762A.5/8–1051
The Minister in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State
Dear Dean: Having read your memo of July 13th on German rearmament and problems of the defense of Europe,1 and having seen also your letter to Morrison2 which I have delivered today, I am prompted to send you a few personal observations about British attitudes on this subject and to make a few suggestions that may be of some use in dealing with them. I feel that if we can get an understanding with them and an identical position, or at least a close one, that can be of real assistance in evolving a solution with the Germans and the French.
If we do not secure their cooperation, they may be a real obstacle to progress. As you know, they have set a leisurely pace regarding German rearmament. However, I believe their attitude is undergoing substantial change and that they are becoming more favorable to the European Army plan. I think we can get them in step with us and convince them that they should assume a more positive attitude in the coming negotiations.
The European Army scheme raises some major issues with the British in terms of their relations with us and with Western Europe. To anticipate possible misgivings, it would be useful to clear the air with them on the general question of Anglo-American relations and on our views on British relations with the Continent. I have in mind some explicit reassurances of our special relationship with them, and of the fact that we do not advocate their political merger with the Continent, along the lines set forth in the paper prepared for you on this subject (FM D B–16b3) for the meeting in London in May, 1950.4 This got bogged down somewhat but I believe its conclusions were valid then and are valid now. On the other hand, I think we should make it clear to them that, while recognizing that their global commitments and other considerations are such that they will not join the Schuman and Pleven plans, we do expect them to play an active role on the Continent and to work with us in attempting to obtain the realization of those plans; that their interest here is identical with our own. We should tell the British that their negative attitude has had a deadening effect, and that a change in their approach is essential if we are to crack this problem with the French and Germans.
[Page 1169]Up to now, it has appeared to the British that we have been following two roads toward German rearmament—a direct contribution to NATO and support for the European Army. This impression should now be dispelled by your letter to Morrison.
We should make clear to the British our firm conviction that the European Army must be an integral part of NATO and within its command structure. This is basic. There are already indications of potential British fears that the Continental combination which may result from the Schuman plan, Pleven’s proposal, etc. may threaten their interests. These fears should be mitigated if the European Army is fully integrated and bound up with NATO. Here again our interest and theirs is the same. In addition, the British will be wary of any situation which they feel might lead to a reduction of US force commitments in Europe. Therefore, we should make sure they understand that in our view the European Army would in no way diminish the commitments under or development of NATO but rather that it would provide a means for strengthening it on the Continent.
The fact that German rearmament has seemed to be pushed mainly by us, against the “better judgment” of others, has done us some damage in the UK. The Prime Minister, you will recall, had to back off somewhat last February under pressure from his back benchers. This damage may be hard to counteract and the same impression may be hard to avoid in the future. It might be useful to discuss this frankly with Morrison. More important, however, is the necessity for keeping the British fully informed of our thinking as it develops, and for letting them know well in advance prior to making major proposals in this field. Your letter to Morrison, a month prior to your meeting with him, is the kind of timing that should pay real dividends.
In the next few weeks we will do what we can here to explain to the Foreign Office the various factors motivating your letter and attempt to obtain as much agreement as possible before Morrison comes to Washington. His principal assistant will be Sir Pierson Dixon, one of the best in the Foreign Office, and I shall try to do as much missionary work with him as possible.
With warm regards,
Sincerely yours,
J. C. Holmes
- Presumably a reference to the memorandum of July 12 by the Secretary of State, p. 827.↩
- Not printed. This letter was the same in substance as that printed supra.↩
- For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 869–881.↩
- For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings at London, May 11–13, 1950, see ibid., pp. 828 ff.↩