Subject: Request for Approval of Results of Torquay
Tariff Negotions
The Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements herewith requests
your approval of the results of the Torquay Conference which has been
held, under the auspices of the countries parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for the purpose of arriving at agreement
on tariff concessions to be applied under the General Agreement.3 If
you approve, the United States will sign, on April 21, the
[Page 1246]
instruments embodying the
results of the negotiations, including principally:
By signature of the Protocol the United States will accept the results of
the negotiations and undertake to give effect on June 6, or on later
dates following such an undertaking by other governments, to tariff
concessions negotiated with the following countries:
Concessions obtained and granted by direct negotiations in which the
United States participated are contained in Annex A.4 Schedules containing all
concessions to be granted by each country are contained in Annex B.4
Signature of the Protocol will also constitute acceptance of the
obligation to maintain until January 1, 1954, with the usual escape
clauses unaffected, concessions previously granted. It will also
constitute acceptance of the modifications, withdrawals, and
compensations negotiated by certain countries at Torquay.
Signature of the decisions will constitute a vote in favor of accession
by each of the countries named in (b) above and
by the Philippines, which also negotiated at Torquay. The United States
is prevented, by the Philippine Trade Act, from entering into a trade
agreement with the Philippines. We did not therefore negotiate with this
country and have indicated that Article XXXV of the General Agreement
will be invoked in order to prevent the agreement from applying as
between the United States and the Philippines; there is no legal bar,
however, to voting in favor of accession by the Philippines.
In terms of trade coverage, the United States has secured at Torquay new
direct concessions on United States exports valued at over one billion
dollars. Additional trade will benefit from concessions granted by third
countries in negotiations among themselves. To secure these new
concessions, the United States bound or reduced duties on products
[Page 1247]
imports of which from the
respective negotiating countries amounted to about $270 million in 1949.
Imports of these same products from all countries amounted to $478
million in the same year. Summary tables containing trade data are
contained in Annex C.5
The firming up of most of the concessions previously granted at Geneva
and Annecy benefits an export trade of some two and a half billion
dollars (partly overlapping with the trade on which new concessions were
obtained at Torquay). Considerable adjustments were made by certain
countries in their schedules of concessions prior to their acceptance of
this undertaking, but in all cases the United States secured adequate
compensation in the form of new concessions for all concessions of
interest which were withdrawn or modified. For this firming up of old
concessions the United States granted only a reciprocal guarantee to
continue our Geneva and Annecy concessions subject to the usual
safeguards.
There is no dissent by any member of the Interdepartmental Committee to
any of these recommendations. Since no agreement was reached with the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India or Cuba,
part of the authority to grant concessions which you have previously approved has not been used, and some of
the most controversial concessions have not been made, including the
principal concessions contemplated on the following: wool, woolen
textiles, cotton textiles, earthenware and china, leather goods. All of
the concessions for which approval is sought are within the limits of
authority previously granted.
A fuller description of the results of the Conference and of the reasons
for some of the major decisions taken is contained in Annex D.
Annex D
Memorandum by the Interdepartmental Committee on
Trade Agreements
secret
[Torquay, April 9, 1951.]
Results of the Torquay Negotiations
The Third Set of Tariff Negotiations under the auspices of the
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
convened at Torquay, England on September 28, 1950 for the purpose
of furthering the reduction of tariff barriers by multilateral
agreement within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade
[Page 1248]
of October 30,
1947.6 These
negotiations are now in their final stage and if their results are
approved by the President, the United States will sign the Torquay
Protocol on April 21, thereby accepting these results and obligating
the United States to give effect to its concessions on the
forty-sixth day following signature or on such later dates as the
countries with which individual concessions were negotiated give
effect to their concessions.
As were past conferences of this kind, this conference was conducted
by means of a series of simultaneous bilateral negotiations among
pairs of participating countries, the bilateral negotiations in this
case numbering about 150. At the close of each successful
negotiation, the concessions granted by each country were circulated
to all other participating countries for inspection of overall
results. After the close of this multilateral stage, which is now in
progress, each country’s concessions to all others, with any
appropriate modifications, will be incorporated into the agreement
in the form of a single list of concessions which will be granted to
all parties to the agreement.7
[Page 1249]
Three groups of bilateral negotiations were carried on at Torquay:
(1) negotiations by countries already parties to the General
Agreement for the purpose of putting concessions granted at Geneva
in 1947 and at Annecy in 1948 on a firmer basis for an additional
three years; (2) negotiations among the contracting parties for new
concessions among themselves, beyond those previously negotiated at
Geneva or Annecy; (3) negotiations by six new countries which wish
to accede to the agreement, such negotiations being both between
themselves and with contracting parties.
