460.509/7–451: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Patterson) to the Secretary of State
19. Excon. From Linder. Ref Legtel sent Dept 9, rptd Paris 5, London 5, Stockholm 2, July 3.1 Mtg with Swiss yesterday commenced with lengthy exposition of reasons partial statistics presented by Swiss, who continued insist that tripartite reps in Jan had presented them only with tripartite additions to list, that they were given to understand tripartite list was inclusive of earlier list I, and that in any case they had never been officially given original list I. (We pointed out Fr had given them list I on behalf COCOM in summer or fall of 1950, and we understood tripartite reps Bern had also given them both lists.) Also stated that if Swiss had studied list I carefully and had compared tripartite list with definitions on which we requested assurances in Apr 13 memo, misunderstanding wld not have occurred. (Whole episode may be a genuine misunderstanding, since Swiss contacted about 900 firms in order compile statistics and wld have been easier do entire list at once, but “mistake” indicates lack of curiosity and thoroughness which inconsistent with Swiss character. Furthermore, they recd consolidated version list I from Leg about two weeks ago and certainly at that time shld have indicated that without further research they were unable to meet with US.)
Swiss endeavored persuade us that balance of list I probably inconsequential and urged conclusion of arrangement on a practical basis. We explained we cld not buy a horse when possible examine only its north end.
Linder made clear that we cld not accept their “normal trade” concept, as set forth, as basis for further discussions. Criticized proposal as implying 1951 exports double 1949–50 level and four times 1947–48, so that eventual “reduction” wld be only to present abnormally high level.
Told Swiss we very disturbed hear this in view assurance previously given to Vincent list I (and list II) exports have not been increasing and wld be reduced. Expressed strong objection to including quotas for AEC items and goods which Swiss import and wld re-export. Stated in conclusion that difficult understand Swiss proposal in view dependence upon western supplies in order deliver exports to east, and relatively small dependence upon east for essential supplies.
In subsequent discussions, Swiss argued that their exports of items on tripartite list were not really important, that existing commitments represent counterpart of earlier imports, that imports certificate system wld prevent re-exports, that neutrality requires “normal trade”, etc. Linder stated our objective was “no quota”, to which Swiss replied [Page 1138] that embargo was “impossible” in view their special position. We referred strongly to our special position in view war situation, casualties, etc.
Linder stated that appeared clear no agrmt cld be reached on basis philosophy and that we cld not pursue “practical” approach until complete statistics available. In response to inquiry by Homberger as to what will be done about Swiss export licenses from US, Linder replied that we cld not possibly recommend to US Govt that these exports be licensed under existing circumstances. Mtg adjourned to enable Swiss think matter over. Later in day Swiss suggested another mtg this morning.
Entire del including Leg reps convinced Swiss were shaken by firmness our position. We incline believe, therefore, that some practical solution possible.
We have informed UK Leg here, at their request, concerning misunderstanding re lists, details of Swiss proposals and gen tenor our reply, indicating that our final position has not been given to Swiss and that we expect discuss matter with UK and French in London. Fr Leg here will be given same info as UK.
Linder, King and Ainsworth leaving for London after mtg today.
Sent Dept 19, repeated info Paris 6, London 7, Stockholm 3. [Linder.]
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