Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/7–451: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

London, July 4, 1951—2 p. m.

Depto 15. From ECC to ISAC and White House for Harriman. Eisenhower has seen and concurred. (Impossible obtain Gen Handy’s final concurrence, altho JAMAG has cleared. Handy will cable direct tomorrow.)

Re ISAC D–4/7a¹ and Todep 551, June 26.² ECC has, after consultation Gen Eisenhower, fol points re timing and manner divulging “gap” study to Congress and NATO countries:

1. Believe doc D–4/7a is very useful and generally agree with lines of action indicated therein. However, wld caution against both (a) taking the particular figures themselves too seriously in our own circles, and (b) giving impression to Congress or to other NATO countries that we fail to recognize numerous variables and likely margin of error. Shld rather consider them merely as giving gen order of magnitude and relationships in order to provide basis for NATO appraisal and Congressional understanding of problem which lies ahead. Concept of “gap” is a tool of analysis. If properly used it can be helpful in continuing reappraisal of requirements, in estimating target dates, and planning an orderly build-up in balanced phases. In this connection it is Gen Eisenhower’s belief that altho a sharp tapering off of the program of US aid for Eur can unquestionably be foreseen, it is not now possible to set a definite date for this in terms more exact than “in about three years.” Similarly, because of inherent uncertainty in estimates of requirements and of possible errors in estimates of capabilities, the date on which build up of forces can be completed must be expressed in same terms.

2. Believe we shld consider entire study (modified as per para 6 through 9 below) as showing that, in terms of presently projected programs (including appropriations) and presently estimated requirements, a substantial “gap” is indicated for mid 1954, and that three concurrent lines of development are required in order to narrow it as far as possible on that date. These lines are: (a) Continuing refinement of estimated mil requirements through successive revisions of plans and estimates and required scales of equipment and readjustment of build-up schedules in light of econ and financial feasibility; (b) Development of awareness by US, and particularly in Congress, that aid program must continue at high level for at least two years after FY 1952 (see also para 4 below); (c) Development of awareness among Eur NATO countries that their own present plans are not adequate (see paras 6, 7 and 8 below). We shld work out courses of action designed to contribute to these developments.

3. With respect to para 2 (a) above it seems doubtful that remunerative work can be accomplished until the revision of Gen Eisenhower’s def plan now under way has progressed to a point where new estimates of force requirements can be developed. Indications now are that this stage can be reached in approximately two months. Continuing efforts shld be made progressively to scale down equipment to the minimum consistent with the mission the forces are expected to perform. Fol the development of the revised estimates of force requirements, a reassessment of build-up schedules and target dates in light of econ and financial feasibility must be made. It must be made clear, however, that such a reassessment will influence, not the FY 1952 build-up requirements (including mil aid program) which are already quite firm, but rather programs to be developed for subsequent years.

4. Re para 2(b) above, our limited experience with congressional groups here suggests that Congress may be more interested in seeing possibility of program being successfully completed within a stated time limit than in now getting relatively firm estimates of future cost. Consequently, see value in communicating net effect of D–4/7a to Congress without disclosing actual figures and saying that we intend to work out solution concurrently along the lines in para 2 above. If it shld become necessary to indicate general orders of magnitude to Congress, we shld stress caution along lines para 1. Reasonable expect this wld create confidence that that administration knows what it is about and it is not relying solely on US appropriations to perpetuate “hand-out” program. At same time it wld not dodge possibility which we must all envisage, namely, that future annual cost to US as well as to Eur NATO countries may exceed any of our current budgetary projections.

5. Balance this msg refers to para 2(c) above, i.e. to developing appropriate awareness among Eur NATO countries.

6. We have long been in favor of providing Eur NATO countries with a serious presentation of the extent to which present efforts fall below our (and their collective) estimate of requirements. However, we have also realized that this must be done most convincingly, and in such a way as not to run substantial risk of discouraging Eur NATO countries by creating impression that goal is not attainable. Suggest we can now do this by giving full D–4/7a study with caution along lines para 1 above and with analysis based on the spelling out of para 2 above. Serious Europeans who see D–4/7a presented in this way, will, we believe, be convinced of necessity of getting own and other Eur countries contributions up to the point of capability, although action might not fol until after NATO appraisal confirming gen magnitude US estimates.

7. For obvious reasons believe important we release SG costing submissions to all NAT countries (if necessary with appropriate deletions) prior tabling of US study based on those submissions.

8. Believe we shld not at this time push too hard in the direction of Eur commitments to meet cost of full MTDP build-up. Rather shld concentrate, pending full appraisal that will follow SHAPE study in para 3 above, on reaching Eur goals approximately the same as those in congressional presentation for FY 1952. These US unilateral goals are already known individually to most Eur countries. Recommend we be authorized not only to table D–4/7a study but to lay before other NATO countries as a group (a) comprehensive picture of these goals, together with (b) comprehensive picture of country-by-country aid figures, including value end-item aid to date and projected for FY 1952 (even on an illustrative basis) to show clearly where each country stands in our estimates of the job to be done. (This recommendation does not supersede that contained in Depto 1 of July 2³ which is for immed action here.) Presentation shld help convince the group as a whole that the goals we have set out for each member are related to our estimate of the requirements of the total program, and are also equitable in relation to the effort by, and aid to, each of the others.

9. Wish emphasize importance we attach to release end-item program values (para 8(b) above). Doubt purposes tabling D–4/7a and burden-sharing exercise can be achieved without this release. End-item programs for 1950 and 1951 already tabled in DPB in physical but not value terms and individual countries are aware tentative 52 enditem programs and data on US unit costs of major items. Probably also necessary in order make D–4/7a meaningful to other NATO countries that we show some sort of projections US aid for FY ‘53 and ‘54. Recommend that when initially tabling this study we make projections at FY ‘52 level and make clear that further US contribution if any (see first sentence second para statement quoted Todep 551) will still leave substantial deficit requiring increased Canadian and European efforts above their present plans.

10. You will see from above that we conceive presentation of D–4/7a as having limited but necessary value on European side now in that it can (a) get European govts to think in terms of increasing intensity and size of effort (where now feasible; France is probably the only exception at present), rather than in terms of justifying decisions already made, and (b) create pressures within Europe for increasing efforts of laggard countries. We must, however, think and plan beyond this presentation. In particular, believe we must provide the missing component in the whole MTDP as now seen by the Europeans. This component is the prospect of an affirmative and expanding future after some reasonable interval of time during which strains of rearmament are undergone. This prospect wld be based on (a) the emergence of a comprehensive, time-phased and well-balanced plan and (b) an awareness that mil security is necessary to real econ growth, that econ strength is necessary for mil security, and that the great increase in production and productivity incident to the rearmament program can be turned in time to improving the standard of living. Once this component has been supplied, believe there wld be new limits of econ and polit feasibility higher than our and European present estimates. Under such circumstances, “gap” may be closed in what after all is politically, strategically and morally the soundest way, i.e., through adequate European contributions willingly made. Separate message this points [point?] fols.

11. Also believe USDep and other US reps in NATO shld have advance instructs as to what response shld be made to queries resulting from release statement in Todep 551.

12. Wld greatly appreciate being kept currently informed by cable of all developments connected with this matter as it requires further planning here and affects current actions in other areas of NAT activity and preparation for ECC testimony before Congress. [ECC]

Spofford

1. Ante, p. 193.
2. Ante, p. 210.
3. Not printed.