Office of the Historian

460.509/7–951: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1

secret
priority
niact
Washington, July 9, 1951—4 p. m.

154. Excon. For Linder.

1. If on basis negotiating situation London you continue believe desirable authorize missions approach other Govts before conclusion Tri policy talks Dept will concur and send instructions accordingly. However, we wld appreciate your reviewing recommendations in Embtel 136, July 72 in light of fol.

2. On basis past experience we believe that UK position crucial and that unlikely other COCOM countries will embargo any item in which they have any trade unless UK takes lead. We therefore believe principal objective Tri talks is to obtain as large a measure UK support as possible and that if US now in effect makes unilateral approach Brit may not be so firmly behind US at time of presentation proposals to CG. We continue believe US position shld be one of urging that possibility Tri presentation to CG be kept open until extent of agreement clear.

3. We had assumed that once extent of UK–Fr agreement with US proposals was clear US wld examine extent agreement to see whether or not Tri coverage adequate or whether it was still essential to supplement Tri proposals with unilateral US proposals. Suggestion in Embtel 136 wld in effect commit us to supplementary unilateral approach even if UK and Fr had agreed to a satis package.

4. We had attached considerable importance not only to Linder’s presentation specific proposals to CG but also this opportunity to give CG better understanding US legis situation. We question whether missions on basis of Deptel 60713 or any tel can make our case as effectively and also feel that series of unilateral approaches tends to detract from US assertion that it wishes to continue handle export control questions on a multilateral basis in a multilateral forum.4

Acheson
  1. Drafted by Camp and cleared with Leddy, Peterson, and Thomas Beale, Acting Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. Same as telegram 7021 to Paris, June 22, p. 1129.↩

  4. Paragraph 5 of the original draft, which was omitted before the transmission of the source text, reads as follows: “If on reconsideration you nevertheless believe time factor and negotiating situation such that US 1–A list and gen info QC and exception proposals should be given other countries prior to CG mtg, it might be better for Dept to handle given fact that other countries will undoubtedly raise questions such as effect of cease-fire on Kem Amendment and gen relationship between US approach and COCOM negotiations. It is clearly desirable that uniform answers be given to these and other questions which may be difficult anticipate.”

    On July 10 the Department of State sent circular telegram 36 to all COCOM capitals advising diplomatic officers in the various embassies to inform the Foreign Ministries in their countries of the nature of the proposals which the U.S. Delegation would make to CG as outlined in telegram 7021 to Paris, June 22 (ibid.). (460.509/7–1051)

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