Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/11–1651: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret priority

Washington, November 16, 1951—7:52 p. m.

2980. For Perkins, Byroade and MacArthur from State.

1. Realize under current circumstances most decisions respect NATO–EDF–German complex of problems must be made in Europe. However think certain observations from here on recent developments may be useful from this more distant vantage-point.

2. Assume in fol comments that US position continues to be that agreed on in preparation for Sept Tripartite talks² and conveyed during those talks, namely full support for Ger contribution to Western defense through EDF provided practical EDF arrangement within NATO framework can be worked out in reasonable period of time.

3. There appears to be mounting area of disagreement as Fr raise crucial issues involved in full development their EDC concept which from here appears to follow middle line described in Rome 2127 (rptd Paris 243³) by Itals as impractical. Belgs have had serious second thoughts (see esp Paris 2602, rptd London 658;⁴ Paris 2883 rptd London 767⁵) as have at least some of Dutch. Have some doubts whether Itals prepared stay in den alone with Fr and Gers. Moreover these developments along with Fr spell-out of proposed transitional arrangements have created new difficulties for Gers, partly attributable to violation of their, on the whole not unreasonable, definition of “equality”. Suspect Alphand’s reported difficulties with Chamber comite may also arise from Fr “middle” course. (See last para Depto 609, rptd Paris 1032.⁶) Thus appear to be facing serious delays if not possible breakdown of proposal. We have no good alternative salable to Fr and Gers.

4. While action at Rome appears to us difficult if not impossible (see Todep 317 rptd Paris 2799⁷), would for many reasons be bad if action not possible at suggested Jan mtg. By then Ger talks generally shld be well along and further delay for EDF undesirable. Also important have some kind of decision on Germany for US MSP presentation. Suggest therefore that time may have come to pursue with Schuman question of how EDF agreement can be reached meet this new delayed time sched. So far as basic issues are with EDC aspects, rather than EDF, it may be time indicate, along lines which do not seem to us to be inconsistent with Schuman-Acheson conversations in Sept, that choice looks to us as likely to be between EDF with only general reference to future development of EDC (alternative three of Rome 2127) or necessity, as understood all along, of getting German contribution made through other means than EDF in order meet time table for Western rearmament.

5. Realize this approach does not cover EDF–NATO problem which we still think must be approached within framework of considerations contained in separate airgram this subj, revising draft carried to Paris by Laukhuff.⁸

Webb

1. This telegram, which was drafted by European Regional Affairs Director Martin, was cleared by German Political Affairs Deputy Director Calhoun and was repeated to London for Ambassador Spofford.
2. Regarding the meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in Washington in September, see the editorial note, p. 882.
3. Of November 13, p. 916.
4. Of November 2, p. 911.
5. Dated November 14, p. 919.
6. Dated November 13, p. 917.
7. Not printed, but see footnote 2, ibid.
8. Draft under reference here is not further identified.