Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

394.31/4–351: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Torquay Conference (Corse)

confidential
niact

Washington, April 3, 1951—6 p. m.

537. Corse from Beale and Raynor,¹ BNA. In opinion Dept highly desirable from polit viewpoint that agreement be concluded with NZ substantially along lines indicated Deltel 645.²

We are concerned by possibility that failure to reach agreements with UK, Austral, SoAfr and NZ will be interpreted as evidence of the establishment of a solid front by those Commonwealth countries presumed to have maximum interest in the maintenance of the imperial preference system. Most important therefore that positive action be taken to prevent the development of a greater degree of solidarity than now exists. The formation of a bloc at this time, or even the creation of the impression that such a bloc had been brought into being, wld greatly increase the likelihood that these four countries wld act in closer concert in future negots. It wld moreover become increasingly difficult for a single country to break away from the bloc in future negots and wld therefore greatly increase our difficulties in seeking favorable action on preferences in future. Further, the formation of a bloc as a result of concerted action on preferences at Torquay wld tend to establish a presumption of unity of policy in other related or even unrelated fields which might make difficult our dealings with individual countries of the group on other problems. We believe it is politically important to avoid the impression that the US cannot treat successfully with individual Commonwealth countries on trade and other problems, and equally to avoid the impression that the Commonwealth countries have aligned themselves against an important US program. These objectives will be served by the agreement concluded with Canad, but wld be further served by conclusion of an agreement with NZ which wld in such circumstances assume an importance out of proportion to the actual trade involved.³ [Beale and Raynor.]

Acheson

1. G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.
2. Negotiations between the United States and New Zealand had been proceeding satisfactorily, but the collapse of the United States-Australian negotiation had made it necessary for the United States to withdraw its offer to New Zealand on fine wools (the offer to New Zealand being conditional because of New Zealand’s position as a secondary supplier). In Torquay telegram 645, April 3, 1 a. m., the United States Delegation informed the Department of State of a TAC decision (with informal dissent by the Agriculture member) to attempt a limited agreement with New Zealand. The New Zealand Delegation was cabling its Government for instructions. The United States Delegation had emphasized that such an agreement would have to be ad referendum on the part of the United. States (presumably because of the negative vote of the Agriculture member). (394.31/ 4–351)
3. In telegram 659, April 6, 9 a. m., the Delegation at Torquay informed the Department of State that “New Zealand delegation today stated no basis for agreement. . . . Gave as reason lack of time for New Zealand Government to consider the situation arising out of altered circumstances which made possible only limited agreement. New Zealand delegation [had] no authority to negotiate limited agreement and apparently definite instructions from Wellington not received.” (394.31/4–651).