762A.5/7–1651
Memorandum by the Secretary of State
This morning we had a meeting at the Pentagon on my memorandum entitled German Rearmament and Problems of the Defense of Europe.1 Messrs. Jessup and Matthews attended with me. General Marshall had [Page 837] with him Mr. Lovett, General Bradley, Frank Nash and Colonel Beebe.
I reviewed the problem of the memorandum, which was to find a method of making progress on European rearmament which would renconcile the French, German and United States points of view. The concept of the European army or the European defense force seemed to furnish such a possibility. I stressed the importance of going forward simultaneously with the European defense force idea, the restoration of German sovereignty, and the raising of German troops. The discussion lasted approximately an hour, much of it devoted to clarifying possible misunderstandings.
Mr. Jessup read a telegram received this morning reporting the latest decisions of the Steering Committee of the European defense force talks in Paris.2 General Marshall read views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by General Eisenhower on the earlier telegram along these lines.3
The principal concerns of the Defense representatives were: First, To get as early a start as possible on the raising of German forces. They believed this was essential to continuing Congressional support of MDAP. Second, they did not wish a European Army to interfere in any way with the organization and management of General Eisenhower’s forces. The recent telegram from Paris seemed to meet many of their fears in this regard. Third, they stressed the importance of our not being trapped into a position where we would have accepted the European army as a step which must precede any other action, thereby depriving ourselves of any freedom of action and putting ourselves entirely in the hands of the French.
After discussing all of these factors fully it was decided that as soon as I had heard from Mr. McCloy and Ambassador Bruce I was to prepare a paper stating proposed US policy for discussion with Defense and later submission to the President. There seemed to be general agreement that this paper should be for internal US guidance and not to give to foreign governments. There seemed to be at least tentative agreement that the policy recommended might be to give the French and British a draft contractual agreement with Germany and plan for beginning the recruitment of Germans and to propose to them that we be prepared to discuss and settle the three matters either before the next NATO meeting or before the General Assembly, but in no [Page 838] event later than November 1. The three matters should be some sort of an agreement on a European defense force which would not necessarily be complete in all political and economic details but would be subject to reaching agreement on the latter two. These two should be the contractual arrangement with Germany and the plan for raising German contingents as soon as possible.
Our general attitude should be that we would be prepared to take these up simultaneously provided agreement could be reached by the date mentioned. If this were not agreed to, we would not be committed to wait on either of the other two for final conclusion of the European defense force talks.
The next step is for us to agree upon such a paper and then to present it to Defense and attempt as soon as possible to lay an agreed paper before the President.4
- Under reference here is the memorandum by the Secretary of State as revised by Ambassador at Large Jessup, July 12, p. 827.↩
- The reference here is presumably to telegram 289, July 15, from Paris, not printed, which reported that the Steering Committee of the European Army Conference had made appreciable progress in two meetings on July 13. The Committee had agreed to substitute the words “European defense forces” for “European Army,” that General Eisenhower would have full power to organize and deploy European units as required by any military situation, and that the views of General Eisenhower would be duly taken into consideration before the Conference reached military conclusions. (740.5/7–1551)↩
- For General Eisenhower’s views, see telegram 131, July 7, from Paris, p. 820.↩
- For the joint memorandum of July 30 by Secretary Acheson and Acting Secretary of Defense Lovett and approved by President Truman on that day, which eventuated from the agreement recorded here, see p. 849. Regarding the preparation and approval of that joint memorandum, see the editorial note, p. 847.↩