740.5/7–1651: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
347. 9. We have meanwhile received various tels whose full discussion of problem furnish most useful contribution to its solution (Paris 25 July 3, rptd London 4, Fkft 3; Paris 130, 131, 132 July 7, rptd London 24, 25, 26, Fkft 13, 14, 15; London’s Depto 35, rptd Paris 49, Fkft 21). We still awaiting Gifford’s reaction.
[Page 835]10. Without undertaking point-by-point discussion of tels, we wish to comment on certain basic points. This comment is FYI and not to be passed on to Fr or Brit in its specific points at this time. Thus, fundamental issues are raised by statement in opening sentence of para 2 Paris 25 that Ger contribution to defense outside Eur Defense Forces framework will be serious blow to our objectives. This wld only seem to be true on two assumptions, first, that such contribution wld preclude later working out of Eur Defense Forces idea, and second, that US participation in NATO defense plans will terminate at some indefinite time in future. As pointed out in paras 3 and 5 above, whole tenor of Deptel 7155 June 28 was to effect that we wld hope for ultimate success of Eur Defense Forces plan. We wld have thought US attitude of support for this plan had been made sufficiently clear to everybody beginning with Secy’s ltr to Schuman dated Dec 20.2 As for second assumption, we think long-term interests of US will be best served not alone by development of Eur Army but by policy of permanent association with other nations in defense scheme for Atlantic area. We cannot be sure that western Europeans are sufficiently strong by themselves to outweigh Ger influence in future Eur Defense Forces. We thoroughly subscribe to views in para 3 of London’s Depto 35.
11. There appears to be an increasing tendency to disregard the long-range problem of development of cooperation both in milit and other fields in the Atlantic Community, and to treat Eur integration and a Eur Army as final solutions for all problems including that of security against Ger. This is a dangerous tendency and we think it ought to be checked both in our own long-range interests and in the interest of bringing about more widespread Eur support for the idea of Eur integration, including Eur Defense Forces. Dutch, for example, are opposed to a Eur Army precisely because they fear it will expose them to Fr leadership (which they dislike) or to possible future domination by Ger or other unknown forces, unless closely tied in with the US and Brit in the North Atlantic Community. To be successful, our influence in favor of Eur Defense Forces must be combined with reassurances of active interest in the expansion and making permanent of North Atlantic cooperation.
12. We readily recognize delays inherent in producing Ger troops for contribution to NATO force whether along lines our 7155 or otherwise and our latest thinking here with regard to polit difficulties is that solution can and shld be found much earlier than Paris anticipates. On other hand our feeling has been that not only are some delay factors operative in case of Eur Defense Forces plan (e.g. necessity of completing contractual arrangements, etc.) but in addition there wld be delays attendant upon solution of most difficult polit problems surrounding [Page 836] estab of common finan contributions, common training programs, common defense org, etc. Until these questions are solved, a Eur Defense Force is such in name only and does not go beyond what we suggested wld be possible under NATO org in our 7155.
13. We have particular difficulty in understanding precisely what scheme Paris has in mind under para 12 of its tel 25. Apparently SHAPE feels it shld not become involved in basic training of raw recruits, if we understand correctly para 3, Paris 131, and paras 2 and 4, Paris 130. Accordingly do not see how estab Ger recruiting and basic training org cld be avoided unless all Ger contribution is to be held up until Eur Defense org is agreed and set up as going concern. It is hard to see how Ger demands for equality are met by Paris’ proposal and we wld welcome amplification of views on this point.
14. Dept wishes to emphasize it is wholly prepared support two points Eisenhower makes in para 1 of Paris 130. We also like and have adopted throughout this Section, Eisenhower’s suggestion of substituting “Eur Defense Forces” for “Eur Army”. This strengthens point we make in paras 10 and 11 above.
15. Essence of Dept’s attitude (and this can be passed on to Fr and Brit) is that this whole problem must continue to be approached with open mind and that it is not necessary at this time to make choice as between the Petersberg and Paris reports. We believe soundest decision will be reached if we consider both of these reports on their merits and try to find, as we go along, answers to many problems which reftels usefully point out. We simply do not know on basis of any info now before us the practical answers to most important aspects of Eur Defense org. It is for this reason that we adhere to views expressed in first Section of this tel and believe it desirable to continue to press for earliest consideration of Bonn and Paris reports. We hope that you will be able to persuade Fr to agree to expedite this consideration as only way of determining what is most satis solution to problem from practical and polit viewpoint.
- This telegram, which was also sent to London as 327 and was repeated for information to Frankfurt as 407 and to Bonn as 28, was drafted by Laukhuff of GER/GPA and was cleared by Matthews, Perkins, Cabot of S/ISA, and Knight and Martin of EUR/RA. This is section two of a two-section telegram. Section one (telegram 346 to Paris) is printed supra.↩
- Regarding the Secretary’s letter of December 20, 1950, see his letter of January 27, to Foreign Minister Schuman, p. 759.↩