Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series

Study Prepared by the Department of State¹

secret

[Washington, October 12, 1951.]

NSC 114/2, Annex 5

The Information Program

objectives and minimum tasks of the programs

1. The objective of the international information and educational exchange programs is to assure that by the middle of calendar year 1953 the United States Government is possessed of the resources required for effective overt psychological activities in support of and complementary to other measures designed to further the achievement of the national objectives.

2. The general task of the international information and educational exchange programs in facilitating the achievement of these objectives remains as stated in Annex V to NSC 68/3:²

• “The frustration of the design of the Kremlin will result primarily from concrete decisions taken and vigorous measures executed in the political, military and economic fields by the peoples and the governments of the free world under the leadership of the United States. The task of the United States foreign information and educational exchange programs is to assure that the psychological implications of those actions are, first, fully developed and, second, effectively conveyed to the minds and the emotions of groups and individuals who may importantly influence governmental action and popular attitudes in other nations and among other peoples.”

3. The further statement in Annex V to NSC 68/3 likewise continues to be applicable:

• “Governmental action and popular attitudes will be influenced along lines favorable to the achievement of United States objectives through recognition of the interests shared by the people and the Government of the United States and other governments and peoples ...

  The United States and other peoples and nations share common interests, which information and exchange programs can cultivate, in:

  a. National freedom, including both the desire for recognized status in international affairs and the desire to maintain characteristic indigenous cultures.

  b. Peace and security against external aggression.

  c. Social advancement, economic progress and human welfare, under governments responsive to popular aspirations.

  d. Effective international relationships to serve these ends.”

4. The situation in which the general task must now be carried out is fraught with greater danger and therefore charged with greater urgency than existed when Annex V to NSC 68/3 was approved and than was then thought would exist now. Moreover, nearly a year’s time has been lost in acquiring important facilities, notably powerful radio transmitters strategically placed, and the base of program operations, particularly in the fields of information centers and the exchange of persons, has been narrowed by congressional action. The expansion of the program is therefore more rather than less difficult than it was a year ago.

5. Five specific tasks emerge as the minimum laid upon the international information and educational exchange programs. All actions contributing to military strength, economic stability and political cohesion in the free world will have a psychological impact and will contribute to the successful performance of these tasks, but actions of a primarily psychological character are also called for.

6. The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of outright action by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist China or of the satellites of the Soviet Union, or in the form of the subversion of existing free governments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism.

7. This involves psychological action along the following lines:

a. To keep the people and the leadership of nations under the domination or the influence of the Kremlin, including the Soviet Union itself, keenly aware of the vast potential strength of the free world, the steady transformation of much of this strength into ready defensive capabilities and the determination of the free world to maintain the peace in any honorable way possible but to defend its freedom if necessary.

b. To warn the people and the leadership of such nations of the reckless nature of the policies of the Kremlin and the possible consequences thereof.

c. To open and to widen schisms between the leaders and the armed forces, the bureaucracies, the religious groups, the peasantry, the industrial workers and youth of these nations.

d. To expose among the peoples of nations susceptible to subversive influences the myths surrounding Soviet Communism, to recall the fate of free peoples whose governments have attempted to cooperate with parties and factions subservient to the Kremlin, to minimize fears as to the strength and influence of fifth columns subservient to the Kremlin within such nations and to nourish popular confidence in the capability of these nations, by their own acts and as the result of strength accruing from the cooperation of other free nations, to defend themselves against both aggression and subversion.

8. The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth of confidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the free world, especially in Western Europe, including Western Germany, in their capability successfully to deter aggression by Soviet Communism or to defeat it should it nonetheless occur and to inspire concrete international, national and individual action accordingly.

9. This involves psychological action along the following lines:

a. To convince the peoples and the governments of these countries that, although Soviet Communism is intent upon bringing about the collapse of free societies, its present intentions do not necessarily involve general war and that it may be deterred from general war if unified strength is rapidly built by free nations.

b. To build confidence in the power of existing deterrents to aggression and the still greater power of the deterrents now developing—the certainty that a united, strong free world will win any war that Soviet Communism might precipitate.

c. To develop understanding of the advantages and the necessity of the voluntary participation, in varying degrees, of Germany, Japan, Yugoslavia and Spain in the common defense of the free world.

d. To develop awareness and appreciation of the common interests, loyalties, traditions and symbols shared by the peoples of the free world and of the institutions, global and regional, that embody them.

e. To demonstrate that, although adjustments in living standards will be called for in order to assure the defense of the free world, they can be kept within bearable limits, both as to extent and duration, and the military strength thus created will constitute a shield behind which social and economic progress can later go forward in an atmosphere relieved of tension and fear.

f. To stimulate and to maintain confidence in the leadership of the United States, respect for its peaceful intentions and trust in its reliability, steadiness and moderation.

