662A.00/9–2651: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State 1
2744. Eyes only for Acheson. Following HICOM’s meeting with Chancellor Monday,2 Hallstein and Blankenhorn saw PolAd’s late Tuesday. They stressed importance of conducting negotiations with minimum of publicity. Chancellor has not yet given details to Cabinet or Bundestag and has asked that every effort be made to prevent leaks to press and speculation by unauthorized individuals. We agreed do our best to minimize speculation.
Hallstein said he had several further points to raise which had come to light after more careful study on tripartite memorandum3 and proposed draft convention.4 He outlined these as follows:
1. Reserved powers. Whereas Federal Government recognized Allies must retain certain rights, it proposed these should be subject of agreement with Federal Government. To define them so they appear to be a relic of supreme authority would be interpreted in Germany as merely another form of the general recapture clause now contained [Page 1535] in paragraph 3 of Occupation Statute. Federal Government likewise wished avoid any mention of declaration of June 1945 since German public would not understand that at time Germany is being admitted to European community as a partner some of its sovereignty would continue to be exercised by others.
2. State of emergency. Hallstein explained that right to declare state of emergency appeared to be expression of highest authority and suggested it be rephrased so that it becomes a more normal exercise of right of the Allies to defend themselves. It would be possible, however, to define the situations in which the Allies might exercise this right.
3. Status of troops. According to Hallstein, the treaty establishing European army would change the status of French troops in Germany since all European forces would be here on same basis. It was difficult to reconcile this principle with any agreement providing for special status for French troops. He recognized that problem of US and UK forces was different.
4. Programs, (a) Reparations. Hallstein considered that all that was necessary would be for Germans to agree to take no action prejudicial to eventual settlement of reparations in peace treaty.
(b) Deconcentration. The necessity of maintaining coal and steel control groups should further be studied in light of French Government’s letter of April last5 since Hallstein thought that after entry into force of Schuman Plan their continued existence might be incompatible with assurances given the Germans. Hallstein said that this was what Chancellor had in mind when he said Monday that there was aspects of our proposal which were not in conformity with Schuman Plan.
This problem required further study on part of the Germans and Hallstein proposed to provide further details prior to Monday’s meeting.
(c) Internal restitution. Whereas Hallstein made no specific proposals in this respect, he raised question whether present system in force particularly in US Zone provided fair and just solution.
5. Council of Ambassadors, Hallstein reiterated the Chancellor’s argument that continued existence of Council of Ambassadors would mean that High Commission had only changed its name. He saw no need for continuing such an organization. The provisions for inspection, even though they were limited to security restrictions, were likewise incompatible with equality of rights.
6. Security safeguards. The prohibition of manufacturing of war materials and atomic research could only be dealt with through European defense force in interest of common defense. Continued restrictions of this nature did not conform to Germans new partnership status. He proposed such restrictions should be handled in manner similar to agreement dealing with materials in short supply. In German view there could be no reason to keep any restrictions on manufacturing of civil aircraft.
7. Consultation on matters relating to the East. Hallstein recognized Allies had agreed to consult Germans on all matters affecting Germany in relation to Soviet Union but pointed out that Germany’s [Page 1536] proximity to Soviet Union meant that it would be vitally affected by all aspects of Allies dealings with Soviet Union. He therefore asked that Germany be associated in the formulation of common policy vis-à-vis Soviet Union in same way that it will be associated in formulation of common defense in Europe.
8. Arbitration tribunal. The reservation that questions relating to reserve powers and state of emergency would not fall within jurisdiction of arbitration tribunal was an impossible stipulation for Germany since the tribunal would have no meaning if it were not empowered to deal with factors limiting the sovereignty of the Federal Republic.
As time was limited because Hallstein had to attend meeting between Schumacher and Adenauer, PolAd’s took note of his declarations and explained briefly why it was not possible, in particular to accept German position on reserved powers, state of emergency, reparations, and consultation on matters relating to the East, and arbitration tribunal. Federal Republic agreed status of French troops in connection with European army required further study. It was pointed out in matter of Security safeguards these were being further examined by our governments to whom German observations would be communicated. We made brief explanation for the need three Ambassadors to act in council on matters affecting tripartite interests but said we were prepared to examine question of presentation if principle were agreed. Further discussions on these and points raised by the Chancellor will be scheduled at early date.