Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

460.509/7–2051: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

secret
niact

Bern, July 20, 1951—5 p. m.

115. We are seriously concerned about instrs sent to Linder re Excon negots with Swiss (Deptel 439 sent Paris, rptd info Bern 125, July 19)¹ as we believe position requested by Dept wld have most critical effect on our relations with Swiss. It is our understanding that Swiss objections on principle to absolute embargo all strategic items were communicated to Dept well in advance of opening of negots in Bern (Legtel 1515 May 10).² Dept’s reply (Deptel 1525 rptd info Paris 6027 May 11)³ gave us impression there was some understanding of this position in Dept. Since that time, although we have been aware that US objective was to persuade Swiss adopt de facto embargo on all items, we supposed that eventually it might be necessary or advisable to conclude practical arrangement whereby minimum quotas were maintained on a certain few items.

In Legtel 1551 rptd Paris 193, May 20,⁴ it was suggested that before any US del was sent to Bern scope and purpose of negots be well understood on both sides. It seemed at that time that there wld be no practical reason for negotiating if Swiss intended to maintain principle of “normal trade” as it was then conceived. Fact that Swiss accepted proposal for negots on whole problem gave us fairly clear indication that they were prepared to make concessions. By same token we consider that willingness on our part to enter negots gave Swiss understandable reason for thinking that we also were willing make concessions. Otherwise there wld appear to be very little purpose in having negots or for sending US deleg to Bern.

In para 5 Deptel 1772, rptd info Paris 7020, June 22⁵ Dept stated that “objection of US negots must be obtained complete as possible de facto embargo, etc.”, indicating once more that solution on basis something less than total and absolute embargo might be acceptable if Swiss refused to go whole way, and it must have been apparent from Legtel’s to Dept since opening of negots that Swiss were expecting that arrangement wld be reached which wld fall somewhere short of original US objective. Fact that part of del remained to continue discussions after Linder’s departure certainly gave Swiss good reason hope that their expectations wld be fulfilled.

Up to receipt of reftel we had no reason to think that US del in effect had no auth to agree to arrangement on any basis different from original US terms. We also had no reason to think that the question of US action on pending license applications was not tied into present negots. Swiss have made it very obvious since outset that they expected some change in US attitude on licensing if reasonably satisfactory agreement cld be reached in Bern.

We do not wish to speak for del since we have not had opportunity discuss details with Linder since receipt of reftel. We do wish however to record with Dept Leg’s opinion that Dept’s instruction places del in an intolerable position and will almost surely, if carried out, provoke charges of bad faith against which we have no good defense. In view these convictions we sincerely hope that Dept’s final instrs will be framed so as to avoid the difficulties which we have outlined. In any event wld appreciate reply soonest.

Linder has been informed that Leg does not believe it wise for him to return to Bern if acting under present instrs. Linder agrees that situation must be clarified and will stand by in Paris pending word from Dept.

Sent Dept niact 115, rptd info Paris niact 24 for Linder.

Patterson

1. Supra.
2. Not printed; it reported on discussion between Embassy officials and representatives of the Swiss Government concerning what steps the Swiss were taking to meet United States desires regarding items on the international lists. (460.509/5–1051)
3. Not printed; it stated that the Department of State had two objectives in negotiating with the Swiss Government and they were to release needed exports to Switzerland as soon as the Swiss gave assurances that it would not allow these materials to be exported to the Soviet bloc and to convince Switzerland to adopt adequate control over all List items. (454.119/5–1151)
4. Not printed; it briefly summarized preliminary talks with the Swiss Government concerning the subject of export controls. (460.509/5–2051)
5. Ante, p. 1128.