740.5/7–651
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of
European Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) and the Director of
International Security Affairs
(Cabot)
top secret
Washington, July 6,
1951.
Subject: NATO
Reorganization
I attach a draft statement of principles to re-invigorate NATO, which the Secretary asked, at
our meeting on Tuesday,1 be drawn up for submittal to the President. This
draft reflects that discussion plus subsequent discussions with Mr.
Ohly and Mr. Harriman. I should appreciate your comments before
giving it to the Secretary, which I hope we might do not later than
Monday.2
A second paper requested by the Secretary, indicating the precise
steps which the adoption of these principles might call for, is in
preparation.
[Attachment]
Draft Statement Prepared in the Department of
State3
top secret
[Washington,] July 6,
1951.
The North Atlantic Treaty Council of Deputies has now been
functioning as a full-time body for a year.
General Eisenhower has been
in Europe as the Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty forces
there for nearly six months.
The United States Government has recently completed a first
estimate of the cost, under present plans, of building up a
defensive force for Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty.
The size of the job on this basis makes it imperative that
extraordinary efforts be made to improve the ability of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to cut costs to the bone and
to see that the cost is fairly shared.
As the recognized leader in the North Atlantic Treaty operation
the policies of the United States toward it are crucial to
success. The organization through which the United States
exercises its leadership is equally important. But neither the
U.S. nor the Europeans can work effectively if the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole is not set up and does
not operate efficiently.
The importance to U.S. security of the success of the NATO effort and the need to follow
up on the investment which we have already made in money,
equipment, forces, and in the person of General Eisenhower,
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all require a fundamental
reexamination of present U.S. policies, of present U.S.
organization and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as
revealed by experience to date.
It is recommended that the U.S. Government agree to base its
action in NATO and in handling
U.S. military and economic aid for NAT countries on the following principles:
- 1.
- With respect to U.S. policy toward NATO:
-
a.
- Having recognized the NATO operation as vital to U.S. security,
give it a corresponding priority in all U.S.
activities;
-
b.
- To recognize that success in NATO is dependent on a
spirit of cooperation and sacrifice which can only
exist if the U.S. is prepared to act to the
fullest extent, consistent with our global
responsibilities, as a full partner;
-
c.
- To give more weight to NATO recommendations on
defense efforts of NAT countries, including U.S. military
and economic assistance, and rely less heavily on
bilateral planning. Bilateral pressure by U.S.
should be used primarily to get these NATO plans carried
out.
- 2.
- With respect to U.S. organization:
-
a.
- To delegate responsibility much more
extensively to our regional and country
representatives in Europe, including General
Eisenhower
and U.S. personnel attached to him;
-
b.
- To provide for more effective central
direction and coordination of the activities of
U.S. representatives in Europe;
-
c.
- To arrange fuller participation by General
Eisenhower
and his U.S. staff in all U.S. activities
connected with NATO in Europe.
- 3.
- With respect to NATO
organization:
-
a.
- To provide for more active international
leadership in NATO matters from the highest political
levels;
-
b.
- To transfer as rapidly as possible from the
area of committee action by unanimous consent to
action by international staffs, as for example
that headed by General Eisenhower, all NATO work not involving
decisions on matters of important national
policy.
