Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

751.13/8–951

The Secretary of State to the French Foreign Minister ( Schuman )¹

secret

Washington , August 9, 1951.

Dear M. Schuman : I have been thinking a good deal about the range of problems we face jointly in integrating a Ger contribution into the defense of Eur and in establishing a new contractual relationship with the Ger FedRep.² We clearly ought to reach a common understanding as to how satisfactory solutions to these problems can be reached as quickly as possible. Accordingly, I am writing to you personally with a view to agreement upon a working program which will enable us to reach decisions on the various questions involved. In view of this purpose, I shall not attempt here to discuss detailed solutions to these problems since I believe this can be handled more satisfactorily through appropriate channels after we have agreed upon the general approach.

The urgency of these matters arises from their inseparable connection with building the defense of Western Eur. We all agree that our common plans for Western European defense will not be complete without a Ger contribution. We also agree, and recognized at Brussels, that a Ger contribution depends upon simultaneous progress in adjusting relations between the Western Occ Powers and the German Fed Rep. Nor is the immediate problem of defense the only reason for urgency. Both of the above matters bear directly upon the development of an integrated Europe, which depends to a great extent upon decisions soon to be made—the ratification of Schuman Plan³ and the success of the efforts now being made in Paris by European nations to establish a common defense community.⁴

Our approach to these problems has not been a static one. We have thought—and still think—that rapid progress toward European association within a developing Atlantic Community is essential to our common peace and prosperity, and to that of the whole free world. We have also thought—and still think—that urgent progress in realizing our common hopes for a concrete Ger contribution to Western defense is also essential. During the past year we have given full support to the development of a European defense force under the Atlantic umbrella as a long range concept to which all of our efforts shld be devoted. At the same time we have thought that the urgency of securing a German contribution to defense required an interim solution which wld allow Ger preparations to get under way in such a way as to be compatible with the longer range goal of establishing a truly European defense force.

We now see a real hope that these two objectives can be combined. The recent and striking progress made in the Paris conference on the establishment of a European defense community makes it possible that a German contribution can be obtained quickly through the establishment of a European defense force. General Eisenhower believes this can be done. We are prepared to act on the basis of this hope and possibility. We will give the fullest support to a program which wld combine the short range necessity of obtaining the German contribution quickly and the fulfillment of the long range concept of the establishment of a common defense force in Europe. We will do this vigorously if the European nations themselves approve this course, if they will promptly work out the military aspects satisfactorily to the NATO Military Comite and to SACEUR, and if they will complete the process in time to allow Germany’s contribution to become effective within the time schedule we have all agreed must be urgently met for the defense of Europe. For this reason we believe it essential that the full elaboration and final implementation of all the necessary administrative structures and political arrangements in connection with the European defense force would not be a condition precedent to the actual beginning of German defense preparations. We wld hope that agreement in the Paris conference, acceptable to NATO as a whole, could be reached this fall among the European nations participating at Paris which wld allow initial preparations in Germany to proceed pending the final and formal act of establishment of the European force. We believe such steps can be taken without prejudice to the security considerations, relative to Ger rearmament, which we all have in mind.

With these considerations in mind I turn to a plan for moving to rapid agreement on the new political relationship to be established between the Western Occupying Powers and the Ger FedRep. We agree, I think, that the progress made in this field must be equal to that made in the defense field. For a variety of reasons the three govts have been slow in this field and my present concern is that the completion of an agreement recording a basic change in our relations with the Fed Rep might in itself be a delaying factor in its entry into defense. The cumulative effect of recent world events and the present temper of German opinion make it not only necessary, but in our own interest, to put forward, simultaneously with the military solution, a political formula of a far-reaching nature. I also believe that we cannot ignore the effect in Germany of the forthcoming Peace Treaty with Japan.⁵

I suggest that in general the Germans shld be given full power to conduct their own affairs and that the powers we retain shld be determined solely by the fact that Germany is a divided nation confronted with a menace to its security beyond its own control. Our mission there shld be changed from one of ‘occupation’ of the territory of a defeated enemy to one of assistance to a partner who is freely contributing to our mutual defense. This will involve, as we have already agreed, abolishing the Occ Stat and the High Commission. Supreme authority would be retained in four fields only: (a) the right to station troops in Germany and to protect their security; (b) Berlin; (c) unification of Germany and a subsequent peace settlement; and (d) territorial questions. I believe we shld also begin to give thought now to the admission of Germany to NATO as a full member after she has obtained this new political status and final decisions have been taken on Germany’s defense contribution. By proceeding along these lines I believe there is a good chance of building a solid foundation for future German cooperation with Western Europe and the whole Atlantic community.

