PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563
Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State 1
There is one point I feel I must make and make very clearly in regard to the current discussion on the NSC 68 series. The issue is extremely simple and should not be clouded by considerations such as those advanced in the S/P memorandum to you2 or in the discussion with you yesterday concerning European attitude or [of?] whether sacrifices etc. of rearmament are justified. Those fall into another category and should be considered separately.
The only issue here is whether or not the NSC 68 analysis of the Soviet Union is sufficiently accurate to serve as a guide for U.S. Government interpretation of Soviet actions and for an estimate of probable future Soviet moves. My entire position is that it is not; that it is not a true picture of how the Soviet Union operates insofar as I have [Page 178] observed it and studied it. Furthermore, I contend that Soviet actions since April 1950 do not fall harmoniously within the analysis of NSC 68. It must be recalled that NSC 68, the master paper on the Soviet Union, was completed less than three months before the Soviet Union took its most important single action since the close of hostilities, i.e., Korea. Yet NSC 68 would not set anybody’s mind to think of the | probability of such type action on the part of the Soviet bloc. In fact, as I read it, it rather tends to the thought that isolated actions of this character are less rather than more likely in the light of the general Soviet design. Furthermore, it seems to me that the significance of Korea and Chinese intervention particularly has been analyzed in the light of NSC 68 rather than as checks to determine the validity of the general thesis. In short, I repeat, there is one issue and one only, and that is whether or not this is an accurate analysis of the way the Soviet Union operates in international affairs.