The countries which participated are (a) the
following contracting parties: Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
Dominican Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Haiti, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United
Kingdom and United States; (b) the following
acceding countries: Austria, Germany,
Korea, Peru, Philippines and Turkey; and (c)
Uruguay, which negotiated for accession at Annecy but did not sign
the Annecy Protocol in time to accede in accordance with the terms
of that Protocol.
Before agreeing to the firming up of Geneva and Annecy concessions,
several countries negotiated with the other contracting parties for
the purpose of modifying or withdrawing some of their concessions
and making compensatory concessions. Although not initiating any
action of this kind, the United States participated in the
negotiations for this purpose with twelve countries, namely Benelux, Brazil, Chile, Cuba,
Denmark, Finland, France, Haiti, Italy, New Zealand, South Africa,
Uruguay. All of these negotiations were concluded except one of the
items still under discussion with Cuba.8
Negotiations directed to the mutual exchange of new concessions were
undertaken with the following 17 contracting parties: Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom. Negotiations were however not
completed with the following five: The United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, Cuba and India. New negotiations were also
[Page 1250]
undertaken and
successfully completed with all of the acceeding countries except
the Philippines, with which the United States may not, by domestic
law, negotiate a trade agreement. To comply with the requirement of
the Philippine Trade Act to this effect, the United States not only
refrained from bilateral negotiations but intends to notify the
contracting parties that, while welcoming the Philippines as a party
to the agreement, it is necessary to invoke Article XXXV of the
agreement to prevent it from applying between the United States and
the Philippines because of this Act.
Results of each of these categories of negotiation are discussed in
succeeding sections.
i. extension of existing concessions
As drafted at Geneva in 1947, the General Agreement provided that
concessions granted would not be withdrawn except in various
specified circumstances until January 1, 1951, after which they
could be withdrawn by a simple process to be preceded by
renegotiation. When plans for the Torquay Conference were
formulated, it was decided that, although these existing concessions
might continue in force after January 1951, it would be desirable to
obtain agreement by the parties to substitute the later date of
January 1, 1954 and so assure a continuation of concessions free
from the rights under Article XXVIII for an additional period.
This change, which involved an amendment of Article XXVIII of the
Agreement, will have been accomplished by the Torquay Conference
when two-thirds of the parties (the required majority) accept the
amendment which has been included in the Torquay Protocol, to be
opened for signature on April 21. A declaration, by which countries
agree not to invoke Article XXVIII until January 1954 will also be
opened for signature, to cover the period prior to the entry into
force of the amendment.
Before accepting the extension of time on concessions previously
granted, a number of countries indicated that they would have to
exercise their right under Article XXVIII as originally drafted to
withdraw or modify certain concessions which they felt they could no
longer maintain. In accordance with that Article, however, they were
ready to negotiate (attempt to agree) with the parties with which
such concessions had initially been negotiated and with others
substantially interested as to what other equivalent concessions
they should grant in exchange. In all cases the United States was
able to obtain substitute concessions which the Committee believes
constitute adequate compensation. It may therefore be said that the
tariff reduction previously achieved has not been impaired in any of
these negotiations.
[Page 1251]
Not all countries exercised their right to renegotiate particular
items prior to accepting amendment of Article XXVIII. After
examination of the cases in which interested parties in the United
States had urged that we exercise this right, none were found to
justify the risk that any use of the right would create widespread
demand for similar treatment of many other products. The United
States did not, therefore, exercise this right with respect to any
items, although it did renegotiate a few minor technical adjustments
under another procedure. Canada also refrained from exercising this
right, and the United Kingdom made only very limited use of it.
Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Greece, India, Liberia,
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia also refrained from Article XXVIII
action on any item.
The total coverage of United States exports on which concessions were
obtained at Geneva is, in terms of 1949 export trade, something like
2 billion dollars. At Annecy we obtained commitments on another half
billion dollars worth of export trade. With relatively minor
exceptions discussed below, the undertaking to continue the
favorable treatment specified in the General Agreement for at least
another three years will thereby have been secured. Even at the cost
of somewhat more extensive renegotiation than was contemplated it is
a major achievement to have firmed up these important guarantees for
United States export trade.
