Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

CFM files, lot M–88, box 159, Ottawa NAC mtg, NATO Council Documents

Report by the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies (Spofford) to the North Atlantic Council ¹

secret
C7–D/3

Ottawa, 14 September 1951.

Report by Chairman, Council Deputies

Introduction

1. The Council has received progress reports from the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board, the Financial and Economic Board, and the Standing Group, to which is attached a report from General Eisenhower.² My purpose in adding a further short report is to set forth certain general comments on the relationships between present planning and proposed action within the various Treaty bodies and to make certain suggestions which may assist the Council and the subordinate Treaty agencies in dealing with the pressing problems faced by the Organization. In making this report as Chairman of the Council Deputies, I am speaking as the individual designated by the Council to be “responsible for directing the Organization and its work”, and the comments made below represent my judgment in that capacity. Therefore, my report has been shown to the Council Deputies but their specific approval was not asked, and it does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Deputies.

Major issues now before the Council

2. After an interval of 9 months since the Brussels meeting,³ the Council will now meet twice within a short time. In terms of major issues, these two meetings can be vitally important in the development of NATO and for the completion of effective arrangements for the defence of the West. Since the Brussels meeting the Treaty Organization has taken more permanent form with the setting up of the DPB, the FEB, and the creation of SHAPE, the principal military command. While these new agencies have been in existence for only a few months, they have nevertheless been able to focus on the major problems facing them. The first reports of the DPB and FEB, now before the Council, present essential factual data which is now, for the first time, available on a multilateral basis for NAT planning and action. While much of the data is tentative and subject to further refinement, the reports contain factual background on various segments of the problems facing the NAT agencies to serve as a basis for the Council to guide its further action.

3. The reports also point up what is to my mind the principal most urgent task facing NATO if planning to date and the future course of its action is to be translated into effective collective defense. Reference to the reports of the Standing Group, the Defense Production Board and the FEB, in so far as they relate to the force problem, the production problem and the resultant financial and economic problems, will serve to illustrate the point.

4. In each of these fields, there are two related but distinct problems: first, the determination of fully agreed overall requirements as to levels of manpower, material and finance needed; and, second, the allocation among the Treaty members of the tasks of meeting these agreed requirements. While the reports before the Council now show progress on both points. Treaty planning to date has not yet developed a clear definition of the full and coordinate problems, let alone provided a basis for adequate solutions to them.

Force Requirements and Commitments

5. While there will be no recommendations for dealing with the forces problem before the Council at Ottawa, the Standing Group states that it is developing recommendations, to be ready for the Rome meeting, which will set forth the military estimate of the full force requirements, in the light of the revisions of DC 28 suggested by SHAPE. These recommendations, in addition to indicating the general measure of the force requirements, will contain recommended allocations among member governments of the forces “gap”. The Standing Group report states that: “The importance of the problem of closing the gap cannot be overemphasized. The provision of the minimum of forces required for the defense of the NAT area, as well as the development of the necessary production and financial programming, depends upon the solution of this problem”.

6. Similarly General Eisenhower, in urging an early solution of the force problem, states that he finds the military effort to be “so closely inter-locked with economic, financial and social matters that it is often impracticable and indeed quite unrealistic to consider one of these fields without giving due attention to the others”.

7. Without making any assumptions at this time as to the ultimate force levels to be fixed by the Council, or as to the allocation of the forces required to fill the forces gap, it is clear that any disposition of the forces problem will make even more urgent the fixing of materiel requirements; the allocation of production tasks; and agreement upon solutions for the financial problems. It will also make more important the reaching of agreement as to the manner in which a German contribution to the defense of the West is to be made, since any final decisions upon forces or material will be unrealistic without knowledge of the assets and liabilities which the German contribution will introduce into NATO military, production and economic planning no matter at what stage these contributions may come.

Military Production

8. The report of the Defense Production Board deals with only a segment of the production problem, since it is largely based upon a part of the equipment deficiencies of only 7 Continental European countries and their estimated capacities for defense production. In relation to 75 important items of equipment, the Board finds that these countries have a potential capacity for several times the production presently planned. However, to realize this production in terms of finished items required by 1954, orders in substantial amounts must he placed now. Shortages of machine tools, raw materials and manpower might impede the full utilization of this capacity. The Board concludes, however, that the primary limiting factor at present is that of finance.

9. The Board has referred various aspects of these financial implications to the FEB. The FEB has the matter under consideration but has not to date made any recommendations.

