Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

740.5/6–851: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State

secret
niact

London, June 8, 1951—11 a. m.

Depto 1090. Excon. Subj embargoing exports to Sov bloc of scarce materials required for NATO def purposes.

1. Believe we have reached satis agrmt with Brit on above matter, subj to top level clearance which they expect obtain shortly. This wld involve: (a) minor changes in text to our proposed CD res including changing “exports shld be embargoed” to “supply shld be denied” (see para 3 a of Depto 1057 of June 2 [4] rptd Paris 2581¹ ); and (b) inclusion in CD minutes of Brit “interpretation” re our phrase “security interests of exporting country concerned,” which wld require our tacit approval but not specific endorsement. Brit propose to interpret this phrase, “as covering imports which must be obtained from Sov bloc to sustain basic econ strength of exporting country.”

2. In absence final Brit clearance this proposal before CD meeting June 6, and in view of our belief that Brit support for our res would greatly influence continental countries, we reached understanding with Brit (Berthoud) that when subj came up on agenda at June 6 mtg Brit dep wld immed request postponement discussion until June 11. However, apparently due to lack coordination Brit side UK dep failed entirely to intervene and mtg produced succession of statements from continental deps opposing US draft resolution.

3. Norwegian dep led off with strong statement that reports from DPB identifying scarce materials were most inadequately documented and shld be referred back to DPB for further study. He further took firm position that CD shld not adopt principle embargoing such materials to Sov bloc, even with provision for exceptions, in absence thorough study of econ implications by FEB, which shld also study raw materials shortages in relation to civilian requirements to supplement DPB assessment in relation to mil prod needs.

4. Neth and Fr deps spoke more briefly along similar lines, urging reference DPB report to FEB for gen advice and elimination at this stage of any reference to embargo. They referred to commercial interests of western European countries, commitments under existing commercial agrmts, need for consultation by FEB with IMC, etc. Fr dep also emphasized desirability obtaining through HICOM parallel action by FedRep.

5. US dep made brief rebuttal statement emphasizing NATO def needs and obligation CD to establish basic policies to govern activities of subordinate NATO bodies. After distributing drafting amendments to initial US draft res which had been agreed at staff level with the Brit (see para 1 a above) adjourned discussion until June 11.

6. Our present plan is:

a. Try to pull Brit firmly into line before next meeting CD on basis described para 1 above;

b. Seek opportunity to discuss with other dels, especially French, before next meeting;

c. Piave US dep open discussion at June 11 mtg with strong presentation case for US draft res; and

d. Press Brit to join in urging upon continental deps acceptability US res as supplemented by Brit interpretation.

7. While lack of DPB documentation for its findings is not helpful, believe strong case can be made on basis “common knowledge” that materials it has listed are in fact in short supply and are urgently required by NAT countries to carry out their rearmament and stockpiling programs. In this connection, DPB has just reported to CD a supplemental list of scarce materials to be added to the list contained in D–D (51) 94, April 10, 1951.² Supplemental list, based upon inquiry to member countries and including items reported as in short supply by at least three member countries, covers: antimony; beryl; magnesium; tungsten carbide; non-ferrous scrap; pig iron; steel ingots, blooms, and billets—carbon and alloy; specialty steels; chromium and ferrous-chromium; metallurgical coke; asbestos; amosite, and chrysolite; corundum; graphite, natural; kyanite; cotton; cordage fibres; plywood; silk, including noils and synthetic fibres, except rayon; sperm oil; tung oil.

8. From remarks made by Fr dep and others, believe major stumbling block may be impression among continental countries that positive unanimous FEB approval of exceptions wld be required to release a NAT country from its commitment to impose embargo under our res. Language of our res is that “FEB, in consultation if necessary with other appropriate internati agencies, is requested secure prompt agmt among NAT countries as to specific measures to be taken (in denying supplies to Sov bloc of materials designated by DPB) and as to exceptions if any to be made”. As explained in detail in Depto 992 of May 25, rptd Paris 2492 (see especially paras 3 and 4 thereof),³ we do not interpret this in sense described above, and believe clear statement to this effect wld be very helpful. Wld appreciate your more specific endorsement of this position than is contained in Todep 464 of May 29, rptd Paris 6433.⁴

9. We do not presently intend, subj to further development CD discussions, to abandon wording re “security interests” in favor of “mil-econ advantage,” but we shall in any case state US view along lines set forth Todep 483 of June 5, rptd Paris 6597.⁵

10. Any info re developments relating to Kem amendment not covered in latest issue of current econ developments wld be very valuable background for June 11 mtg.⁶

Sent Dept Depto 1090, rptd info Paris for Emb and OSR 2640.

Spofford

1. Ante, p. 1083.
2. NATO document D–D (51) 94 of April 10, 1951, “Draft Use of Export Controls to Insure Adequate Supplies for NATO Military Production,” is not printed (NATO Sub-Registry).
3. Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 1080.
4. Not printed.
5. Not printed, but see the first footnote 2, p. 1084.
6. In telegram Todep 499 to London, June 8, the Department of State concurred In the British interpretation as summarized in paragraph 1 of the source text and instructed Spofford to state the U.S. view that, in the Department of State’s understanding of the draft resolution, the FEB would be assigned responsibility for reaching agreement regarding the embargo of materials which the DPB found to be in short supply and needed for Western defense programs. Member nations would not, therefore, be required to take any action to control DPB items until the FEB makes its recommendation. (740.5/6–851)