The largest group of concessions originally negotiated with the
United States which eventually were notified under this article were
Cuba’s concessions to the United States on a group of articles
including cotton and rayon textile items on which concessions had
been granted to the United States at Geneva.
The trade in question was valued in 1949 at about $33 million
(imports into Cuba of U.S. merchandise), or some 8 percent of total
imports into Cuba from the United States. The United States
originally undertook to renegotiate with Cuba the rayon and cotton
textile items which made up the bulk of this trade as a result of
Cuba’s representations at Annecy that she faced a crisis in her
textile industry. Long negotiations at Torquay failed, however, to
result in the offer by Cuba of rayon textile rates which the United
States was willing to accept. Thereupon Cuba decided to modify rayon
rates in question under the procedure of Article XXVIII. This move
was one which Cuba was fully entitled to make; the rates thus set
were fixed by unilateral action of Cuba, and the United States did
not accept them. We did, however, accept compensation for this
action which was separately reported to you in March and which the
Committee believes offers satisfactory alternative opportunity for
expansion of American trade.
Subsequently, for technical reasons, Cuba decided to transfer to
Article XXVIII the modifications in cotton textile rates and the
compensation
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therefor
which had been agreed upon with the United States, so that all of
these negotiations as well as negotiations on relatively minor items
notified from the start under Article XXVIII have now been effected
under a single procedure. This agreement was completed at Torquay,
subject to your approval.
Still later, upon representations by the United States that Cuban
treatment of American rice is not in accordance with Cuba’s
agreement obligations, Cuba notified this concession also under
Article XXVIII and negotiation in regard to it will be carried
forward after Torquay under a special procedure adopted for such
cases.
The next largest group of concessions initially negotiated with the
United States and modified or withdrawn under Article XXVIII were
those of France which, as initially proposed, affected a trade
valued at over $20 million, or 10 percent of the trade covered by
France’s Geneva concessions on dutiable items. The items were all in
the machinery and equipment fields, as were the compensatory
concessions finally obtained after extended negotiations. In the
negotiations the scope of proposed unfavorable action by France was
considerably reduced, and significantly more compensation was
obtained than was first offered. The Committee believes that good
compensation is now offered.
South Africa originally wanted to withdraw or modify concessions on a
trade valued at about $40 million but was persuaded to continue the
most important part of the concession on agricultural tractors,
which accounted for two-fifths of the trade involved, and to give a
binding of the duty on automobile parts in exchange for other
modifications which will allow South Africa somewhat greater
protection for developing light industries, while continuing
favorable treatment on American export specialties.
The other Article XXVIII negotiations were considerably less serious,
and it is believed that in all cases in which United States trade
was involved adequate compensation was obtained, whether the
concessions involved were initially negotiated with the United
States or some other country. The texts of the Article XXVIII
agreements in all of these cases are contained in Annex A.
ii. new negotiations with contracting
parties
Of the fifteen negotiations with seventeen existing contracting
parties (one negotiation with all three Benelux countries), ten were successfully concluded.
Five were terminated without agreement, namely those with the United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Cuba and India.
Of the agreements obtained, the best by far is with Canada, both
qualitatively and quantitatively. A good though much smaller
agreement was also obtained with France. Of the others, small
agreements
[Page 1253]
were
concluded with Indonesia and Brazil and five rather small agreements
were concluded with other European countries. The latter were
limited partly because we had negotiated only two years ago with
some of them (Denmark, Italy, Sweden), partly because such countries
as Benelux, Norway, Sweden and
Denmark have relatively low tariffs in which they have already given
concessions. They now hesitate to give more partly to maintain some
domestic protection and partly because they feel bound to secure
first some reduction in the existing disparity of tariff levels
between themselves and other European countries with high tariffs,
notably France and Italy. The coming of the time when it will no
longer be possible for balance of payment reasons to restrict
imports by quantitative restrictions, and the resulting greater
importance of tariffs undoubtedly also played a part.
The United Kingdom agreement failed partly for reasons of this order
but mainly for other reasons. The ending of Marshall Plan aid
highlighted the probability that the time would soon come when the
United Kingdom would be expected to relax substantially quantitative
restrictions now maintained for balance of payments reasons, and
this prospect increased British reluctance to reduce tariffs.
Probably the most important single consideration in the formulation
of the British position was the slender majority of the Labor Party
in the House of Commons and the fear that any action to reduce
protection, particularly any action to impair the Commonwealth
preference system, would strengthen the opposition.