The Financial and Economic Problem

10. The interim report of the FEB is the first systematic approach by the NATO agencies to the job of evaluating the economic and financial aspects of the NATO defence effort. The FEB has confined its initial considerations to the problem of equitable distribution of the defense burden, based on an analysis of the 1951–52 defense programmes. The report measures the economic impact of present country defense efforts as a basis for considering means of equitably adjusting the present burden, and assesses the economic capacity of each country to contribute to the common defense. The report, therefore, does not make any recommendation as to the means for meeting deficiencies in forces required for full defense or the comparable full production programmes. The Board considers that, in its opinion, the feasibility of undertaking greater economic burdens in the common defense effort “can only be appreciated in the light of the political and military implications of failure to undertake such increased effort.

Suggested NATO action

11. The following facts emerge:

(1) There is a deficiency in forces required by the present plans. The military agencies of the Treaty are pressing for adoption of the measures to make up this deficiency. They will make specific recommendations at Rome.

(2) There is a short-fall in planned production required to equip the forces within the time called for by military plans. Lack of finances is limiting combined NATO action to remedy these deficiencies.

(3) The fact that the limitation is in the last analysis financial and economic is recognized by all the Treaty agencies. But the FEB considers that the feasibility of increased economic burdens must be determined in the light of political and military considerations.

It is apparent that this complex of military-political-economic prolems calls for solution in the broadest terms. This implies action by the Council on the international plane and government action on the national plane so that realistic and effective development of future plans and carrying out of the existing plans can proceed. Obviously, no single decision of the Council can resolve the difficulties inherent in the situation, which go to the heart of the economic life and stability of many of the member countries, as well as to the collective military security of all. However, the Council should be put in a position at the earliest possible date to assess the overall problem, and to adopt measures which will tend to bring into balance the requirements on the one hand and the resources on the other, in the light of existing political and economic realities.

12. The first step toward this end is the development on a multilateral basis of facts and data which will enable the Council to measure the problem in its various aspects. Until recently information adequate for this purpose has not been available. However, with the completion of the interim reports of the various Treaty agencies with their supporting data, it should be possible to proceed rapidly to develop an overall appreciation of the various orders of magnitude involved. A Joint Working Group, consisting of the senior representatives of the civilian Treaty agencies, has, under the authority of the Council Deputies, considered this problem in a preliminary way. Whether its preliminary suggestions as to a programme of action will be approved by the Council Deputies for submission to the Council is not certain at the date of this writing. Whether or not they are approved, it is clear that closely coordinated action through some inter-agency mechanism is required to develop rapidly the facts bearing on the problem.

13. The appraisal of the facts and formulation of recommendations for Council action is a matter which will require the highest degree of competence and closest coordination by representatives familiar with the political, economic and military factors. It is for the Council to decide what agency or combination of agencies should be entrusted with this task.

14. The development of coordinated action along the lines proposed should, in addition to laying the basis for Council decisions, offer the means of ending the inconclusive reference by one Treaty agency to another of urgent problems, and consequent delay and inaction.

The carrying out of these suggested tasks should of course not in any way delay or defer progress by the DPB and FEB on the matters on which they are now engaged, which should, in accordance with their recommendations, be pressed urgently, particularly the extension by FEB of its current studies on the economic impact of the defence effort to the fiscal years 1952–53 and 1953–54.

Certain financial problems requiring interim solution

15. There are two problems of extremely high priority, which require interim financial solutions in advance of development of the overall position outlined above:

(a) One relates to the interim financing of defense production. The report of the Defense Production Board shows that production capacity exists in Continental European countries which, if activated now, would meet some of the major equipment deficiencies, and that failure to activate it immediately will result in a failure to achieve production from this capacity in 1954. The Financial and Economic Board has considered but has not yet recommended proposals for “prefinancing”. Without some such pre-financing scheme or other interim arrangement, valuable months will be lost. It is suggested that the Council instruct the Treaty agencies to develop and adopt solutions on an interim basis which will activate European production to the fullest extent possible, subject to readjustment, if necessary, when final arrangements for financing are made.

(b) The other pressing financial problem, that of providing for the costs of infrastructure, is of acute importance to the buildup of forces by SACEUR. The amounts involved are not great in the light of total defense requirements. After lengthy negotiations it appears that the Council Deputies can reach agreement concerning the 1951 program for construction of airfields and signals installations. However, as military plans develop, other similarly urgent requirements will come forward. It is essential that the Treaty agencies be given authority by governments to work out agreed solutions promptly.

