740.5/6–251: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State 1
Depto 1046. Met again with Icelandic legal rep Andersen this morning.2 He advises that in view of our assurances regarding intended meaning Article IX, section 8 of multilateral, Article 7(c) of bilateral and Article XI, section 4 of multilateral he is recommending to his govt that it sign multilateral and expects it will agree. Under circumstances we have given him our interpretations as follows:
- a.
- “It is view of US that first sentence of para 4 of Article 11 of draft agreement on status of NATO mil forces is to be interpreted to mean that reasonable quantities of provisions, supplies, and other goods may be imported free of duty whether they are for exclusive use of a force or its civilian component or of dependents, provided, however, that these duty-free imports shall not be available to civilian components and dependents if laws of receiving state bar their use by them. We believe provisions are complementary to those requiring observance of local laws. Present practice where our troops are in [Page 174] foreign countries is that no such restriction is applied to civilians. It is our understanding that this practice will be continued and that language, ‘Where such use is permitted’, concerns right of receiving state which wld only be applied in cases where privileges are being abused.”
- b.
- “There is textual difference between Article VII (c) of the Iceland-US agreement and Article IX, para 8, of multilateral agreement. US considers that latter provides that excise taxes, purchase taxes, sales taxes, etc., shall be applicable to local purchases by individuals. This is also implicit in Article VI (a) of bilateral agreement. Multilateral languages so far as bulk purchases for forces are concerned shld be read in connection with Article IX, para 2 (Article VI (b) of bilateral agreement), which provides for such purchases to be made thru channels of govt of receiving state. Under multilateral agreement such purchases will be made thru authorities which purchase for local armed services. We assume that such govt purchases are not taxed and that practice under multilateral agreement will be that described in Article VII, para 3 of bilateral.”
Hope you agree with these interpretations.
Andersen says that if Iceland signs multilateral it will expect exchange of notes to be made with US to effect that bilateral is still controlling between US and Iceland.
Icelandic rep also stated that if there was no objection there will probably be a delay in ratification by Iceland until any storm over signing has died down. Ratification by other signatory nations will probably take some time and therefore there shld be no objection to similar delay in Iceland.3
- Repeated for information to Paris and Reykjavik.↩
- Under consideration in this telegram was the possible Icelandic reservation to the draft agreement between the parties of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their armed forces; see the editorial note, p. 186. In telegram Depto 1033, May 31, Spofford reported that he had met with Icelandic Council Deputy Petursson and Icelandic Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Hans G. Andersen on May 31 regarding Iceland’s reasons for not wanting to sign the NATO status-of-forces agreement. The Icelandic representatives explained that the publicity attending the NATO status-of-forces agreement would cause political problems in Iceland. The Icelandic Parliament’s approval of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 was obtained because it was then argued that Icelandic bases would be provided to NATO only during hostilities. The United States-Iceland defense agreement of May 8, 1951, which provided NATO bases in Iceland to the United States prior to hostilities, had neither been published nor formally presented to Parliament. The Icelandic representatives also raised legal questions regarding the relationship between the United States-Iceland agreement of May 8, 1951, on status of personnel and the proposed NATO status-of-forces agreement (740.5/5–3151) Regarding the United States-Iceland agreements of 1951 under reference here, see volume iv .↩
- Telegram Todep 484, June 5, to London, expressed Department of State concurrence in the interpretations set forth in this telegram and approved the formula for Icelandic signature of the NATO status-of-armed-forces agreement set forth in the penultimate paragraph of this telegram (740.5/6–551). A few days later, Iceland agreed to sign the multilateral agreement in accordance with formula set forth here. Telegram 269, June 16, to Reykjavik, instructed that an appropriate note be addressed to the Icelandic Government before June 19 (740.5/6–1551).↩