration of unification possibilities; in other words SPD line about the same as Commie line only put less bluntly and with different ultimate objectives.

Hallstein indicated necessity of going forward rapidly with Washington decisions in order to face opposition with fait accompli as soon [Page 1537] as possible but expressed view that Chancellor wld have to have much improved package than that disclosed to him at first mtg if he were to offset opposition in light of Grotewohl proposals and Schumacher position.

Chancellor is now putting out to press that he is pessimistic about our negots. This is partly studied and partly real. He is not thinking realistically re security guarantee as he has in mind a security contract embodying the mutuality of old type Eur mil alliances rather than an appreciation of Atlantic security concept or position of the US. I intend tell him Monday we are not going to respond to Grotewohl by raising a bid, that there are principles to which we are going to adhere—Ger divisions or no Ger divisions, but within that framework we are prepared sincerely to negotiate with him in order to find the forms which can best meet the needs of effective presentation to all our respective parliaments and people. As there are many signs that Gers feel we can be forced to raise our bids, it is important to check growth this attitude quickly if we are to make progress. Indeed there is for the moment a spate of wild demands from many quarters in Ger. Therefore, our line shld be that we do not intend to abandon our principles whether Ger contributes or not. On the other hand, we shld point out our well-considered policy is to continue to offer a solid base for Ger participation in the Eur West community with the vast imponderable of US support, with all that this implies for the security and welfare of Eur, incl Ger and the world. The introduction of this note in good-tempered but firm form from the US while expressing full sympathy and understanding for the desire and propriety of Ger unification wld be helpful. My overall feeling is that though we have not yet felt either the last Sov attack on this line or the full weight of even the initial attack, we can continue to hold a good position. It may cost us some delays if for no reason than that it will take some time for Ger opinion to resettle before we can put it confidently to a real test. Intend keep this note uppermost in talks with all leaders during coming week. Long talk with FDP people last night whose gen attitude seemed constructive.

Believe it is rather clear Adenauer’s real concern over Wash decisions lies in the security guarantee field, commercial aviation and council of Ambs. So far no real concern expressed over emergency clauses re security of troops though no doubt he will try out many other points as he goes along.

There is rather convincing evidence some one either in my office or yours is leaking to Schumacher or his people. I am trying to take effective precautions here but in this case speed with which he seems to have had full Wash decisions even before we returned here points to possibility though not certainty of Wash leaks.

McCloy