Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

JCS Records, CCS 370 (8–19–45) Post-War Requirements for Military Forces¹

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret

Washington, 22 October 1951.

Subject: Review of the Current World Situation and Ability of the Forces Being Maintained to Meet United States Commitments.

1. In accordance with the directive contained in your memorandum, dated 22 February 1950,² the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward herewith their current review of the world situation and the ability of the forces being maintained to meet United States commitments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this review should not be circulated outside of the Department of Defense.

2. The following general conclusions from the review reflect the events of the three months preceding:

a. There is a present threat of additional Soviet and/or Soviet-inspired aggression directed against all non-Communist areas on the periphery of the USSR and/or its satellites and additionally, against those nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which do not border on Communist territory, as well as against Berlin, Trieste, Japan, Formosa, and Thailand;

b. The degree of the Soviet threat in each instance depends on the plans and intentions of the USSR, its willingness to engage in general hostilities, and/or its estimate as to the lengths to which it could go without provoking general hostilities. Inasmuch as these factors are not subject to control or determination by the United States or its allies, the initiative as to further hostilities on the part of the USSR and/or its satellites presently rests with the USSR;

c. The key to current international political maneuvers is the degree of importance which the USSR attaches to the rearmament of Japan together with the strengthening of NATO and the rearmament of Germany, and the measure which the USSR will adopt in the face of those eventualities;

d. Of basic importance to the position of the West vis-à-vis the USSR is the strength of the United Kingdom. That strength, and the influence of the British Commonwealth of Nations in world affairs, are showing indications of deterioration;

e. In view of the wide dispersal of the areas for which the United States has assumed obligations, and for other reasons, it is self-evident that the United States, even with assistance from its allies, does not now possess the means immediately to fulfill all its defense obligations in the face of overt armed aggression; nor can it for a considerable period achieve a posture of strength sufficient to cause the Kremlin to give up its long-term objective of world domination;

f. There is increasing evidence of the weakness of European overall support to United States Far Eastern military, political, and economic policies. In this connection, if current political action fails to stop deliveries of munitions and strategic material into Communist China from the Western World, the United States should press the nations allied in Korea to establish a naval blockade of Communist China;

g. Inasmuch as the Korean problem is a symptom of world tension, a satisfactory resolution of that problem probably cannot be achieved by politico-military action which is confined to Korea; rather, a resolution of that problem in a manner satisfactory to the United States is not to be expected unless and until there is a general relaxation of world tensions;

h. The growing Communist air build-up in North China and Manchuria has reached the stage where serious consequences might result therefrom for United Nations forces in the Korean area. Inasmuch as the security of United States forces in this area must be maintained, it may become necessary for the United States to employ its air power unilaterally and on short notice to attack certain Chinese Communist air bases;

i. If the Korean armistice negotiations do not move rapidly to a satisfactory conclusion, the United States is faced with the prospect of continuing to fight a politically inconclusive war in Korea, with the prospect of enlarging the scope of military operations beyond the bounds of Korea into China in an effort to bring the war to a successful conclusion, or with the prospect of reviewing our entire position in the Far East and in the cold war in an effort to seek other solutions to the problem;

j. If an armistice were arranged and became effective in Korea, the Chinese Communists might then redeploy forces for military operations elsewhere. In any event, an armistice in Korea would not necessarily assure peace and stability throughout the Far East;

k. The long-range importance to the security interests of the United States of a friendly and allied Japan makes it mandatory that the security of that nation against aggression by the USSR be assured at this time by the United States by all measures, including, if necessary war itself;

l. A premature withdrawal of French authority from Indochina would, in all probability, result in an early collapse of the Associated States of Indochina and their inevitable fall to Communism. Accordingly, the United States should support present French policies whereby France will continue to furnish political and military advice, support, and guidance to the Associated States until such time as the development of those States justifies an orderly withdrawal of French authority;

m. From the military point of view, any action at this time to establish a system of regional security in the Pacific area would be premature;

n. A consequence of a war between India and Pakistan would be internal deterioration in both countries which might open the way for a Communist seizure of power in parts or all of India, a situation which would be of gravity to the security interests of the Western World. Accordingly, the United States should take energetic measures in the political, psychological, and economic fields to prevent such a war;

o. Loss of all or a large part of the Middle East to the USSR either through military action or as a result of internal disorder would create a grave situation for the Western World;

p. It is of great importance that the United States continue to take energetic measures to support the achievement of a solution of the Iranian problem which will:

(1) Provide for the continued orientation of Iran toward the Western World (this should receive overriding priority);

(2) Make possible an effective command organization for the defense of Iran in coordination with the other areas of the Middle East; and

(3) Assure the continued supply of Iranian oil to the Western World, at least during peace;

q. Considering the problem of the Middle East from the viewpoint of military operations only, it would appear that it may be some time before a decision can be reached as to the line upon which an effective defense could be established against invasion launched by the USSR, or as to the force requirements for such a task. Any defense which would secure a large part of the territory of both Turkey and Iran would require an effective allied command for the area in consonance with appropriate political arrangements, and reinforcement in considerable strength, particularly of Iran, at a relatively early date by forces such as those from Commonwealth nations, which are not now available. Such a defense would require timely retardation and demolition operations, including oil fields, involving forces not now available from the United States;

r. The current crisis in Egypt (together with that in Iran) could result in serious damage to United Kingdom prestige in the Middle East and in the world generally;

s. The United States should, in general, support the British position in Egypt, at least until the establishment of an effective Middle East command organization which could provide for the coordinated defense of the Middle East and which would receive the wholehearted support of Egypt;

t. The security interests of the United States at this time would be greatly benefited if the British Commonwealth of Nations could achieve once more a state of political and military solidarity under strong and effective leadership by the United Kingdom; failing this, wholehearted support of United States military policies must be obtained from the several members of the British Commonwealth through other means;

u. The results of efforts made to date toward stimulating military production in Europe are far short of European needs. In this connection, the mobilization base of the allies should be expanded by the development and utilization of the industrial potential of Germany and of Japan as a source of munitions;

v. In light of the world situation, it is timely to accelerate the establishment of West Germany and Japan as strong partners and military allies of the United States; and

w. As programs are developed for the defense of the entire, area of NATO, including West Germany, it may become necessary to review United States policies as to priorities of delivery among those nations receiving Mutual Defense Assistance Program material with a view to determine the desirability of expediting deliveries of end items of armament to the forces of West Germany.

3. In light of the current world situation and the foregoing conclusion relating thereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following actions:

a. Recognizing that the Kremlin apparently has not changed its objective of world domination, the Department of Defense should nevertheless request the National Security Council to take into consideration the improved military posture of the United States vis-à-vis the USSR in national policy decisions, without permitting, however, any relaxation of effort in continuing to improve that military posture of the United States;

b. The Department of Defense should request the National Security Council to examine the problems of the Middle East with a view to determining the capability of Turkey, possibly in concert with the United States, and with recognition of British and French political assets, to assume primary leadership in that, area; and

c. The Department of Defense should request the National Security Council to undertake studies to develop the feasibility and the possibility of success of active United States support of the United Kingdom in bringing about a state of political and military solidarity within the British Commonwealth of Nations to the end that the integrated policies of the Commonwealth fully support the military requirements of the Western World; if the study indicates the futility of such a course of action, then to determine measures best suited for the United States, in the interest of its own security, to develop maximum support of United States military policies by the separate Dominions of the Commonwealth.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman

1. National Archives Record Group 218, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Not printed.