From the beginning of the conference there was evidence that the
United Kingdom not only proposed to make very meager offers but was
encouraging Commonwealth countries to do likewise. This was
accompanied by a firm attitude that such offers should nevertheless
be worth the grant by the United States of all or nearly all of our
controversial offers, which made up the bulk of the requests the
United Kingdom had made on the United States. Repeated and
unsuccessful efforts were made to secure from the United Kingdom
expanded offers adequate to justify the granting of the bulk of our
controversial offers. At the same time we drastically reduced our
requests on the British, which had originally been based on the
assumption that a very comprehensive agreement would be obtained. In
spite of this, it was made clear by the British that the only terms
on which an agreement could be secured would be by our offering
concessions on most of the controversial items, including woolen and
cotton textiles, leather, china and earthenware, with other good
offers thrown in, in exchange for concessions by the British no one
of which offered any break in the preferential system and no one of
which offered any substantial improvement in British treatment of
United States agricultural products.
[Page 1254]
Three main arguments were used by the British to defend this
position. First, they maintained that the dollar shortage made it
impossible for them to offer more substantial concessions. Secondly,
as concerns preferences, they indicated that in their judgment, this
was no time to weaken the ties within the Commonwealth and that it
was contrary to United States interest to seek to do so. Finally,
they claimed their offers balanced ours.
As for the dollar shortage argument, it is clear that so long as the
dollar shortage exists, the United Kingdom will in any case maintain
quantitative restrictions which prevent any undue increase in
British dollar purchases, and therefore the agreement would be
somewhat one-sided even if our requests were met. As for the
political wisdom of reducing preferences and thereby weakening
Commonwealth ties, this argument was felt to be irrelevant since in
fact no such result would have occurred; in fact in some cases it
developed that the Commonwealth country involved had no objection to
reductions and the only obstacle was the United Kingdom
attitude.
So far as the balance of offers was concerned, total United Kingdom
offers covered 1947 trade valued at $130,000,000 compared with our
offers of $122,000,000; but the United Kingdom offers covered only
11 percent of our trade, whereas ours covered 55 percent of our
imports from the United Kingdom. Furthermore, of the British offers,
$100,-000,000 represented bindings of existing rates, most of which
were worthless, and reductions were only $30,000,000 (the United
States offers were almost entirely reductions in duty). If 1948
figures were used, the figure for total United Kingdom offers would
have been about half of that for 1947. Qualitatively, the United
Kingdom offers were small, and there were no offers at all on our
most important exports, agricultural products, and no significant
reductions in preference. In fact there were only two or three
offers which we could by any stretch of the imagination call
important.
The Delegation was well aware, throughout, of the seriousness of not
having an agreement with the United Kingdom but likewise believed
that unless there were adequate concessions by the United Kingdom,
it would be impossible to grant United States concessions on various
controversial items. Its efforts were, therefore, directed toward
securing a good and comprehensive agreement.
In the middle of March, the lack of substantial United Kingdom offers
was explained to the Department of State which agreed that an
unbalanced agreement should not be made and accordingly a note was
handed to the Foreign Office by the United States Ambassador. The
note warned that failure of the British to make additional
concessions, including reductions in Empire preferences, might lead
to no agreement at all and that in any event a one-sided agreement
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would not be
possible. Protracted meetings followed with no change whatever in
the British position.
The impasse with the United Kingdom which arose, as indicated above,
primarily because of their unwillingness to offer us any significant
reductions in duties on agricultural products or in preferences,
necessarily gave rise to a similar impasse in the negotiations with
the other Dominions, particularly Australia. The United Kingdom has
commitments with the Dominions under which the United Kingdom is
obliged to obtain the consent of the Dominions before it reduces
preferences. In our negotiations with the Dominions we insisted that
part of the price for our offers to them (especially, in the case of
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, raw wool) was their
agreement to the reduction of preferences in the United Kingdom or
other parts of the Commonwealth. In view of the stated unwillingness
of Australia to release the United Kingdom to the extent necessary
to grant the concessions we desired, the Committee decided that we
would be unable to grant Australia the very controversial concession
on wool without which no agreement was possible. As in the case of
the United Kingdom, high level approaches to the Australian
Government were unavailing. Without the concession on wool, no
agreement could be concluded with New Zealand or South Africa.
