Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/6–2251

The Counselor of Embassy in France (MacArthur)¹ to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

top secret personal

Paris, June 22, 1951.

Dear Jamie: On June 20 I dropped you a Personal Top Secret letter² which I hope you are holding very close indeed, setting forth my impression of certain of the thinking going on here with respect to NATO reorganization.

This morning several of us in the upper US element of SHAPE had a general go-round on this subject. In the light of this purely informal and private conversation, I believe my letter of June 20 may be a bit misleading. I gathered from this morning’s talk that in addition to Mr. Hoffman and other Americans who have raised the question of NATO reorganization, several of the Congressmen who were recently here had fairly strong views that NATO should be made more effective. I also believe I was not correct when I said that General Eisenhower’s thinking tends toward the establishment of a high-level man of Cabinet stature who would not be a member of either State, Defense, or ECA. I believe this is one possibility that has been batted at him, but I think he has by no means bought this concept, although I do believe he does think that at home we must have someone of very considerable stature to prevent the inter-Departmental committees from going around and around. I should also like to let you know that at upper working level here there is a definite feeling that pressures to make General Eisenhower some kind of supreme czar of US-European activities should be resisted. Whether or not he should have some kind of deputy in Washington through whom he might channel requests for action is something which may be considered at some later date.

I would like to re-emphasize very strongly that nothing has crystallized at this end, but that some thought is being given to the problem since it seems likely that it will probably be raised in Washington. I would like also to emphasize that at upper working level here (and I include Generals Gruenther, Schuyler, and Leavey of the US element) there is a strong feeling that no precipitous decisions, recommendations, or suggestions should be forthcoming from this end.

I know you will hold this letter and my letter of June 20 to yourself and Mr. Perkins, since I could get in very serious difficulties indeed if the erroneous impression were obtained here that I am in any way cast in the role of informant on matters which are being held very, very tightly here and not being reported to other agencies at home. As I wrote you before, I am passing along this information to you simply because I do feel that you at home may be hit very soon by propositions for NATO reorganization, and you should be thinking about how you may handle any number of suggestions which may come from members of Congress or other prominent Americans.³

Sincerely,

Doug

1. Attached to the Embassy, on detail to SHAPE.
2. Ante, p. 188.
3. On June 26, this letter and the earner one by MacArthur of June 20, p. 188, were answered by Perkins during Bonbright’s absence from Washington. Perkins thanked MacArthur for his thoughts and informed him that the reorganization study was being pushed in the Department of State from several angles; in particular: speeding action by the U.S. Government and the Standing Group in Washington, strengthening the Council Deputies, placing Eisenhower in a position where he could and would communicate directly with NATO governments including the United States, and establishing periodic meetings of the North Atlantic Council. (740.5/6–2251)