Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

759.5–MAP/7–2751: Telegram

The Chargé in Denmark (Shantz) to the Secretary of State

secret

Copenhagen, July 27, 1951—7 p. m.

84. Excon. Toisa. In very satisfactory mtg yesterday extending about two hours between Linder and Kristiansen,¹ acting chief FonOff econ sec, attended by Emb and other Den reps fol discussed.

1. List I additions. Linder explained fully legis and admin background Kem and Battle bills² and reasons behind our COCOM proposals. Stressing our interest in multilateral approach he urged Den accept maximum number additions to list as well as other proposals; in answer to questioning assuaged Den feelings by explaining why Nor has recd exemption.

To Kristiansen’s contention Battle bill seemed best suited for bilateral arrangements Linder again emphasized US preference for multilateral approach altho admitting US wld continue wish to be consulted bilaterally. Kristiansen then stated Den ready accept “majority” of list I additions (when Linder hoped this meant very substantial majority Kristiansen agreed stating “all but small minority of items” with qualification experts’ study not yet completed) but that it wld be difficult for Den to accept a few items. Altho some technical difficulties posed by remainder US proposals he foresaw no reason why Den cld not agree.

In conclusion Kristiansen stated his belief Den can give satisfaction and will go along as far as security interests involved “even if it hurts”. Fact Den does not have diversified line of goods advantageous in COCOM since this makes easier acceptance additions to list I but is weakness from point of view of negots with bloc since Den cannot offer as wide a range of goods as can other countries.

2. Re auto parts for Pol, Linder stressed urgency for Den to present full story re effect nondelivery or delay in delivery of parts on coal shipments from Pol, which Kristiansen agreed to do latest Monday.³

3. Re res in CD to embargo scarce items to bloc, Kristiansen led into this by stating that “rightly or wrongly” Den concerned over US attitude which implied econ warfare. Den had hoped raise question in CD and was disappointed its del had not done so. Linder countered with statement it was difficult understand why Den alone had held out when other countries with similar interest had agreed altho we had suspected reasons for concern of Danes were unfounded. He outlined reasons, expanding on Spofford memo of July 6,⁴ why it was reasonable in certain circumstances direct embargo to bloc. As illustration Linder pointed out that NATO countries clearly entitled first priority on scarce items, next other countries which supply materials essential to def effort of NATO, etc., until it was clear bloc might be last on list of priorities, thus insuring that it wld in practice obtain no scarce materials or items. Kristiansen grasped at this concept and indicated strongly as personal opinion that if para 5 of D. D. (51) 158⁵ cld be reworded to indicate priority concept with bloc on bottom of list rather than embargo his govt cld agree to res. While Danes feel strongly about their principle in this matter, Linder and Emb sense from the mtg that Danes are embarrassed to be alone; hence we believe shld be possible find words which they wld accept.

Conclusions: as result of Linder talks which allayed basic Den fears on econ warfare, Emb thinks Den will:

(1) Help in reaching agrmt in COCOM on additional list I items.

(2) Agree to other proposals in COCOM.

(3) Agree to rewording of the CD res embodying principle of priority rather than denial to bloc.

Sent Dept 84, rptd info London 10 for Spofford, Paris 9.

Shantz

1. Erling Kristiansen.
2. For information concerning the Kem Amendment, see the editorial note, p. 1073; for information concerning the Battle Act, see the editorial note, p. 1176.
3. For information concerning National Security Council action on the question of the export of automobile parts via Denmark for Poland, see the Report prepared by the Department of State and the Economic Cooperation Administration, August 24, p. 1169.
4. Not printed, but see Depto 58 from London, July 17, p. 1149.
5. NATO document D–D (51) 158 of October 24, 1951, “Use of Export Controls to Insure Adequate Supplies for NATO Military Production,” is not printed. (NATO Sub-Registry) For information concerning an earlier draft of this document, see footnote 2, p. 1094.