Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/7–1951: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret
priority

Paris, July 19, 1951—1 p. m.

391. From Bruce for the Secretary only. No distribution except as he directs. Copy sent to Gen Eisenhower.

1. McCloy and I had joint discussion in Paris on July 17 with Gen Eisenhower and others on subj of Eur defense force (EDF). We found we had both recd your memo of July 13² for comment. Since we reached same views on this subj we have prepared this joint reply.

2. Your memo (paras 1 to 26) contains what we consider to be accurate analysis of situation subj to comments below relevant to your paras 9 and 15.

3. We also agree with your view that constructive solution must come through Eur army. In order to break present stalemate, we are convinced, however, that it will not be sufficient to set creation of its institutions as future goal, but that their basic structure must be settled and agreed and in course of being created in definitive form. We believe that this can be done in way to avoid delay in completing treaty and to achieve German contribution speedily. Our reasons for this conclusion are set out below.

4. Fed Govt cannot recruit any soldiers until Ger constitution amended to authorize such action. This will require two-thirds majority in Bundestag. Moreover, Adenauer has repeatedly stated he cannot seek Bundestag action on mil contribution unless support of very large part of Bundestag is assured. To get such vote over probable sharpshooting of Schumacher, it will be necessary to present issue to Bundestag in way creating greatest popular appeal. Strongest inducement wld be package combining contractual agreement granting new status replacing occupation statute and high commission and treaty creating EDF. This wld appeal to (a) desire for substantial pol equality; (b) strong sentiment for creating Eur community; and (c) desire to establish effective defense further east. Any partial or piecemeal proposal can be attacked strongly by SPD and can hardly have required popular appeal.

5. French will clearly not agree to requisite change in German status or to Ger contribution without bitter opposition and costly delay unless EDF institutions are in process of actual creation and Ger contribution is within treaty framework. Interim treaty merely combining armies in field with agreement to work out Eur defense institutions in future will in all probability not be acceptable to Fr. This does not mean that treaty must contain details of solutions for all problems, but it must at least create institutions and empower them to develop solutions within terms of treaty.

6. Consequently there is no tentative or interim solution which will result in recruitment of a Ger soldier because it cld not meet these essential conditions. Unless Bundestag has before it solemn undertakings spelling out in substantial detail changed status and basic form of Eur army within which Ger soldiers will serve, Bundestag will not (a) pass constitutional amendment or (b) vote defense participation.

7. For these reasons we are convinced that most practical and swiftest road to our objective is by working to complete basic treaty for EDF in shortest possible time. We shld use every influence and all appropriate pressures to get Freneh-Ger agreement promptly on suitable treaty, creating Eur institutions and agencies with adequate powers to solve detailed problems and fixing basic principles to guide their solution. Conference is now actively considering proposals based on this concept. This wld permit progressive solution to problems of finance, production and admin much as you suggest. Under these proposals, treaty wld provide that Eur def comm wld act initially through existing defense agencies on regional basis but progressively take over discharge of full responsibilities regarding admin, common budget, and common procurement as rapidly as feasible.

8. By adopting this approach it shld be possible to complete treaty in final form for submission to parliaments by about same time as agreement on contractual relations will be ready for Bundestag ratification. This timetable presupposes full support from US Govt and active participation on part of US officials in deliberations of EDF conference as well as continuous advice and guidance from Gen Eisenhower. Fr and Ger officials are urging this course. Conference has already, on Fr initiative, adopted all mil suggestions thus far made by SHAPE. Size of units yet to be worked out but believe Fr will change their position to one acceptable to SHAPE. Conference is taking steps to obtain further SHAPE guidance. This procedure shld ensure practical mil solutions thoroughly agreeable to Gen Eisenhower. Fr officials have been made aware that support of United States and Gen Eisenhower hinges upon their giving an earnest of determination for speed and mil effectiveness.

9. In view of fact that Gers cannot recruit in any case until basis had been laid for constitutional amendment, we shld concentrate on means of shortening time thereafter for required recruiting and training of Ger-speaking recruits. On basis of discussions here, we believe it will be possible to accompany treaty by convention providing for training of recruits by SHAPE (and its subordinate structure) and existing defense agencies under delegated authority from EDF during an interim period until EDF agencies become operative and can progressively assume this function. Ger will need agency to handle recruitment and other matters which are to be on natl basis in all countries and to carry out certain admin and supply functions under delegation from EDF while common Eur institutions are getting under way. Useful work might be undertaken soon to prepare for this agency. Above procedures will avoid delay in recruiting and training of Gers and will meet Ger demand for no discrimination even during initial period of EDF.

10. We have in mind time schedule which wld permit consideration of both mil and pol parts of package by FM at 15 Sept mtg. Present schedule provides that AHC report on contractual relations wld be sent to governments not later than 15 Aug. Report will indicate basis areas of agreement and matters of disagreement which mins will have to resolve.

Interim report of Paris EDF conference shld be completed within next week and submitted to govts. Report shld represent constructive basis for settlement of mil problems. This wld permit joint consideration of Bonn and Paris reports.

By time of FM mtg Paris EDF conference shld have under consideration draft treaty. By having FM thus consider mil and polit parts of package together at 15 Sept mtg, we shld obtain maximum Fr cooperation in working out acceptable contractual arrangements and in resolving other outstanding issues.

11. The above program seems to us soundest route to our objectives. Moreover, while we are fully aware of polit pressure at home for getting on with Eur defense and Ger contribution, we believe this program, if fully explained, wld be understood and supported by Amer public for several reasons:

(a) Ger contribution will be obtained as quickly as is possible and within framework offering greatest safeguards against Ger militarism in future;

(b) Eur central agencies wld greatly facilitate task of creating effective defense force for West Eur, mobilizing its econ resources for defense, and ensuring most efficient use of Amer mil assistance in building such defense;

(c) This wld further, perhaps decisively, Eur polit integration and help to overcome Amer impression of Eur weakness and confusion.

Bruce

1. An identical telegram, mutatis mutandis, was sent to the Secretary of State as telegram 529, July 19, from Frankfurt from McCloy. A memorandum of July 19 by Jessup, not printed, records a discussion in the Secretary of State’s office on this telegram as follows:

   “The Secretary said that we could not tie ourselves absolutely to the European Defense Force concept. Our position should be that if the Europeans can work out this plan and get a treaty so that decisions can be made in September we’re for it. When the treaty is signed and the Contractual Agreement with Germany is agreed upon, Germany would go ahead with action in the Bundestag on the constitutional amendment and then proceed to raise troops and if the treaty was not ratified that would be the fault of Europe.” (740.5/7–1951)

2. The reference here is presumably to the memorandum by the Secretary of State as revised by Jessup, July 12, p. 827.