Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

762.00/9–2351: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret   priority

Frankfurt, September 23, 1951, 8 p. m.

2649. Eyes only Acheson and Byroade. It has become obvious since my return that negotiations to carry out Washington decisions² will be strongly influenced by reemergence issue of German unification.³ Cool analysis and action in connection this situation will be needed in coming weeks.

There is possibility that events, nurtured by Soviets, may push unification issue into forefront of German mind, with contractual arrangements and defense participation temporarily becoming secondary matters. There is no profit in telling Germans to take one or other because basic urge for unification is such that any opposition on our part to it would make it impossible for any German government to participate in any and all projects to integrate Western strength.

We must not of course get into position of bargaining for German support for our plans. At same time we must not permit Soviets to take leadership in unification issue. Our policy must be to convince Germans that realization of projects to integrate Germany with free world is only firm basis for later unification of Germany. This is complex and holds possibility that we may not be able to stick to original timetable and that our activities in next few weeks must be elastic. Insistence on immediate action on integration, without meeting unification issue, might destroy chances to achieve our fundamental policy.

My long, friendly talk with Reuter yesterday September 22 in Berlin emphasizes these points.⁴ It is well to keep in mind that Reuter recently had patched up some of his differences with Schumacher who supported Mayor other day in internal Berlin SPD controversy.

Renter believes we must take Grotewohl proposals⁵ seriously. At present he feels these actions have been primarily propaganda, but that there is likelihood Soviet, fearing German armament, may make bold unification proposals in coming weeks. Until they do, he favors Germans in Berlin and Bonn handling situation. Mayor said Germans recognize hollowness of Grotewohl proposals and his own quick, firm action in replying on Berlin phase of problem will be followed next Thursday in Bundestag when Bonn Government will lay down precise terms and answers for all German elections. Allies, Renter believes, should keep their powder dry, wait a few weeks and see what develops from East.

Nevertheless Renter emphasizes that German unification urge is such that if Soviet pushes we shall be facing serious problem. At present time he feels we should go forward with our timetable for integration with West, but we should recognize that events might interfere with that timetable. He admitted that, faced with serious choice between unification of Germany on democratic but neutral basis, and immediate integration into Western defense, German people would find it difficult not to choose unification. He made plea for patience and understanding on this point, emphasizing that reunited Germany would be stronger democratic Germany than present Bundesrepublik. Just as Berliners, who had been through fire in recent years, were strongest democrats in Germany, so would East Germans be firm and lasting democrats because their present experiences would make them for decades bulwark against Communism. Our goal should be, he said, not only to include West Germany but also East Germany into program of European integration.

I pointed out dangers of trying to have it both ways in Germany. American people were impatient for action. They had spent time, effort, money in trying to strengthen Europe, including Germany, so that there would be strength on continent to defend own freedoms. American people would be likely to misinterpret delay on Germany’s part at this late stage of proceedings. The Foreign Ministers had taken important decisions with regard to German sovereignty and German participation in defense. It was inconceivable that American people or other European peoples would be interested in defending Germany unless Germans were willing to make contribution to common defense. Just as important in total European program of inter-gration, I added, was Schuman plan.⁶ Germans must now give evidence of what side they were on. World, including America and Eisenhower, could not wait much longer for German decision. If Germans were now to delay, American reaction might be to wash hands of entire project and let Germans fend for themselves.

In short, I endeavored to point out the far-reaching significance (perhaps the collapse of the whole European defense system and consequently of US support) if real progress were not made this year. I reminded him that it was the sense of the growing strength of the US, as well as recent US policy, which has brought the Soviet to the point of making this offer. Germans must not dissociate themselves from that policy if they are to continue to be in a strong position in relation to the Soviet.

Reuter was evidently impressed with exposition. He repeated that he saw no reason why at present we should slow up program of integration. I pointed out that Schumacher was not exactly helpful. Reuter said Schumacher is beginning to recognize that there were limits he must not overstep in opposition to Allied plans. “I will do my best with him. Sometimes I can influence him a little though, to be sure, he will not change overnight”.

We discussed Schumacher’s antagonism toward French. Reuter replied that he too was suspicious of French in Berlin. I told him we had had recent assurances that French would take more liberal attitude toward Berlin-Bonn relationships, particularly in regard to adoption of Bonn laws in Berlin.⁷ Reuter declared that a more favorable attitude on part of French in Berlin would make a big difference and would also influence Schumacher.

Conversation with Reuter reemphasized the pull of German unification on Germans. Reuter admitted that neither he nor anybody had found way through complexity of situation. It is apparent however that we are heading into a period where careful thought will be needed in Washington and here.

In sum I am inclined to think we now confronted with the well-designed and planned reaction of the Soviet to the San Francisco and Washington decisions. Response in West Germany already indicates very careful preparation. I urge strongly that in view of the real delicacy this situation that no comments be made until we are sure we have uniform and solid position.

McCloy

1. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. For the texts of the decisions on Germany, taken at Washington by the three Western Foreign Ministers, see WFM T–5a, p. 1197, and footnotes thereto.
3. For further documentation on the U.S. position on the question of German unification, see pp. 1747 ff.
4. For further documentation on U.S. policy toward Berlin, see pp. 1828 ff.
5. Regarding the Grotewohl proposals of September 15 concerning the holding of all-German talks, see telegram 498, September 17, p. 1780.
6. For further documentation on the Schuman Plan, see volume iv .
7. The assurances under reference here have not been identified further. For documentation on the French position on Berlin, however, see pp. 1828 ff.