394.31/2–351: Telegram
The Temporary Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Torquay Conference ( Phelps ) to the Secretary of State
niact
395. USTAC. Attention Corse.
A. Following is summary of views expressed by Wilgress in conversation he sought with Schwenger this morning. (Ourtel 394)1
1. Wilgress summarized by saying multilateral negotiations were “pregnant with possibilities for future”. He considers b, rather than a, paragraph one, reftel real reason for extension.
2. Wilgress believes failure multilaterals here would mean drive in Paris for European preferential plan, contemplated by French, Italians and others, would have to exclude UK. Efforts to prevent would [Page 1337] probably fail and would create much friction among Western countries. Plan would result not in successful effort integration but merely additional source friction among Western countries and advent of frankly mercantilistic states or small blocs throughout Western world. Would be disastrous for UK. In event of stalemate or Western success in current struggle with curtain countries, would, by weakening western economies and creating friction, prepare favorable ground for Russia to resume struggle later.
3. Decision to extend not easy. Could result revolt here, jeopardizing many useful, if less important, results Torquay. Many delegations feel unwilling change plans to leave basis present dates. Wilgress, as conference chairman, anxious avoid small accomplishment Torquay, to say nothing of failure.
4. This risk due difficulties reported previous tels re multilaterals. Success project depends partly on degree US interest. Schwenger, personally in general agreement Wilgress, suggested risk would be smaller if US decided to make clear our interest high level London, Paris, Rome, Washington as well as Torquay. Might send Torquay high official respected Paris (Wilgress mentioned Katz)2 for at least some early meetings multilaterals and should assign one or more senior officials to del to concentrate on multilaterals.3 Schwenger sent forth Washington view limited multilaterals Torquay would establish channel and furnish basis keeping further European tariff reduction efforts on MFN basis. Wilgress agreed entirely, said that was principal basis his suggestion April 8 reported reftel.
5. Wilgress considers France key country. Considered French attitude, reprted our following tel fourth meeting multilaterals,4 merely willingness go along purpose extend Torquay results, thereby please US, Canada. Considered French still strongly favor European preferential arrangements after Torquay. Believes change this attitude would be easiest if go along French on Torquay matter without forcing full decision now as to later framework but later insist using channel established Torquay limited multilaterals for future European tariff reduction efforts.
6. Schwenger suggested best way get active start Torquay was change British attitude. Wilgress considered British short-sighted. Regretted British Del Torquay dominated [by] BOT. Point of view limited by preoccupation short-run trade problems. Schwenger mentioned Wilgress could contact Wilson, Gaitskell, Hall.5 Wilgress decided [Page 1338] discuss Wilson lunch today (and report Schwenger) basis UK interest preventing continental preferences as well as long run considerations outlined paragraph two above. Regretted high London officials preoccupied problems associated war effort. Expressed concern same situation Washington and Ottawa. Hoped issue would be pointed for all three capital terms long-run pattern economic organization Western World. Wilgress said might sound out other London officials if seemed useful.
7. Schwenger stated Washington reaction date extension not known beyond general statement we would stay Torquay if useful for multi-laterals. Would inform Wilgress through Baldwin.6
8. Wilgress asked whether non-OEEC GATT members had been informed. Thought advisable in some cases. Schwenger mentioned Cuba, dominions.
9. Agreed decision dates needed about one week, probably not earlier because psychological impact negotiations, probably not later because physical problems hotel arrangements and travel plans.
B. Entire tone Wilgress approach one of great concern. Apparently felt taking serious decision, might jeopardize his record as chairman GATT 7 if not successful but had to be tried view gravity issues involved.
Sent Department 395; repeated info London 184, Paris 32. For OSR.
- Supra.↩
- Milton Katz, United States Special Representative in Europe, Economic Cooperation Administration.↩
- Raymond Vernon of the Commercial Policy Staff, Department of State, was subsequently designated.↩
- See Torquay telegram 397, February 3, p. 1339.↩
- Respectively Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade, Hugh Gaitskell, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and (probably) Sir Edmund L. Hall-Patch, Permanent British Representative on the OEEC.↩
- Charles F. Baldwin, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs in the United Kingdom.↩
- Wilgress had been Chairman of various of the Sessions of the Contracting Parties.↩