PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563
Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen)1
top secret
[Washington,] August 22, 1951.
The current reexamination and bringing up to date of the NSC 68 series will perhaps afford a convenient
opportunity to introduce more precision and accuracy in the analysis of the
Soviet Union’s international policy. While the main premises of NSC 68 remain valid, a more precise definition
of the pattern of Soviet behavior in international affairs would reduce
appreciably, I believe, certain general and highly speculative statements
concerning Soviet purposes which are contained in the original NSC analysis and contained in its subsequent
revisions.
The importance of an accurate and precise estimate of Soviet purposes goes
without saying, since such an estimate is in large measure the basis for
many of our actions in the field and the programs on which we are currently
operating. An imprecise analysis of the nature of the Soviet danger may not
only lead us into incorrect action in the foreign field but might place our
justification and reason for the efforts we are currently undertaking in the
defense field at the mercy of a traditional shift in Soviet tactics.
[Page 164]
The following observations therefore are not designed to supplant the main
thesis of the NSC 68 series, i.e., the vital
necessity of a build up of US force and that of our allies, but are put
forward for consideration in the current review. It is my belief that the
proper approach is to deal insofar as possible, either with facts whenever
they are available, and certain factors in regard to the Soviet Union and
its policies which are generally undisputed and which have remained constant
during the entire existence of the Soviet Union rather than highly
speculative and controversial opinion as to “Soviet intentions”. It is my
belief that speculation as to Soviet intentions which can neither be proved
nor disproved is unnecessary in order to demonstrate the vital necessity of
an adequate military defense in the free world. The acceptance of this
thought by persons who have had no actual experience with the Soviet problem
tends to play down dangerously the effect of our own actions upon Soviet
policy. They are moreover dangerous since if events should prove them
inaccurate—which they might—a good deal of the foundation and justification
for our current effort might be pulled out from under us.
[Annex]
Memorandumz by the Counselor (Bohlen)
top secret
[Washington, August 22, 1951.]
The Soviet Union is both a first-class power and the directing center of
an international conspiracy. The same small group of men both control
and direct the Soviet Union as a country, and control and direct the
organizations of international communism. It is in the dual nature of
the Soviet regime that lies the continuing menace to the United States
and any countries of the non-Soviet world. This menace will not be
removed as long as the Soviet Union continues to exist in its present
form regardless of whether the Soviet Union is in a period of expansion
or is relatively quiescent. The doctrine which animates the men who
control both the Soviet Government and the international communist
organization is implacably, unrelentlessly and unappeasably hostile to
the United States and any regime not under Kremlin control. This factor
alone taken in conjunction with the fact that the Soviet Union and the
countries it controls are heavily armed and are continuously rearming is
sufficient in itself to require the United States and the countries of
the free world to maintain military establishments adequate to
counterbalance the armaments, actual or potential, of the Soviet bloc.
It is not necessary to justify this elementary requirement of our
national survival on any particular phase of Soviet activity. The need
for adequate defense will remain as long
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as the Soviet regime continues in power or until
there is so fundamental a change in its present structure as radically
to alter the entire world situation.
In the eyes of Soviet rulers, they are in a constant state of warfare
with all non-Soviet powers and organizations. However, the chief purpose
of the Soviet Union is not the world-wide extension of communism to
which all other considerations are subordinated, but rather the reverse.
The world revolutionary movement is since the inception of Stalin’s
dictatorship in Russia the servant and not the master of the Soviet
Union. Ever since his accession to power the guiding thought of the
Stalinist Group has been that under no circumstances and for no
revolutionary gains must the Soviet state be involved in risks to the
maintenance of Soviet power in Russia. The process of imperialistic
expansion will always take place when opportunities for such expansion
exist without serious risk to the maintenance of Soviet power in Russia,
but will not be undertaken if in the eyes of the Kremlin the acquisition
of any positions for communism involve a serious risk to the Soviet
system.
Soviet actions since the end of World War II confirm in every respect the
accuracy of this judgment. It has been for the last six years within the
power of the Soviet Union to acquire by overt force virtually all of
continental Western Europe and the Middle East since there has been no
force even remotely comparable to that which the Soviets could bring to
bear in those areas. The reason why the Soviet Union has not capitalized
on these opportunities is clearly the fear of world war or rather war
with the United States which would inevitably risk the continued
existence of the system in Russia. The ease of the armed aggression in
Korea, according to available evidence, is not a departure from
traditional Soviet caution in this respect but appears rather to have
been based on a very profound miscalculation on the part of the Kremlin
as to what U.S. reaction would be. The unwillingness of the Soviet Union
to risk the maintenance of Soviet power in Russia for the sake of the
acquisition of new positions in the world does not in any sense mean
that the Soviet Union will not use armed force under certain
circumstances to repell an armed threat, either to the Soviet Union, or
to areas which it now controls. The history of the Soviet Union, in
particular, the small undeclared wars fought with Japan at Changkufeng
in 1938 and at Nomahan in 1939 are striking examples of the willingness
of the Soviet Union, while basically desiring to avoid a general war, to
use armed force to meet an armed threat to its frontiers. If this
analysis is correct, the chief danger of general hostilities in the
foreseeable future would appear to lie in the possibility of a Soviet
misjudgment as to the action this country would or would not take in a
given local situation rather than from any Soviet plan to initiate
general hostilities. The clarity, therefore,
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of the U.S. position as to what we would or would
not do in a local situation will probably be the determining factor in
the Kremlin’s eyes as to whether or not to risk further local aggression
in the manner of Korea, In short, it is not Soviet policy that has
undergone any appreciable change since the end of World War II, but
merely that the circumstances under which it has operated have been
infinitely more favorable to Soviet purposes than in the period
preceding the war. It is these changed circumstances and the
polarization of power between the Soviet Union and the United States,
the points of pressure between the two worlds that have brought about
the continuing and real danger of World War III rather than a new
element in Soviet policy. This distinction is important since it
recognizes that U.S. actions are equally determinant with Soviet
policies in diminishing or enhancing the possibility of an outbreak of
general hostilities which would not be the case if the thesis of a
Soviet blueprint, plan or program for world domination was accepted as
the chief guide to Soviet actions.
