Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5 MAP/9–651: Telegram

The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Porter) to the Acting Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Bissell)¹

secret

Paris, September 6, 1951—9 p. m.

Repto 4425. ToISA. Fol is our evaluation of present situation of FEB and our notions as to what we can reasonably expect to get out of board in future. It is based on attitudes displayed during work on interim report and on report itself:

1. Although report is less than we would have wanted, final report is much improved from earlier versions.² For your info, most of these improvements took place during final week of drafting and prior to receipt by US of detailed London and Wash comments. Most of those comments naturally paralleled our own thinking, which had previously been made well known to the drafters and to the full board. Improvement during entire course of final week appears to us significant as showing shift in thinking of most Eur countries, this shift being in direction which we want. This undoubtedly due to impact of Spofford paper re gap, as well as to our insistence on lifting sights. Undoubtedly whole report would have been vastly better if gap paper had been presented at earlier date.

2. It would be wrong to suppose, however, that Eur yet see eye-to-eye with US. Attitudes displayed at FEB indicate that Europeans have uneasy feeling, still short of conviction, that our gap analysis may be correct and that requirements of defense program will be such as to make larger effort necessary from them. While they recognize problem, they are apparently reluctant to admit it as yet. Believe this accounts for timid way in which question of possible required increases is handled in FEB report, as well as for unsatisfactory manner in which London combined NATO working group first approached its job.

3. In course of drafting, three distinct attitudes were shown:

(a) UK is still insistent upon its own earlier version of “burden sharing” and is trying to lay groundwork for making an econ case that US is better able than other countries to take on financial cost of filling gap. Believe this objective is responsible for UK unwillingness to mention size of US contribution in report in concrete terms (see Repto). Believe we should indicate US is at present dissatisfied with participation of Eur because it does not adequately demonstrate determination to meet Eur responsibilities re defense. We hope that discussions re burden sharing with Gaitskell in Wash will clarify attitudes of two govts. Complete understanding between US and UK re meaning of “equity” as well as size of total job, appears to us to be absolute prerequisite for fruitful work in FEB on problem of econ and financial adjustments needed to meet higher mil goals.

(b) Continentals, particularly French and Itals, made strong effort to present econ reconstruction (for which appetite is apparently insatiable) as prerequisite to greater defense effort. This clearly reflection of their preoccupation with internal Communist problem. Believe desirable both French and Itals be made clearly aware of our own concern about this problem, while at same time, we make it clear to them that basic solutions have to be found by Natl Govts and this may or may not result in continuation large amount US econ aid.

(c) Smaller countries, without exception, emphasize belief that polit and econ factors make it impossible for them to increase defense budgets further. Believe, however, that Belgs, Norwegians, Danes and Portuguese willing to increase somewhat, if bigger agreed NATO plan is approved by Council. Not sure this applies to Dutch, whose present problems appear to be most serious among smaller countries.

4. Would strongly recommend against US expecting FEB to play aggressive role in getting larger mil appropriations until after there is very authoritative and gen agreed requirements program against which FEB can work. Important to bear in mind that FEB composed principally of representatives of Finance Mins, (a) who traditionally reflect more skepticism re stated requirements of defense departments than other govt officials until they are faced with a firm polit decision to go ahead with the job, and (b) who in most cases have recently been through struggle re mil expenditure level within their own govts. Above not to deprecate potential value of FEB in working out specific ways and means to raise required funds, but simply to underline need for US placing major reliance on Council itself or on deputies to determine either at least approximate magnitude of expenditures required or basis upon which they can be calculated and to pass this down to FEB as instructions. We are convinced that only with such authoritative statement of requirements, which each govt recognizes as such, will we be able to get full value out of FEB. This brought out most clearly in attitude of FEB on production problems put to it by DPB, resulting in negative report in D(51)54. (Note: US disapproved this document, as reported in Repto 4426.³) Main lesson for US is that Eur Govts, or at least their reps in FEB, not prepared to agree with US unilateral gap estimate or mil plus DPB requirements; estimates have at present insufficient authority call for specific recommendations from FEB re increased mil appropriations. Only such recommendation we could now get from FEB would be for increasing US appropriations which, of course, we are not prepared to accept.

Porter

1. Repeated to London for Batt.
2. This is a reference to the various drafts of Part IV of Council Document C7–D/1 which concerned the activities of the FEB; the entire report, made up of four parts, was designed to inform the North Atlantic Council which was to meet in Ottawa about the status of the various agencies of NATO. For documentation on the Seventh Session of the Council, pp. 616 ff.
3. Not printed; it stated that the United States Special Representative in Europe and the United States Council Deputy agreed that this document was not sufficiently constructive to warrant U.S. agreement, and they requested that it be reconsidered by the FEB. (740.5–MAP/9–651)