Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5 MAP/10–1951: Telegram

The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)¹

secret
priority

Paris, October 19, 1951—5 p. m.

Repto 5257. ToISA.

Subj: Division of US aid for 1951–1952 and related “burden-sharing” decisions.

1. We are convinced that total NATO position will be better from US standpoint if 1951–1952 division of US aid can be carried out predominantly in multilateral framework, and in conjunction with other “burden-sharing” decisions, especially re Belg. Main reasons are (a) that US has previously invited multilateral recommendations re distribution of aid, especially in its sponsorship of WG–12 and FEB, and in its endorsement of FEB recommendations at Ottawa; (b) that US position in TCC will be improved if we now demonstrate clearly our intention to deal multilaterally; and (c) most important, our sincere desire to treat common problems on a multilateral basis whenever possible.

2. We realize Wash is proceeding with plans for bilateral discussions. However, believe that with timing appropriate to problems raised by TCC operation, and with careful staff preparation, we can get much better results from US standpoint by combination bilateral and multilateral approaches as developed below.

3. Our main concern about multilateral consideration at this time has been that reopening 1952 aid question in FEB within next few weeks wld have depressing effect on TCC operation. This because under present circumstances each Eur country’s presentation to FEB will probably be a recital of weaknesses designed to show need for US aid proportionately greater than that of any other country. For this reason, we have concluded that multilateral discussions shld not now take place. Furthermore, personnel, both Eur and US, for FEB exercise wld be required for next few weeks for TCC operation.

4. There wld be also good reasons for delaying purely bilateral as alternative to multilateral negotiations:

(a) Chief one is that US position not yet clear on such crucial questions as amount of economic aid available; substitutability (if any) by countries between economic and end-item aid; criteria for, and amount of, offshore purchases; negotiation objectives re intra-Eur aid; Canadian aid.

(b) Of almost equal importance is confusion which wld result from simultaneous discussions in TCC and in country capitals of questions re magnitude of effort and levels of aid. Realize these questions can be logically separate—i.e., TCC applies to long-term whereas country negotiations wld deal with 1952 only—but believe almost inevitably there wld be serious conflicts.

(c) TCC decisions will probably have some influence on 1951/1952 “burden-sharing”.

(d) Data submitted to TCC, especially on rate of actual expenditures, will have important bearing on US 1951/1952 decisions.

5. It appears to us that all above objections wld disappear if we decided to have multilateral consideration by FEB, but postpone this until TCC operation has reached point where there is community of opinion (not necessarily with specific agreement) on (a) general magnitude of mil job to be done and (b) limited extent to which US itself can be expected to fill financial gap (we assume, of course, that US position can be clarified by then). We now tentatively set such time as Nov 15–19 after TCC has completed country examinations and has SCC report.

6. Believe, therefore, we can safely put 1951–1952 questions to FEB on about Nov 19, setting Dec 2 or 9 as deadline for FEB recommendations to US. If as late as mid-Nov it appears that TCC operations are off schedule, we can move FEB dates forward.

7. Realize that some bilateral approach will serve US interests, not only in helping to meet commitments to some countries (e.g., Fr and Italy) but also in arriving at general areas of agreement. Recommend beginning bilateral discussions in country capitals as soon as we are ready. These discussions wld have limited objective of informing the individual countries:

(a) Of our intention to have multilateral negotiations re distribution of US aid and of our hope that multilateral decisions will be reached which we can follow in consistency with our statutory and policy obligations;

(b) To make clear to each country the general objectives of the US aid program with respect to that country;

(c) Inform each country of our thinking (based on our best current analysis of their presently known programs and those submitted to TCC) re estimated dol receipts from US mil, infrastructure, receipts from off-shore purchases, and our thoughts as to allocation of direct economic aid and general levels of mil expenditures with which they are associated;

All of above to be carefully hedged by repeated refs to point (a) above.

(d) To get fullest possible understanding of countries’ problems and attitudes.

8. Between now and about Nov 15 we shld firm up US positions which now appear to us to be somewhat unclear (see para 3(a)). Consider it extremely important from our standpoint that US enter multilateral discussions with very clear notions as to US objectives and limits both in TCC and re 1952 division of aid and burden-sharing.

9. This message not concerned with those continuing bilateral discussions and negotiations which relate to our continuing responsibility to see that US contribution is provided in full accordance with US objectives and policies.

10. US dep, please comment.²

Porter

1. Repeated to London.
2. In telegram Depto 485 from London, October 20, Spofford endorsed the general approach outlined in the source text and agreed that the “firm US drive behind TCC as multilateral method for reconciling mil requirements with politico-econ capabilities wld seem to be somewhat contradicted if we concurrently acted only bilaterally in allocating [19]52 aid.” (740.5/10–2051)