Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

400.509/2–651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret
priority

Washington , February 9, 1951—8 p. m.

4211. Excon. Ref Paris tel 4646 Feb 6 rptd info Bern 72, London 1109, Stockholm 64;² Stockholm tel 949 Feb 8 rptd Paris 165, Bern 15;³ and Bern tel 157 to Paris Feb 8 rptd Dept 1131, Stockholm 15, London 36.⁴

1. Subj to concurrence AmEmb Stockholm and AmLeg Bern, which shld be given direct to London and Paris, USDel COCOM shld promptly inform UK and Fr Dels, and Missions Paris and London shld discuss with FonOff at high level, US position set forth below with respect (a) Tri response which shld be made to Switz and Swed and (b) action which Tri shld recommend to COCOM. As to timing, believe acceptable Tri agreement on next steps more impt than reaching agreed view by Feb 13 on (a) but shld make effort obtain Tri agreement on (b) along lines set forth Para 5 below, if possible in time for COCOM mtg Feb 13.

2. Tri response to Switz/Swed along lines suggested by Tri COCOM Dels as result exchange views Feb 5 (Paris tel 4646) wld be unsatisfactory to US Govt in several respects:

(a) Although US believes cooperation offered by Switz/Swed toward effective control over re-exports and transit movements represents long step forward, assuming COCOM PCs make full use of facilities offered by S/S (and that Swed in fact willing extend to all PCs same facilities offered to US), it is clear that such action meets only part of control problem already recognized by CG and COCOM (COCOM Docs 176 and 221B). Remainder of problem is to secure adequate S/S controls, close as possible to those of PCs, over highly strategic exports to SovBloc from S/S production—or as compromise for time being, parallel control over selected items where S/S exports from own production constitute important gap in agreed internatl controls. On this point Swiss reply is unresponsive and does not offer discuss such controls. Swed reply, although responsive to this problem and in some respects encouraging, contains no definite assurances. Nevertheless it offers basis for further discussion. Two cases appear to be sufficiently different that shld be treated separately.

(b) US cannot concur in Tri response to S/S or Tri report to COCOM which implies that progress thus far achieved is sufficient. Much remains to be done, and there shld be no relaxation of Tri pressure on S/S to adopt adequate controls. Re Swiss in particular, US fails understand how Fr can judge reply “completely satis”. Suggestion of Brit that best Tri tactic wld be to await Swiss Parliamentary action on 1939 legis is inconsistent with COCOM view that this is matter of urgency. There is no assurance whether or when Parliament might consider this question.

(c) US cannot agree that Tri shld “regret” that S/S “have no method for preventing export strategic goods made from components of West Origin”. Swed in fact exercises licensing control over all exports to SovBloc, and Swiss Fed Council reportedly cld reintroduce 1939 law or adopt other adequate control measures prevent strategic exports (whether or not involving components of West origin, which is limited aspect of problem not mentioned in previous Tri démarches). In US view, Tri shld adopt positive approach, reiterating concern and expressing hope that S/S will adopt controls, so far as possible comparable those of COCOM PCs.

(d) US is pleased to note that Br and Fr recognize validity US concern re S/S exports strategic goods made from components of West origin. For its part, US cannot continue contribute to frustration its own export controls by providing to S/S specialized equipment or essential materials of high strategic importance used directly in production highly strategic end-products for shipment to SovBloc. Similarly, US cannot continue supplying List I items to S/S in event (not so likely) that they are shipping same items to SovBloc from own production. If Brit and Fr share view PCs shld not contribute directly to S/S ability to export highly strategic goods to SovBloc, US believes they shld be willing support Tri recommendation to COCOM that “each PC shld examine effect on its own controls of lack of parallel controls in S/S and shld take any action it considers appropriate, pending possible agreement in COCOM on common policy, to avoid defeat of its own security controls”.

3. In view foregoing, US recommends that Tri reply to Swiss shld be along fol lines:

(a) Tri Govts have agreed to require Swiss import certificates for IL I items and as gen rule (or ad hoc) for IL II items for shipment Switz. (For its part, US will clarify that presentation import certificate does not mean US export licenses will necessarily be granted.)

(b) Tri Govts for time being accept informal Swiss assurance that exports of List II items in future will not exceed recent levels, and they wld appreciate receiving current info concerning exports these items.

