S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary:
Points of Emphasis in NSC Consideration of NSC 114/2.1
1. The need for urgency
[Page 233]The rate at which delivery of military end-items will increase has an important bearing on the conduct of foreign policy.2 In the first place, it is a key factor in determining when the United States will achieve relative preparedness, which in turn has a considerable influence on the conduct of foreign policy. Our relative preparedness for war must be taken into account in deciding what initiatives we can take, when we can take them, and how far we can afford to pursue them. Our relative preparedness for war also affects importantly the attitude of allied and friendly countries toward our initiatives. Examples of this are Western German rearmament and the Korean war.
Secondly, the delivery of military end-items to allied nations is a key factor in determining when these nations will have confidence and security in their futures and in determining the pace and scale of their defense efforts. MDAP deliveries are way behind schedule, and this has already greatly complicated and increased the problem of persuading them to make the necessary defense effort. Our failure to meet our commitments to them necessarily affects their performance in the mutual defense effort.
As we understand the tentative program submitted by Defense, the question of urgency centers in the question of how and when the two items of $50 billion and $20 billion mentioned in the last paragraph on page 323 should be scheduled. We are not familiar with the physical and financial considerations which must be taken into account, but we would urge that to the extent practicable at least the second of these two items, reduced as much as possible by screening and review of estimated requirements, should be scheduled for production in FY 1953 and FY 1954.
Under this heading of urgency, we would also emphasize the need for an accelerated and expanded civil defense program, as a deterrent to war, as a means of safeguarding our initiative in the atomic field, and as an essential basis for rapid recuperation and mobilization in the event of attack.
2. The allocation of end-items to U.S. forces and Allied forces
Apart from the question of the rate at which delivery of military end-items will increase, though closely related to it, is the question of the share of U.S. forces and Allied forces in the actual output of military end-items. Although we recognize that the Defense program is tentative and that it is not intended to prejudge the volume of MDAP deliveries, we are nevertheless concerned about the fact that [Page 234] the tentative program provides only $5 billion of new obligational authority for military assistance in FY 1953, and reserves a decision on the additional requirements of approximately $20 billion. If we are to proceed on any such basis, we urge that the NSC decide at this time that the allocation of actual output of military end-items shall be determined on the basis of the national interest in light of the international situation. If it is desirable and physically possible to make deliveries of end-items to Western European and other allied countries in excess of those for which obligational authority is available, we would want the active support of Defense and other interested agencies in obtaining such new legislation as might be necessary to make the larger deliveries.