On the issue of preferences, Canada adopted a much more cooperative
attitude: although Canada was unwilling to grant us preference
reductions where to do so would have meant breaking contractual
commitment to the other parts of the Commonwealth, she readily
agreed to release the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth
countries from any obligations which would have prevented these
countries from meeting our requests. On most items involved, the
United Kingdom professed its inability to make concessions because
of commitments to countries other than Canada, but even in the case
of items (such as canned salmon) on which the preference was bound
only to Canada, and on which Canada had granted releases, the United
Kingdom refused to make any offer.
In the circumstances, it was not possible in the judgment of the
Delegation, to make any agreement whatever with the United Kingdom
since the United Kingdom insisted that even a limited agreement
would have had to include offers by us which we would not feel
justified in making on the basis of the poor offers forthcoming from
the United Kingdom. This position was strengthened by the fact that
such an agreement might have become public just as the Senate voted
upon extension of the Trade Agreements Act. More basically, it is
felt that the United States tariff has now been reduced to a point
where it is of real importance to conserve the bargaining power
remaining to secure the substantial reductions in tariff levels and
preferences which we still hope to obtain.
[Page 1256]
Failure of the negotiations with Cuba must be attributed primarily to
lack of time for adequate negotiations. By the time the textile and
other Article XXVIII negotiations had been completed it was March,
and the ranking members of the Cuban delegation had already left
Torquay, apparently leaving instructions that in no event was the
delegation to accept any form of modification of the United States
present commitment on sugar, which would adversely affect the
concession if domestic quota legislation in the United States ever
lapsed, as was desired by this Government. Agreement to some
provisions along this line was requested by the United States in
return for any further reduction in the duty on Cuban sugar. When it
finally became evident that sugar would not be included in the
agreement, almost no time remained to negotiate for adequate
concessions to match our other offers.
For all of these reasons, part of the authority granted to make
concessions was not used. Valuable results have nevertheless been
obtained for those concessions which were granted. In all, the
United States obtained direct concessions on exports to these
countries totaling about $400 million, about three-fourths of which
in concessions from Canada. It is not possible to give at this time
a figure for the additional benefit we will derive from concessions
by other contracting parties among themselves, but such benefits
will be substantial. Among the outstanding concessions obtained in
our own negotiations are reductions by Canada in duties on salt beef
and pork, grapefruit juice and apples, gelatine, liquid medicinal
compounds, petroleum products, miscellaneous machinery, automobile
parts, rubber tires and hose. Other important Canadian concessions
were listed in the separate memorandum on Canada submitted to the
President on March 23. From France important concessions obtained
are reductions on dried fruit, lard, fruit juices, various
chemicals, air-conditioning machinery, truck trailers, aircraft, and
a number of types of scientific apparatus. From Benelux we obtained concessions
improving treatment of United States wheat, dried fruit, canned
vegetables and canned fruit. Low duties were bound on certain
chemicals, rubber tires, pneumatic tools, cranes and hoisting
apparatus and electric drills.
In exchange for these and many other concessions, the United States
granted concessions on products imports of which from the country
with which each concession was negotiated amounted to about $182
million. This figure does not include the value of imports of these
same commodities from negotiating countries other than the one to
which each concession was granted by initial negotiations nor does
it include imports from other countries, though all imports of the
commodities in question will benefit, regardless of country of
origin. Principal concessions involved by the United States in point
of difficulty are reductions
[Page 1257]
in duties on sheet glass (Benelux), lace and table wines
(France), plywood, aluminum, cheese and canned salmon (Canada).
Duties on lead and zinc are also reduced by negotiation with Canada
and, in the case of lead Peru, but the rates established are those
which were in effect until January 1, 1951 under the agreement with
Mexico which was terminated effective on that date.
Of these, only the reductions on sheet glass, Douglas fir plywood and
aluminum were reductions to the limit of the authority under the
Trade Agreements Act, and in view of heavy demands for rearmament
and related purposes imports of these products will hardly be any
greater than they would have been without the concession for some
time to come, and there will be no threat of injury to the domestic
industries. In the case of the food products, imports of both salmon
and cheese are very small in relation to domestic production and
there is at present no surplus of cheese. The reduction in laces is
a very moderate one, from 40 to 35 percent, and leaves a substantial
duty.
All of these concessions granted and obtained are contained in the
final bilateral offer lists contained in Annex A. Tables in Annex C
show the trade coverage of concessions obtained and of concessions
granted, in each case by country.
iii. negotiations with acceding countries
Negotiations with the acceding countries were very satisfactory.