The High Commissioners are now working on a report to Governments on the results of their political conversations with the Germans.⁶ We should receive this report within a few days. The High Commission has done a great deal of essential work in exploring the numerous complex problems to be dealt with. But I am told that they will be unable to reach agreement on a substantial number of fundamental questions regarding Germany’s new status. Governmental agreement on these matters will clearly be necessary prior to final negotiations with the Federal Republic. So it seems to me that we should make this one of the primary subjects to be dealt with by the three Fon Mins when we meet here in Sept. I wld urge that we be prepared to reach tripartite agreement on these matters at that time. In view of the work schedule we all face this fall, the High Commission, after submitting their report, should continue to work together and with the Gers on certain matters which do not have to be reserved for our personal consideration in the conference in Wash.

In the light of what I have said, I suggest the following working program:

1. We shld each give urgent attention to the forthcoming High Commission report on their discussions with the Gers on contractual relations. We shld exchange views as soon as possible after study of their report, and do such other preparatory work as will enable us to reach tripartite agreement on all matters presented in their report when we meet in Sept.

2. Agreement reached in our tripartite discussions in Wash on Germany’s new status shld be sufficiently complete so that the High Commissioners cld subsequently conduct and conclude final negots with reps of the Ger Fed Rep. We shld do our best to give them a text of a basic agreement with the FedRep along broad lines susceptible of public understanding. We wld also, of course, discuss progress on defense arrangements with special emphasis on the accomplishments at that time of the Paris conference.

3. The three Fon Mins shld meet in Eur in late Oct before the mtg of the North Atlantic Council to reach final agreement on contractual relations. Sufficient progress shld have been attained in Germany so that the Ger Fon Min cld join our mtg. We shld aim for final four-power agreement then. By that date also, I hope that a completed treaty on the establishment of the European Defense Community wld have been signed by govts and be ready for submission to Parliaments. This wld allow the simultaneous submission in the German Bundestag of the final arrangements on both the political and military aspects of Germany’s association with the West. I am sure we all agree that this is essential. Both from our point of view and from the German point of view questions of political equality and military contribution must be finally considered and decided together.

4. At the mtg of the North Atlantic Council in late Oct in Rome, we shld endeavor to obtain final agreement on those aspects of the above arrangements which are within the competence of that body. At this mtg we wld make the appropriate formal disposition of the NATO action regarding a Ger contribution assigned to the three powers at Brussels and of the separate mission undertaken by European nations to plan for the formation of a European Defense Force. In other words, we shld aim for final agreement, acceptable to NATO as a whole, on the problem of the German Defense contribution at that time.

If some schedule along these lines seems possible to you, I suggest that we shld, for the present, postpone any formal action on the report recently received from the High Commission of their discussions with Ger representatives at Bonn on a Ger military contribution.

Such a schedule of work and accomplishment wld put us well on the road to a stabilization of the German problem and a major strengthening of our own defenses. In confining this letter to the subjects which I have discussed, I do not intend to limit the scope of our talks in Sept about which our reps will continue to consult.

I wld greatly appreciate receiving your views.

I am sending a similar letter to Mr. Morrison.⁷

Acheson

1. This message (in the form of a personal letter) was drafted by Secretary Acheson and Byroade; cleared also with Jessup, Matthews, and Bonbright; and transmitted to Paris in telegram 905, August 9, for delivery without delay to Schuman as an expression of Secretary Acheson’s views referred to in his message of August 3, supra. A copy was also sent to McCloy.
2. For documentation on the talks at Bonn concerning a new contractual relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, see pp. 1446 ff.
3. For documentation on the U.S. attitude toward the formation of a European Steel and Coal Community (Schuman Plan), see volume iv .
4. For documentation on the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community (European Army Conference), which opened in Paris on February 14, see pp. 755 ff.
5. For documentation concerning the signing of the treaty of peace with Japan, see vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.
6. Regarding the report of the High Commissioners to their Governments concerning their political talks with the West Germans during the spring and summer of 1951, see pp. 1446 ff.
7. Transmitted to London in telegram 894, August 9 (740.5/8–951).