Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/11–1351: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret priority

Washington, November 16, 1951—7:26 p. m.

2979. For Perkins, Byroade and MacArthur from State.

1. With respect to discussion of automatic nature NATO action in para 3 of Depto 609² Alphand assumptions not accurate with respect to SHAPE recommendations now being considered by SG. Separate message this subj being sent Spofford and Perkins. Under SHAPE procedure clearly might be deliberate polit decisions which wld control action of NATO forces including EDF. Germany wld have no voice in these decisions until full member NATO, as Ger veto through EDC impossible, as was apparently recognized.

2. Though of course tighter than NATO arrangement, formula proposed by UK for inclusion in EDC (Depto 609) seems suitable language to prevent use of EDF without NAT approval but does not insure that Gers committed if attack is on non-EDF NATO country. Alphand reply is unresponsive, referring to SHAPE getting instrs from “one source” but not to EDF doing so. With respect to request for Wash views, in this as so many these issues we are involved in exploring tortuous Rube Goldberg devices as substitute for simple solution of immed NAT membership for Germany. Cannot go much beyond message brought by Laukhoff to Perkins and pouched Nov 16 in revised form³ to reflect S/P and Ger views.

3. We have just received Depto 631, rptd Paris 1076,⁴ which seems to represent an advance over UK suggestion in Depto 609, rptd Paris 1032, in that it meets our objection cited above. It, however, still does not get around our comment that Ger wld have no voice in the decision.

Webb

1. This telegram, which was drafted by Martin and cleared by Calhoun, was repeated to London for Ambassador Spofford.
2. Dated November 13, p. 917.
3. Not further identified.
4. Dated November 16, from London, not printed. It reported that the British had advised the French of their thinking on the question raised by Alphand as to the possible EDC–NATO guarantees. Although generally reserving their position pending further information on the European Defense Community, the British expressed a preference for an EDC treaty commitment to regard any attack on any NATO member as an attack on the EDC and a reciprocal NATO commitment, perhaps in additional treaty protocol, including the German Federal Republic in the area covered by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (740.5/11–1651)