[Annex]
Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the National
Security Council
top secret
Washington, 11 December
1951.
Subject: Excerpts from a Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper
Relating to NSC 97/1
Included in this memorandum are excerpts from a recent memorandum for the
Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Page 975] on the subject of what additional steps
political and military might be taken to secure or deny Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Bahrein which are presented at this time as being pertinent
both to “A National Petroleum Program,” (NSC 97/1) and the paper entitled “The Eastern Mediterranean
and the Middle East.”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that it has been generally accepted as
between the United States and the United Kingdom that the defense of the
over-all area of the Middle East is a British strategic responsibility.
The maintenance of the security of the area of the Middle East against
aggression by nations hostile to the United Kingdom has been a cardinal
principle of British policy for generations, and the British have fought
for the security of this area in two world wars. The execution of that
policy during World War II was under the same political leadership as
that now heading the Government of Great Britain.
Military conversations were held at Malta early in 1951 among the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean, and the British Middle East Commanders in Chief, to
discuss certain military aspects of the defense of the area of the
Middle East.3 The conversations indicated
that the establishment of an effective defense of areas of strategic
importance against Soviet aggression would require the provision of
forces from outside sources, in addition to such indigenous forces as
might join in the defense effort. It was indicated at that time that
forces were not available for commitment from United Kingdom sources,
and additionally, that such forces were not then at the disposal of the
United Kingdom from British Commonwealth of Nations sources.
The United States has now in the Mediterranean area certain naval and air
forces whose primary task is to operate in support of Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe.4 In addition, there are minor naval and
air force units, of small combat potential in the Persian Gulf area. In
the event of Soviet aggression against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Bahrein, it might be possible, depending on other circumstances, for
United States forces in the Mediterranean-Middle East to offer some
support to other forces operating in defense of those areas. In any
event, these United States naval and air forces cannot be considered as
capable by themselves of providing an effective defense of the Kuwait,
Saudi Arabian, and Bahrein areas.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Because of United States commitments in other areas it is in the United
States interest that the United Kingdom have primary military
responsibility for Israel and the Arab States. However, the special [Page 976] United States-Saudi Arabia
arrangements now existing should continue.
The United States, in collaboration with the United Kingdom, France, and
Turkey, is attempting to establish a Middle East Command as a focal
point for the cooperative defense effort of Middle East nations combined
with such Commonwealth contributions as may be forthcoming, but avoiding
any commitment of United States forces.
The primary military commitment of the United States under Presidentially
approved national strategic concepts, exclusive of the defense of the
United States and support of the United Nations’ efforts in Korea, is
the defense of Western Europe. This is implicit in United States
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. You are familiar
with the concern recently expressed by the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe regarding the inadequacy of forces, in being or projected,
to accomplish this primary objective.
United States forces are not available for specific commitment to the
Kuwait, Saudi Arabian, and Bahrein areas under current war plans.
Consequently, in light of all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that the defense of those areas, together with the
over-all area of the Middle East, should be accepted by the British as a
British responsibility, and that they should develop, organize, and as
necessary provide forces for an effective defense thereof.
For the Secretary of Defense:
K. R. Kreps
Colonel, USAF, Deputy
Director
Executive Office of the Secretary