(c) Tri Govts are most concerned that Swiss Govt has not responded favorably to past requests for adequate controls to assure that highly strategic items on IL I will not be exported from Switz own production to SovBloc. Tri Govts are prepared enter into detailed discussion with Swiss Govt immed, if desired, to discuss problems Switz faces in expanding controls and to ascertain items on List I to which Swiss Govt might give priority attention in interest Western security.

(d) Pending action by Swiss Govt institute adequate controls on IL I items, Tri Govts are examining extent to which inaction by Swiss Govt will tend defeat objectives their own security export controls and are considering what action they might find it appropriate to take individually protect their own controls.

(For its part, US expects to state that it must as a minimum withhold action on applications for export to Switz of goods falling under any IL I listing until appropriate assurance is reed from Swiss Govt that it does not permit exports to SovBloc of locally-produced or imported goods falling under same IL I listing. Where applications for export from US involve capital equipment or essential materials on IL I which are used directly in mfg of goods falling under other IL I listings [production of latter being in impt degree dependent upon use of former],⁵ assurance will be requested that locally-produced or imported goods under such other listings are also denied for export to SovBloc.)

4. US recommends that Tri reply to Swed shld be along fol lines:

(a) Govts of UK and Fr request assurance from Swed Govt that IL I and IL II items shipped from UK and Fr to Swed will not be re-exported and that diversions in transit through Sweden, including its free ports and similar places, will be prevented if a shipment is properly consigned to an importer in Swed and thus comes within control of Swedish authorities. (For its part, US will state that it understands that foregoing assurances have already been given by Swed Govt with respect to items on US 1A and 1B lists.)

(b) Tri Govts for time being accept informal assurance of Swed Govt that exports of IL II items in future will not exceed recent levels, and they wld apprec receiving current info concerning exports these items.

(c) Tri Govts welcome statement of Swed policy re its strategic exports, and note that increased exports of IL I items will be permitted only to traditional (Western) markets, but must reaffirm importance they attach to Swed denial IL I items to SovBloc. Tri Govts are prepared to enter into discussions with Swed Govt immed in order examine implications its trade policy in light of recent Swed export statistics, being furnished, and trust that discussions will lead to prompt controls over exports to SovBloc of IL I items which require priority attention in interest of Western security.

(d) Tri Govts reiterate that adequate control over anti-friction ball and roller bearings is matter of special urgency and hope that Swed will contribute fully toward solution this problem.

5. US proposes Tri report and recommendations to COCOM along fol lines, if possible at mtg Feb 13 but otherwise in report for circulation to COCOM Dels soon as possible:

(a) COCOM shld be informed of details Swiss and Swed replies to Tri démarches, preferably with agreed Tri comment concerning adequacy of S/S response to date but if necessary without comment. (US can concur in comment along gen lines set forth Para 2 (a) above.)

(b) COCOM shld be asked immed recommend that all PCs utilize Swiss import certificate system, preferably adopting common policy of requiring certificates for all IL I shipments to Switz and as gen rule for IL II shipments. (USDel shld point out that common policy of using certificates for same items, as compared with differing documentary requirements each PC, shld facilitate trade by removing uncertainties and that widespread use will demonstrate to Swiss that PCs seriously interested in Excon operation.)

(c) COCOM shld be asked immed recommend all PCs request Swed Govt give them assurances as to re-export and transit diversions for IL I and IL II items as per Para 4 (a) above.

(d) COCOM shld be informed of reply which Tri Govts propose to make to S/S (Paras 3 and 4 above) and of further Tri recommendations to COCOM, when Tri Govts reach ‘agreement on these points. (Pending such agreement, Tri Dels shld not discuss future action in COCOM except re para 5 (b) and (c).)

Acheson

1. Drafted by H. Gardner Ainsworth of the Office of European Regional Affairs and cleared with Miriam Camp, ER, WE, and BNA; repeated for action to Stockholm, Bern, and London. Camp was Officer in Charge of Economic-Organization Affairs in the Office of European Regional Affairs.
2. Ante, p. 1015.
3. Not printed; in it the Embassy expressed the view that there was no reason for a tripartite reply to the Swedish aide-mémoire at this time and that the next approach to the Swedish Government should be in regard to List I embargoes. (460.509/2–851)
4. Not printed; it reported the Embassy’s opinion that half-hearted multilateral action regarding an approach to the Swiss Government may not be preferable to unilateral United States action. (460.509/2–851)
5. Brackets appear in the source text.