Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

394.31/1–1251: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Torquay Conference (Corse) to the Secretary of State ¹

confidential
priority

Torquay, January 12, 1951—8 p. m.

343. For TAC member agencies.

1. Benelux delegation (Deltel 321²) on instruction their governments has formally issued invitation OEEC countries represented Torquay, Canada, US meet January 16 for purpose discuss desirability and procedure for multilateral tariff negotiations (Van Blankenstein proposal³), indicating that their appraisal results to date Torquay negotiations probably not result in considerable leveling discrepancies between European tariffs.

2. In private conversation Van Blankenstein indicated January 16 meeting exploratory and agreed impossible such multilateral negotiations be concluded or perhaps even started Torquay, that many technical difficulties in plan and that extremely doubtful acceptable high tariff countries, e.g. France and Italy. However, said acceptance such or similar program would enable Benelux sign Torquay protocol as could indicate such not end of program reduction of European tariffs.

3. Major objections to proposal appear (a) involves many technical difficulties, (b) leads to immediate consideration reduced rates should apply only to OEEC countries, (c) US and Canada may be requested contribute bargaining power, and (d) may result greater reluctancy give significant concessions Torquay negotiations.

4. Canadian delegation will attend as observer but indicate impossible to complete such negotiations under Torquay timetable and, since not on agenda, uninstructed.

5. Unless instructed otherwise US will attend meeting as observer, taking position if necessary (a) US favors maximum possible reduction tariff rates, (b) any program or procedure should not interfere maximum reductions Torquay negotiations, (c) as a general rule, unless overriding political considerations or within context GATT, US opposed preferential systems, (d) Van Blankenstein proposal is a method for reduction of tariffs and does not contain any policy considerations, i.e. no justification to assume average of OEEC country tariffs in necessarily lowest desirable or essential rate.

6. OSR Paris informed and may send representative if events warrant.

7. TAC members especially Labor, ECA, Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, request comments soonest respective agencies.⁴

Sent Department 343, repeated information Paris 20 (for OSR).

[Corse]

1. The Third Round of Tariff Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was convened at Torquay, England on September 28, 1950. For documentation regarding the Torquay Conference, see pp. 1245 ff. For information regarding the United States Delegation to the Conference, see footnote 2, p. 1245.
2. Torquay telegram 321, December 22, 1950, not printed.

3. For text of the “Van Blankenstein Proposal,” see infra. Dr. H. van Blanken-stein was Deputy Leader and Chief Negotiator of the Netherlands Delegation to the Torquay Conference.

   From early 1950 at the Fourth Session of the Contracting Parties to GATT, February 23 to April 3, 1950, the Netherlands Government had sought to make a major issue within GATT of the question of the renewed importance of tariffs in intra-European trade. The Netherlands position was that prohibitive tariffs which previously had been suspended were being reimposed in Europe and in many cases were worse than quantitative restrictions, to which GATT was paying so much attention in 1949–1950, in that prohibitions were replacing limitations. Delegations of the Netherlands to 1950 sessions of the Contracting Parties contended that the Netherlands was unable to negotiate down rates of high tariff countries because of the difference in tariff levels from which the negotiations commenced, unless binding of rates by low tariff countries were to be accepted as quid pro quo for substantial reductions.

   The view of United States experts was that the Netherlands had pointed out an extremely important issue which could be solved in part through the OEEC, which throughout 1950 was engaged in an effort to identify tariffs of European countries which had an inhibiting effect on intra-European trade.

4. Regarding the membership of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (TAC) and its role in the United States tariff negotiating process, see footnote 2, p. 1245.