740.5/10–1751: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State 1
Depto 465. North Atlantic community WG2 today had free informal discussion of coordination of foreign policy with Bryn leading discussion at Chairman’s request. Discussion followed 3 headings: (1) Scope, (2) machinery and (3) Lange’s suggestion at Ottawa that Parliaments be associated in some way with NATO.
Bryn felt present pooling of military forces made high degree of political coordination necessary. Interests of most members outside North Atlantic area and preoccupation of all with Soviet policy, intentions, and actions made it difficult to fix geographical limit and primary criteria as to appropriateness of subjects shld be degree of common concern. Fol points were made in ensuing discussion: NATO shld avoid infringement on UN jurisdiction although common policies and action in support of UN purposes and principles cld help UN. Larger powers might feel smaller were seeking to limit their freedom if range of topics too wide. Greater powers had widest range of responsibilities but most members had particular interest in one [Page 322] or another problem. Countries, whether large or small, with most direct interest in particular problem shld take lead in proposing it and in ensuing consideration. Most topics wld probably relate in some way to Soviet threat but development of North Atlantic community in non-military fields might lead to possible discussion of policies within community, not merely negative in sense of seeking to avoid or remove difficulties between members but in positive sense of promoting stability and well-being. It was consensus that Ministers shld not attempt precisely to define scope of matters for coordination but that criteria shld include importance to objectives of NAT, degree of common concern, and likelihood of need for agreed action. It was also recognized that while this subj was included in terms of reference of committee of five, it was also included in Deps terms of reference and already in process of development. Accordingly Deps shld continue to develop it currently and comite of five might be able to report at Home on concrete action taken as well as proposals for future.
On machinery, it was agreed that the Deps shld be regular primary instrument but that Council shld play important role and diplomatic and other channels shld also be used.
Fol points were made: Maximum objective was such harmonization of policies and such common action as wld best serve common interest. Minimum objective was to assure that action or policy by one did not adversely affect common interest. All available means shld be used to this end, primarily Council and Deps, but members govts shld also make conscious effort to consult other partners through diplomatic channels as appropriate in order to facilitate coordinated policy and action. Since degree of interest of members in particular questions wld vary widely, it might be desirable for those most directly interested to consult among themselves through any channel, at any time in process. At same time undue degree of prior agreement (such as in Big Three mtgs results of which others learned from press) shld be avoided. Objective was solidarity of all twelve and this required that all concerned be at least kept informed. Spirit of teamwork which Deps had developed was valuable, and they and initial staff shld be utilized to present for consideration by govts agreed presentation of particular problems, facts, and issues involved.
Belg raised question of whether comite of five shld not merely be made permanent but given task of substantive preparation for Council mtgs. All others objected on grounds this was Deps task and composition of comite of five unsuitable. It was agreed that while comite report shld include recommendation as to its future existence, terms of ref and composition, possibility of its use in substantive preparation for Council shld be raised only as query.
In introducing question of associating Parliaments with NAT, Bryn stated his govt had nothing specific in mind but felt strongly necessity [Page 323] for parliamentary and public support for NATO objectives, policies, and decisions, and had noticed in its own Parliament marked difference in attitude between those reps who had been at Strasbourg or otherwise participated in mtgs with foreign reps as compared to those members of Parliament who had not. Two possibilities were: (1) Inclusion of Parliamentarians on Council delegations as was done with UN delegations or (2) something like Council of Eur. On first, he felt present size of Council required streamlining of procedures and enlargement of delegations shld accordingly not present such problem. He believed this question shld be brought before Council at Rome although it might well not be answered there.
Fol points made in discussion: Duplication of, or adverse effects on, Council of Eur shld be avoided. NATO was a governmental rather than parliamentary org. Educational effect on Parliamentarians of travel and discussion with foreigners undeniable as in case of recent Eur visits from US Senate and House. Council of Eur might, following association of US and Canadian Parliaments, become Council of North Atlantic area.
Some form of North Atlantic interparliamentary association or ad hoc mtgs of Parliamentarians might be practical. Substantive discussion by Parliamentarians at Council of Eur was irresponsible and often ill informed. NATO’s work was diplomatic and technical and Parliamentarians wld make decisions more difficult. Parliamentarians were tending increasingly to infringe on proper functions of executive in foreign policy and this shld be resisted. Ministers shld conduct foreign policy and keep their Parliaments informed. On other hand, NATO ministerial decisions were not enough without parliamentary and public support. Governmental systems varied widely. US and Neth Ministers were not parliamentarians. Most Belg and some Nor Ministers were.
Council of Eur had advantages of educational effect and stimulation of idea of unity but disadvantage of irresponsibility and lack of competence. Problem for NATO was to secure advantages without disadvantages. This in turn created problem of securing parliamentary support without impeding proper ministerial freedom of decision. It was agreed that this was one problem which merited discussion and wld obviously require further careful study by WG, comite of five and Council.
At conclusion Bryn stated that since he wld be away for next week, he wld like to go beyond topic of today’s discussion. He said problem was not merely one of coordination of policy but of developing effective common action. In long run this wld require institutional changes. Stikker had spoken at Ottawa of Atlantic federation as something which was obviously not for today but which shld not be excluded as [Page 324] possible future objective. Nor, from point of view of geography and interests, considered Atlantic framework in which it, UK, US, and Canada all participated on equal footing most suitable framework for development of closer association between it and other countries. This was view of Nor Parliament as well as govt and Nor wld be prepared to go at least as far and as fast as majority of NATO members.
- Repeated to Paris.↩
- The Working Group of the Committee on the North Atlantic Community held its organizational meeting on October 16 in London; a record of this meeting is contained in telegram Depto 462 from London, October 16 (740.5/10–1651). The committee was a result of a decision made at the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on September 20 which established a Ministerial Committee to study the future development of the North Atlantic Community. This resolution can be found in telegram Secto 29 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 687.↩