394.31/2–1451: Telegram
The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Torquay Conference ( Corse ) to the Secretary of State
435.1. On Blankenstein’s return from Hague, discussed with him his latest instructions which are as follows: He will try to get maximum number OEEC countries to agree on letter addressed to Marjolin,1 which would state that, in opinion signatory countries, Torquay exercise did not constitute “satisfactory progress” of kind contemplated in October 27 resolution. Such letter, if signed by enough OEEC countries, would presumably be controlling on Marjolin’s required report to council. Blankenstein obviously will attempt extract agreement from other OEEC countries to sign such letter as price for conclusion certain bilaterals. Thereafter, Dutch plan to take up issue in OEEC, with view achieving some formula leading to preferential tariff arrangement. Blankenstein states European integration is overriding Dutch objective, which precludes selective approach on tariff negotiations earlier proposed by Dutch.
2. Implications development preferential tariff arrangement were then fully explored with Blankenstein, including possible effects on US protectionist opinion. Possibility also explored that shift of exercise from GATT to OEEC might eliminate GATT as effective instrument [Page 1349] for Dutch tariff objectives without securing substitute mechanism in OEEC.
3. Following proposal then outlined to Blankenstein as informal and personal suggestion:
- (a)
- Following Torquay, GATT secretariat would be charged with preparing certain “negotiating parcels” in accordance with general instructions summarized in sub-paragraph (c) below. To augment its manpower, secretariat would be authorized to invite cooperation of OEEC secretariat.
- (b)
- In developing its “negotiating parcels” secretariat would study unsatisfactory requests of OEEC members left over from current bilaterials. Secretariat would be free obtain data from other appropriate sources, including information developed in OEEC “excessive tariff” exercise.
- (c)
- Each negotiating parcel would consist of proposals involving concessions by some or all OEEC countries, concessions in each parcel being designed to be in balance. Parcel might include more than one commodity and might be confined to some rather than all OEEC countries.
- (d)
- Intersessional WP, which might be TNC sub-committee, would review proposed negotiating parcels. Any member country called on to make concessions in such parcels would have opportunity offer alternative concessions of equal value. WP might wish to agree that decisions at this stage regarding adequacy of proposed alternative concessions would be made on a voting basis of less-than-unanimity.
- (e)
- After process of review, each country would have option either of accepting, rejecting, or accepting conditionally commitments in parcel. Conditional acceptance would consist of acceptance conditioned on other named countries accepting same parcel.
- (f)
- Accepted parcels which involved no significant concession to countries outside OEEC group would be submitted to CP’s for approval and put into effect. Other parcels would be subject to negotiation with outside interested countries and thereafter put into effect with approval CP’s.
4. Blankenstein promptly telephoned Hague to determine whether reconsideration instructions justified. He has been authorized explore above line further with USRep, discussions continuing tonight.
Sent Department 435, repeated info Paris 39 for OSR, London 198.
- Robert E. Marjolin, Secretary General of the OEEC.↩