Organizational developments

16. As shown by the progress report from the Council Deputies, major steps have been taken in recent months to recast the top structure of NATO in line with the instructions of the Council at Brussels. Since the problems facing the Treaty Organization are without precedent, there are no established guide lines for the development of international machinery to deal with them promptly and effectively. The NATO and member governments should be ready to make improvements in the organizational structure as the Treaty effort moves forward and as the need appears. However in view of the short time available between now and the Rome meeting, and the urgency of the other issues which require decision, it would appear desirable to concentrate on making the existing organization work as effectively as possible and to consider whether changes in the organization may be desirable at or after the Rome meeting. The suggestion has been made that the Council itself should schedule more frequent meetings. I hope this will be adopted. If the Council should decide to meet at intervals of three or four months during the coming year, it would be possible for the agencies of the Treaty Organization to schedule their work in such a way as to obtain prompt ministerial decision on pressing problems as they develop.

The need for increased public understanding of NAT objectives

17. As indicated above, I believe the reports show that the major problem now facing NATO is to provide the resources necessary to accomplish an effective defense structure in time. The next few months are critical. While NATO can develop plans, the resources required can be provided only by political decision and political action. This in turn requires a fully informed public opinion in each country. If NAT is to succeed, the voter and the taxpayer in each country must understand that in consenting to greater taxes, fewer civilian goods, a longer period of military service, he is contributing in a tangible way to his own security. He must have confidence that he is helping build the most powerful defensive strength that the world has known, strength which can mean the preservation of peace. I believe that too little is known of the growing effectiveness of the common defense forces. This is primarily a matter for national action, but national information services can, through the NATO Information Service, be provided with more effective materials to assist in the problem of developing strong public support. The NAT Information Service has made a good beginning, but its scope and effectiveness must be increased. If this is properly done, increased public understanding should be of the strongest possible support to governments in working toward adequate defense measures.

18. It may be that the presentation of NATO to the public has tended to over-stress the burdens of defense. This may have given the impression that military strength was the end and not the means to an end chosen by the North Atlantic community. Therefore, ways and means should be found to emphasize to public opinion in each country that military strength provides the shield behind which the Atlantic community can continue its progress, with closer cooperation toward peaceful objectives as the basis of the policies of each member and of the common effort. In Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty the parties agree to contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. It has been inevitable that, during the first two years of the development of the Treaty Organization, the primary emphasis has been on the other objectives of the Treaty relating to the defense effort. As progress is made toward realization of the defense goals, it is timely for the Council to consider specific steps to realize the non-military objectives of NATO.

Conclusions

19. The Treaty agencies, in presenting their reports to the Council, necessarily have dwelt on problems unsolved and ground yet to be gained. While it is impossible to overemphasize the importance of the unsolved problems, we should also keep in perspective the tremendous progress toward collective defense over the past four years.

20. Four years ago the only existing defense pact between NAT members was the Treaty of Dunkirk; the Brussels Treaty had not yet been signed; the idea of a pact between the North Atlantic powers to provide for common defense had not even been conceived. Two years ago the North Atlantic Pact had just come into effect and the Council was meeting for the first time to consider organizational plans. One year ago the strategic concept had been approved, the Council Deputies had been established and had completed their first few weeks of work, and the concept of the integrated force was being presented to the New York meeting.⁴

21. Today the major elements, military and civilian, of the Treaty Organization are organized and operating. Plans have been approved and agreement on a wide range of matters has been reached. The integrated force under General Eisenhower has been established and its strength is growing week by week. The concept of effective common defense in peacetime has become a reality.

22. To carry forward this unparalleled effort it is still necessary to solve a host of major problems. But with the determination evidenced by the progress to date and the gathering momentum of the common defense effort the remarkable progress over the past few years should be capped in November with the decisions which will permit the effective defense of the West to be made a reality.

1. This report, which was circulated as Council Document C7–D/3, was presented by Spofford during the ninth meeting of the Council on Wednesday, September 19; for a report on the proceedings of that meeting, see telegram Secto 27 from Ottawa, September 20, p. 675.
2. The various progress reports of these NATO agencies as well as the Eisenhower report comprised the four parts of Council Document C7–D/1 which was received for information by the Council during the same meeting that Spofford gave his report cited above.
3. For documentation concerning the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Council held at Brussels in December 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 585 ff.
4. For documentation on these developments in 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1 ff. The earlier developments are documented in prior volumes of Foreign Relations.