Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/6–251: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret
niact

London, June 2, 1951—8 p. m.

Depto 1055. From Spofford and Achilles. Re Paris 7433.² We fully concur Jessup’s belief stress should be placed on fact NATO relationship is long range one basically broader in scope than mere defense alliance and that these aspects of NAT shld receive more emphasis.

Mere fact it shld seem necessary to assert “NAT will continue regardless of discussions or even agrmt with Soviet,” comes as something of shock and proves the point.

During Senate hearings and debate on NAT, Vandenburg repeatedly stressed these aspects³ and fact treaty’s importance transcended any temporary fluctuations in relations with Sov or any other country. Foreign Relations Comite report reflected this in its summary of reasons for recommending ratification of which sixth reads “(6) Treaty is in accordance with basic interests of US which shld be steadfastly served regardless of fluctuations in internatl situation or our relations with any country”.⁴ In present context we may refer to basic interests of all parties rather than to those of US alone. Foreign relations Comite’s fifteenth reason also applicable: “(15) Treaty is not confined to prevention of war but reflects will of participating nations to strengthen moral and material foundations of lasting peace and freedom.” Secy’s statement at signature NAT⁵ and his report to Congress, after May 1950 session of NAC⁶ also contain useful themes.

These broader aspects seem to us also to be important politically from point of view of public support both in US and in Europe. Their longer range appeal shld help to inspire confidence and hope and to develop willingness to make sacrifices necessary for defense effort. Several deps as well as US mission chiefs here for recent regional mtg⁷ stressed importance of this in practical terms of securing both political support and Parliamentary votes for specific def measures.

Stress on these aspects from viewpoints both of talks with Soviets and of public opinion seems particularly desirable at time we are advocating admission of Greece and Turk. We must expect Soviets to distort our advocacy of their admission in support their themes treaty is offensive and designed to secure bases near USSR and that our protestations of treaty’s “Atlantic” and defense character are eyewash. While hesitancy of Eurs to have Greece and Turk admitted has various, causes, it is unfortunately true that these are sensitive points in minds of some of our allies even in advance of any intensive Commie propaganda; drive. Eur willingness to admit Greece and Turk wld certainly be facilitated by clear evidence of continuing and growing US interest in strengthening North Atlantic community.

Importance which Eurs and we here attach to giving clear indication of intention to work in this direction is given in Depto 1045 May 30 (2567 to Paris) and Depto 887 May 5 (2222 to Paris).⁸

[ Achilles ]
Spofford

1. Repeated to Paris for Jessup, to Moscow, and to Frankfurt.
2. June 1, p. 172.
3. For documentation on this debate of July 1949, see Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., pp. 8812–9916.
4. See U.S. Congress Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 1st sess., North Atlantic Treaty Report, June 6, 1949 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949).
5. “Report of the Secretary of State to the President on North Atlantic Treaty,” made April 7 and released to the press April 12, 1949, printed in the Department of State Bulletin, April 24, 1949, p. 532.
6. Delivered on May 31 and released to the press on the same date, printed ibid., June 12, 1950, p. 931.
7. Meeting under reference not identified.
8. Neither printed.