Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762.00/9–2551: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret   priority

Frankfurt, September 25, 1951—9 p. m.

2718. Eyes only for Acheson and Byroade.

[Here follows the text of the first part of this telegram, relating to a meeting of the three High Commissioners with Adenauer on the morning of September 25, with Grotewohl’s proposals for all-German elections as the first topic, printed page 1787.]

Discussion then turned to the results of the Mins mtg and François-Poncet read tripartite memo outlining results of the conference, copies of which are being air-pouched.² Memo summarized the underlying principles and dealt with the main requirements. Mtg was then suspended to give the Chancellor opportunity to consider memo and draft agreement,³ copies of which were also handed him.

Upon resumption it became clear Chancellor was obviously disturbed and appeared to believe that draft agreement implied the Allies were not prepared to accept Ger as an equal partner in the Eur community, or to trust her. He said the Ger people cld only contribute to Eur defense or enter a Eur defense community on a basis of equality and reciprocity, and any agreement providing for Ger contribution must contain these principles. In his opinion the draft before him did not do so and cited four cases:

1. It was not possible to consider that Ger wld be free to conduct its foreign affairs if Council of Ambassadors cld interfere by a majority vote. Also the right of inspection to see to it that contractual agreements were carried out was inconsistent with the principle of equality. If these proposals were maintained, it would mean the High Commission had only changed its name;

2. The idea of a Eur army seemed to him to have been discarded in fact. If Ger were to have no right to build aircraft or to manufacture certain heavy weapons or to engage in atomic research, this implied discrimination and lack of trust. In any Eur army restrictions cld not be applied to one member which did not apply to the others. The concept of role Eur army meant equal standard for all. He felt that many Ger soldiers mistrusted the idea of a Eur army and that their mistrust wld be increased if one partner were exposed to greater dangers or subjected to greater limitation than others;

3. The failure of the draft to include the security guarantee was a serious omission since the Ger people cld never understand why they shld be obligated to contribute to the defense of Eur without obtaining an Allied undertaking to defend Ger. The declaration of the Foreign Mins of 1950 had been a unilateral declaration and cld be withdrawn unilaterally.⁴ It was hard to believe that the Allies in their other defense arrangements had made no commitments as to the extent of their reciprocal contributions. The omission of any such undertakings in this agreement gave further evidence of inequality;

4. Although he did not explain in any detail, he said that certain provisions of the draft were not consistent with the Schuman Plan and wld seriously imperil its ratification.

These four examples had given him reason to believe that the proposed draft only represented an amendment of the occupation statute with, it was true, some very marked concessions rather than the creation of a new relationship. Consequently, it wld be impossible for any Fed Govt to accept such a concept or the present draft. Adenauer added, however, that insofar as new arrangements provided for the maintenance of certain acts and legislation of High Commission, these did not appear to offer any serious difficulties. He made no mention of security provisions and Hallstein asked what had become of unilateral declaration or preservation of democracy which apparently they had expected and I gathered were willing to accept.

Chancellor explained his situation had been rendered more difficult by the attitude of Schumacher and of the Protestant leaders, who again Were arguing that the basic law prevents conscription for military service. In his opinion, the psychological state of the German people was bad, and that something must be done to restore their belief that the West looked forward to a partnership with Germany in the common interest. He said that if these documents become known to the public they wld be the best support that Grotewohl could obtain.

The Chancellor then formally re-submitted his draft security agreement and asked that this be taken as the basis for negotiation rather than the Allied draft.⁵

François-Poncet said that Chancellor had obviously misinterpreted certain portions of Allied draft, particularly as regards the authority of the Council of Ambassadors to intervene in conduct of foreign affairs. The Council was only empowered to act in matters of tripartite concern in the reserved fields. Also the inspectorate cld be a mixed group in which the Germans cld participate and its activities wld be strictly limited. As regards restrictions on heavy weapons, manufacture of aircraft, the Allies already believed some of these had been accepted, and had been suggested by Herr Blank.⁶

François-Poncet said that the Chancellor had implied his draft had not been sufficiently taken into account, but that if the Allied proposals were carefully examined it would be found that this was not the case. Many of his points had been included, and those which cld not be accepted by the Ministers had been explained in some detail in memorandum handed the Chancellor, notably as regards security guarantee and guarantee of economic assistance. It also seemed that the Chancellor considered termination of the Occupation Statute and the end of the High Commission with all that it implied meant nothing since they wld have gone anyway. In giving these up, however, the Allies felt that real concessions had been made to the Germans.

Kirkpatrick emphasized that the Ministers had desired to find a place for Germany in the European community which wld ensure her freedom and her equality. It might be that this principle had not been fully translated in the wording of the agreement. If, on the other hand, the Chancellor’s difficulties were limited to the four points that he had raised, Kirkpatrick was confident a solution cld be found. There was room for discussion of all of them. However, there were constitutional difficulties in other countries in connection with any undertaking to provide adequate troops, but even here the Allies had promised to examine the matter further with the Chancellor. The essential point was that this new relationship shld be judged calmly and it shld not hastily be concluded that the Ministers did not mean what they said in talking about equality. He and the Chairman agreed if there were cases in which this principle did not seem to have been applied, it wld be possible to re-examine them.

In conclusion I stated that no one cld doubt the interest of the three Ministers in bringing about European integration and in the integration of Europe they included Germany since without her there wld be no substance to integration.

I then explained at some length US difficulties with regard to any undertaking to station troops and pointed out that at present Germany had obtained more specific guarantee than had been given the NATO powers. I agreed that these issues required further discussion with the Chancellor, and explained that we too had psychological problems which cld only be increased by such statements as Schumacher’s which implied the peace of the world was something to be bargained with to improve Germany’s status.

I said we all fully realized the difficult problems of Germany’s psychology, but I was convinced that the force and logic of European integration wld develop and enable us to reach a common understanding. I said that if our draft convention cld not be signed by any German govt in its present form it was equally true that his draft of security agreement cld not possibly be signed in its present form by any Allied Govt. We were here to negotiate and agree on the method whereby Germany cld as an equal partner integrate itself with Western Europe.

We agreed in conclusion that it wld be preferable to have another meeting with the Chancellor after he had had further opportunity to consider the implication of our draft.

His reaction today was in my opinion based on a feeling that our draft did not fully recognize Germany as a partner mainly because of limitations on end weapons and research and lack of what he calls a reciprocal guarantee of security, but I believe that our subsequent explanations may to some extent have dispelled this first unfavorable impression; In making his report to Bundestag Foreign Affairs Comite this week, he has agreed to stress the fact that the Ministers have recognized that Germany will be accepted as an equal partner in a European defense community. He was obviously preoccupied by difficulties of the current political situation and the problem of obtaining unanimity of approach in answering the Grotewohl proposals. End message.

McCloy

1. This telegram, which was transmitted in two sections, was repeated to London and Paris.
2. The text of the memorandum (statement) is printed infra.
3. For the text of the draft agreement on general relations with the Federal Republic, see Enclosure A to WFM T–5a, p. 1209.
4. For the text of the Foreign Ministers security declaration on Germany, September, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, p. 1286.
5. For the text of Adenauer’s draft security agreement, see telegram 2026, August 31, p. 1520.
6. During the technical discussions held at Bonn concerning a German military contribution to Western defense. For documentation on these talks, see pp. 990 ff.