ECA message files, FRC 53 A 278, Paris Repto: Telegram
The United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz) to the Administrator for Economic Cooperation (Foster)1
Repto 3411. For Foster and Bissell; pass Dept for Perkins and Cabot. Limit distribution.
1. Fol recent conversation Stikker with Eisenhower, Stikker and Marjolin with Harriman, Stikker and Marjolin with me, Stikker arranged dinner July 11 taking advantage presence ministers for OEEC meeting July 12. Present were Stikker, Gaitskell, Schuman and Petsche, Pella, Snoy for Van Zeeland who had been delayed, Langhalle Deputy Foreign Minister for Norway representing Lange, Werkmeister of German delegation representing Bluecher, Marjolin, Hall-Patch and I.
2. Stikker opened talk by expressing concern over degree to which apathy and uneasiness seemed to persist in many quarters in Europe. In Netherlands, there were widespread doubts whether things were sufficiently under control and whether country really knew where it was going. He pointed to Commie strength in recent elections in Italy and France and to difficulties raised by Bevan, Wilson, et al, in England, as indication that these conditions not confined to Netherlands. This has hampered development unity and has been element of inertia in way of defense program. He called on each of those present to speak in turn about his own country and about conditions generally.
[Page 220]3. With varied degrees of emphasis, there was general concurrence with Stikker’s appraisal of existing condition. Conversation then turned to lines of action to deal with it.
4. Although discussion was varied, and much of it rambling and vague, a general trend in thinking seemed gradually to emerge. This shaped itself around ideas which many of us have been examining in recent weeks. It wld be premature to try evaluate practical significance this trend in their thinking, and nothing at all may come of it. At same time, those present spoke with so much feeling, conversation seems worth reporting. Without trying indicate various shades of emphasis of different participants, I will attempt give general summary principal elements in my own words.
5. Apart from varied specific situations requiring specific remedial steps, an underlying moral and psychological source of difficulty was identified. This is fact that European leadership has to unfortunate degree allowed NATO purpose and defense build-up to take on negative character in minds of Europeans. Despite majority support for defense program, there is even among strong supporters excessive tendency to regard it as kind of caster oil which has to be taken. There is uneasy question in people’s minds as to how long this will go on, what it will do to economy, and where it is leading them. There has been no adequate attempt on part European leaders to answer this question.
6. Key requirement is to present purposes, policies and action of NATO in positive terms, as realistic program leading Europe to a promising future. Defense build-up must be understood as integral part such program. This must and can be done, and actual facts, if understood, fully warrant it. It is duty European leadership to make this clear to people of Europe, in such way as to give new impetus to defense build-up.
7. Such a positive orientation wld center fol principal elements:
- (a)
- Great potential for increasing European production and productivity. After indispensable capital build-up military establishment defense effort can be reduced to maintenance basis, and expanded capacity production developed in course defense build-up can and will be turned to renewed expansion European economic strength and standard of living.
- (b)
- Balanced time-phasing. Looking back on period 1947–50, we can now see that, in light of conditions subsequently revealed, free world had neglected its defenses. As compensation, during period 1950–53 or 54, especially intensive attention has to be given to defense build-up. Over total period of, let us say, 1947–57, Europe can and will achieve both necessary defense build-up to establish security against aggression and resumption upward trend in standard of living.
- (c)
- Defense build-up and increasing economic strength are not only mutually consistent, they are mutually necessary. For free people, resources devoted to defense build-up to maintain liberty can in no [Page 221] sense be thought of as marginal, but are fundamental necessity. Beyond this, however, there can be no real and lasting economic recovery and progress in Europe without military security. While fear of war and invasion remains, skillfully exploited by Soviets there can be no real monetary stability, effective investment program, long-term planning, or full-scale effort by management, labor or farmers. At same time, economic strength is equally necessary to real defense of Europe.
8. In concluding meeting Stikker raised question how conclusions cld and shld be followed up. He indicated he wld try to develop a proposed course of action with assistance Marjolin. Gaitskell emphasized his conviction that meeting had been most useful, and called for frequent repetition of such full and candid exchange of views. At least verbally, the need was accepted for European leadership to take responsibility for reorientation thinking people of Europe so as to give fresh impetus and constructive significance to defense program. It remains to be seen whether this acceptance goes deep enough to lead to action.
9. On July 12, Van Zeeland called on me for private talk along same lines; evening July 12, I dined with Gaitskell and covered similar ground. He particularly raised question how follow up the talk in practical way through NATO. He intended discuss this with Schuman.
10. While as indicated it is quite unclear what will come of it, we will endeavor encourage fruitful development in every practicable way.
- Repeated to London for Spofford and Batt; to Paris for Bruce, Schuyler, and MacArthur; and to Heidelberg for Handy.↩