Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/8–2151: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London¹

secret

Washington, September 6, 1951—7 p. m.

Todep 180. Re Depto 240 rptd Paris 376.² Dept and ECA/W apprec receipt ur joint recommendations re NATO wartime econ planning and are in agrmt with much of ur analysis re both need and difficulties undertaking within NATO such planning at an early future date. In light ur recommendations reftel and our views previously outlined Todep 48 rptd Paris 568,³ we believe fol shld be US policy at this time.

(a) During next three to five months, we shld develop US recommendations re major internatl wartime supply-demand problems and readiness measures to be undertaken to meet wartime econ problems. We shld also endeavor to block out framework of wartime orgs.

(b) After completion US studies para (a), we wld consider practicability engaging in multilateral planning. Shld conclusions of our own studies indicate that NATO planning in this field probably fruitless, we wld examine other possibilities such as extensive exchange views with the UK.

(c) Meanwhile, in specific fields where practical wartime planning by NATO appears feasible and where the US has already developed its own views, such as oil, and possibly aviation, we believe it desirable for NATO to undertake planning now. (Further recommendations re these specific fields fol in separate messages.)

(d) When FEB recommendations (re Repto 4097 rptd London Repto 865)⁴ outlined FEB D–D(51)218 are considered by CD, USDep shld take position that in view FEB’s conclusion that it wld be extremely difficult estab principles on which wartime imports shld be calculated, it has now been demonstrated that wartime import planning is not feasible and that the FEB’s recommendations are not in accordance with the terms of reference contemplated by CD Res D–D (51)135. USDep shld urge that consideration sea-borne wartime import requirements be postponed until countries prepared undertake bona fide wartime import studies. Furthermore, USDep shld stress our view that no useful purpose cld result from undertaking gen wartime organizational planning unless countries prepared to accept realistic assumptions.

(e) USRep FEB Working Party (ref Repto 4167 rptd London Repto 16, Repto 4185 rptd London Repna 18)⁵ shld indicate US prepared support NATO wartime planning in specific fields such as oil, and possibly aviation, but that such planning shld not at the outset incl wartime organizational planning. In view considerations para (d) USRep shld state US not able agree to NATO’s undertaking the planning of wartime bodies now to screen sea-borne requirements for the DSA nor to the estab now of stand-by wartime commodity orgs as suggested by UK.

Webb

1. Drafted by James W. Swihart of the Office of European Regional Affairs; cleared with Evans of OMP, Barringer of TRC, Moline of EDT, Beale of BNA, McCullough of ECA, and Eakens of PED; repeated to Paris for OSR.
2. Not printed; it contained the “joint recommendations by USDep–OSR–SUSRep–JAMAG” which were that, unlike the planning for NATO wartime military organization which was considerably advanced, similar planning in the economic field was deficient. Because NATO was the only international body in a position to do such planning, their recommendation was that the United States take the initiative in promoting such planning for wartime economic problems. (740.5/8–2151)
3. Not printed; it reported that the Department of State held that NATO should not undertake wartime economic planning at that time because this would divert the efforts of the FEB and the CD from more important current problems. (740.5/7–2551)
4. Not printed; it reported that the FEB had approved the report of the Working Party on wartime civilian seaborne import requirements with only one drafting change (740.5/8–2051).
5. Neither printed; both summarized the meeting of the FEB Working Party on August 22 which involved a debate over whether or not the representatives should discuss wartime planning before they talked about peacetime planning (740.5/8–2351).