Apart from the trade benefits obtained for United States commerce,
accession by these countries will bring into effect for Germany,
Austria, Turkey, Korea, the Philippines and Peru a set of guarantees
of fair treatment and a set of standards for the regulation of their
commercial policies which is now standard throughout most of the
trading countries of the world. The guarantee of most-favored-nation
treatment in tariff matters and in internal restrictions on use of
imports may be particularly important in the case of ex-enemy
countries. Conversely, it will be especially useful to have Germany
bound by the rules of the General Agreement during the present
formative period in its commercial policy since it is no longer
possible to influence German policy directly.
Concessions were obtained by the United States in negotiations with
the acceding countries on trade totaling over $660 million in 1949,
most of which consisted of concessions by Germany, and we should
obtain very substantial additional benefits from negotiations by the
acceding countries with other countries since the average number of
negotiations by these countries was relatively high. Germany, for
example, completed 20 negotiations, Austria 20, Peru 13, Turkey 18,
while only Korea’s negotiations were few (5).
[Page 1258]
In exchange, the United States negotiated concessions on imports from
the negotiating countries valued in 1949 at about $82 million,
including reductions to Germany on various chemicals, Christmas tree
ornaments, certain scientific instruments, mechanical toys and
cameras valued over $10 each, a reduction to Peru (and the Dominican
Republic) in the rate on sugar imported at the most-favored-nation
rate, a reduction to Peru on bonito and a reduction to Turkey in the
rate on raisins. With the possible exception of the reduction on
raisins, of which imports are insignificant but on which there is an
agricultural support program, none of these concessions is highly
controversial, and rates on a number of the German items remain
high. Cuba retains a margin of preference on sugar of 20 percent,
the minimum preference which she regards as due her. The sugar
concession, as in the case of the Dominican Republic, is subject to
termination in the event United States quota legislation should
lapse.
The apparent imbalance between the value of concessions granted and
concessions obtained, with the balance heavily in our favor, is
explained partly by the fact that as always our concessions actually
apply to imports from all countries, so that a fairer picture might
be obtained by considering imports of the products in question from
all countries. Furthermore, however, the quality of concessions
granted is in this case much better than the quality of concessions
obtained. Peru, to take one case, has had a considerable inflation
as a result of which her old specific duties no longer provide the
protection they were designed to give. This country has therefore
revised its tariff and the concessions we have obtained are
reductions from or, oftener, bindings of tariffs which have been
revised upward since the conclusion of the bilateral agreement
between the United States and Peru in 1943.
Austria, to take another example, has given valuable concessions but
not as valuable in the long run as would appear from the trade
figure of $30 million which enters into the above total, since in
the year in question recovery shipments were still being made on a
scale which will not continue when our assistance terminates. In the
case of Germany, also, our export trade is likely to fall off when
we no longer are contributing to German recovery. Furthermore,
nearly $400 million out of the total $660 million on which
concessions were obtained from the five countries consists of
shipments of three commodities to Germany, namely, wheat, corn and
cotton, on all of which we obtained only a binding, although in two
cases a binding of free entry. Unfortunately, on wheat it was not
possible to reduce the German duty of 20 percent, but it should be
borne in mind that the German concessions were made from a tariff
drawn up under the supervision of
[Page 1259]
Allied representatives who exercised a
restraining influence on the level of tariffs adopted which was not
present in the tariff revisions of other countries. Even so, though
not succeeding in reducing the wheat tariff, reductions were
obtained from Germany in duties on fat pork, concentrated milk,
dried fruit and dried peas. An important additional guarantee
included in this agreement is the commitment that Germany will admit
a favorable quota of American motion picture films.
The concessions granted and obtained in negotiations with acceding
countries are contained in Annex A.
iv. conclusion
Altogether, at Torquay, new direct concessions have been obtained
(though to a considerable extent on products covered earlier) on
United States exports valued at over a billion dollars. Concessions
have been granted on products imports of which from the negotiating
countries amounted to about $270 million in 1949. Imports of these
products from all countries amounted in the same year to $478
million. A substantial new agreement was made with Canada which
reaffirms through positive action the policy of promoting the
greatest possible harmonization of the economies of the two
countries. Smaller but valuable agreements have been obtained in
addition with eight ERP countries
and with Turkey, Indonesia, Korea and three American Republics.
Among the acceding countries are Germany and Austria which through
this agreement are fully recognized as members of the international
trading community. Finally, the United States secured a firming up
of concessions previously obtained on exports valued at something
like two and a half billion dollars.
