Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/7–1951

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance (Ohly) to the Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot)

top secret

[Washington,] July 19, 1951.

As requested by you, I have reviewed the proposed statement of principles¹ prepared for transmittal through Secretary Acheson to the President. Although I realize the inherent difficulty in preparing a statement of this character, particularly when consideration is given to the method in which it will be used, my review nonetheless leads me to make certain general and specific remarks. Some of these remarks would not necessarily lead to changes in the paper but rather represent caveats that we should have in mind.

As to general remarks, I have the following:

1. The paper fails to recognize that SHAPE is only one of several commands that have been or will be established under NATO. Therefore, unless it is intended to increase the scope of SHAPE or to give General Eisenhower, either in his international or national capacity, powers other than those which he holds as SACEUR, certain of the conclusions in the statements in the paper do not make complete sense or must be interpreted as indicative of similar unmentioned conclusions with respect to other NATO commands. If the latter interpretation is correct, then doubt is thrown on the value and workability of certain of the proposals which are made, since instead of unity in the performance of certain actions, there will be multiplicity. I also call attention to the fact that substantial quantities of equipment will be going to forces which are not under any NATO command, either because they will be performing national tasks such as in-shore coastal protection or because they are training units.

2. The paper fails to distinguish between the functions of a field or theater command and the functions of a general staff, or else considers such a distinction to be unimportant. This raises the question of the extent to which we wish SHAPE to become a general staff and to assume the innumerable functions inherent in a general staff operation. While this is a perfectly possible proposal, we should consider very thoroughly whether the assumption of such functions by SHAPE will not prove such a huge task that it will prevent Eisenhower from adequately discharging and concentrating upon the principal tasks of a theater commander. It has been my understanding that Eisenhower did not want to take over the problems of national training, the determination of national equipment requirements, the establishment of tables of organization and equipment, the operation of schools, and all the thousand and one other functions that would fall to his organization if we moved too far toward the general staff concept.

3. The statement fails to distinguish between principles that should be ultimate goals and the principles that perhaps should govern our actions as a means toward reaching those goals. For example, paragraph 1c states that we should place more weight on NATO recommendations and rely less heavily on bilateral planning. I agree, but the real problem is to force the development of NATO recommendations which can be an appropriate guide to U.S. action in lieu of the bilateral approach.

In the realm of the more specific, I have the following comments:

1. While I believe this would be highly desirable, if these individuals can be persuaded or directed to take the time involved, I have serious doubts as to how, from a practical standpoint, Harriman, Acheson, Marshall and Foster can satisfactorily review the effectiveness with which Washington agencies are coordinated to insure prompt and energetic action. I believe this matter is of such importance that these men, in spite of their other responsibilities, should devote the necessary time, which in my opinion means their acceptance of the fact that it will mean a minimum of 2 or 3 days of continuous joint concentration on this problem. I suggest also that Bradley might be an appropriate addition to this group.

2. I have already commented from a general standpoint under 3 above, on the opening sentence in paragraph 1c of the proposed statement of principles. I would like to add one additional point, and that is to caution against the kind of generalization implicit in this sentence. While I agree that we must give more and more weight to NATO recommendations, even to the extent of taking the risk that these recommendations may be less soundly founded than the judgment of our own government, I believe that there are areas in which, because of the nature of the problems involved, we shall always need to rely heavily on bilateral planning. The attempt to concentrate too many decisions of too many different types in international institutions is likely to be followed with the curse that so often characterizes bigness. There should be real power in NATO central institutions and we should be prepared to accept that exercise of power, but we should at the same time recognize that the areas to which such power should extend in practice will for many months, and probably many years, be limited by human incapability of quickly devising the institutions that can handle a large number of the matters now the subject of bilateral dealings.

3. Paragraph 2a of the statement of principles strikes me as another dangerous generalization, although I realize that the nature of this statement makes a certain amount of generalization necessary. At the conclusion of this paragraph I am left with a very confused concept. What kind of thing specifically is it intended that one should delegate, and is the delegation a delegation within the U.S. government or a delegation within the NATO organization? What kind of things is it that we have in mind delegating to “General Eisenhower and the U.S. personnel attached to him”?

4. I am somewhat confused by the first sentence in 2b Does it mean that there should be central guidance from Washington to all NATO elements in Europe or that in Europe there should be a focal point, namely Spofford or the ECC, which provides central guidance to all U.S.-NATO elements?

5. With respect to paragraph 2c, I comment merely that SHAPE is only one of several NATO commands.

6. With respect to paragraph 3b, I again note that SHAPE is only one of several commands and that the MTDP encompasses, I believe, certain tasks which are not under General Eisenhower. I would also, and this goes back to my general comment concerning the dangers of placing too many loads on SHAPE, have serious doubt about fixing responsibility for standardization on a field or theater commander.

1. Presumably this is a reference to the attachment to the memorandum by Martin, July 6, p. 217.