10. The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the undermining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and the withdrawal of governments and peoples into neutralism.

11. This involves psychological action along the following lines:

a. To demonstrate the interest of the United States in and its support for the achievement of legitimate national aspirations on terms consistent with the stability and the cohesion of the free world.

b. To demonstrate that those aspirations will most surely be achieved through cooperation with the free world.

c. To indicate why, in the nature of the present struggle, neutralism is an unreal choice and how attempting to make it is likely to result only in becoming a subject of exploitation by Soviet Communism.

d. To recall the advantages that have accrued and are still accruing to underdeveloped countries from their association with the free world.

e. To foster understanding of the nature and the intentions of the people of the United States and to develop confidence in its leadership.

f. To encourage, without undermining responsible established authority, all progressive forces bent on political advancement, economic improvement and social reform.

g. To indicate how the exacerbation of national antagonisms within an area create opportunities for aggression and subversion by Soviet Communism and to encourage a will for peaceful settlement.

12. The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, hope of ultimate liberation and identification with the free world and to nourish, without provoking premature action, a popular spirit disposed to timely resistance to regimes now in power.

13. This involves psychological action along the following lines:

a. To make continuously plain that the United States looks to the establishment in nations dominated or heavily influenced by Soviet Communism of governments commanding the confidence of their respective peoples, freely expressed through orderly representative processes.

b. To promote faith that the present situation in the world will not last forever and that the ultimate triumph of freedom is inevitable.

c. To keep alive national traditions and values linking captive peoples with the free world.

d. To keep the captive peoples accurately informed of situations and developments in the free world as a source of hope and a guide to timely action.

14. The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and governments traditionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a continued recognition of mutual interdependence and to promote national and individual action accordingly.

15. This involves psychological action along the following lines:

a. To convince such peoples and governments that the United States is sincerely sympathetic with their legitimate national aspirations, and the rest of the free world, achievement of those aspirations is being hastened.

b. To convince these peoples and governments that their freedom is inextricably involved with that of other nations and peoples, is dependent in part upon the skills and resources of other nations and peoples and that the preoccupation of the United States with problems in other areas is therefore justified and in their interest.

c. In Latin America, to foster conscious popular devotion to the principle of Pan-Americanism as the concept within which the American nations can best realize their potentialities and discharge their obligations as members of the free world.

16. The tasks are set forth in descending order of importance and are related to specific geographic regions and countries:

a. The task of deterring aggression by Soviet Communism, paragraph 6 above, must be carried out primarily among the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany and North Korea as regards open aggression by armed forces and among France, Italy, Western Germany, Burma, Indo-China, Iran and Indonesia as regards subversion of existing governments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Communism.

b. The task of building confidence in the capability of the free world to maintain peace by building united strength, paragraph 8 above, must be carried out among all nations not dominated by Soviet Communism but especially those linked in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and closely associated with them in defensive plans: United Kingdom, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Western Germany, Austria and Spain; those linked in the Bio Treaty, especially Mexico and Brazil; and those linked in the Pacific Alliances, including Japan and the Philippines.

c. The task of combatting extremist tendencies threatening the cohesion and stability of the free world, paragraph 10 above, must be carried out primarily among India, Iran, Pakistan, Indo-China, Burma, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Guatemala, Israel, Tunisia, Jordan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia.

d. The task of maintaining hope of ultimate liberation from domination by Soviet Communism, paragraph 12 above, must be carried out primarily among the peoples of the nations in which the task of deterring aggression by Soviet Communism must also be carried out.

e. The task of maintaining a continued recognition of mutual interdependence among governments and peoples traditionally linked with the United States must be pursued especially among the nations of Latin America and the Near and Middle East.

description of the program

Elements Comprising the Program

17. The elements comprising the recommended program include activities carried out under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Program (Public Law 402), the Public Affairs Program for Germany, the Public Affairs Program for Austria, the Public Affairs Program for Japan, the Iranian Student Aid Program, the Chinese Assistance Program, the Finnish Program, the India Grain Program (pending)³ and the Fulbright Program (Public Law 584).

18. The latter five programs are concerned solely with the exchange of persons. The Fulbright Program is financed in foreign currencies made available as payments on debts owed the United States by other governments; no appropriation is required to carry it out. Although they contribute substantially to the achievement of the psychological tasks set forth above, these programs are only complementary to the major effort.

19. Successful execution of the tasks laid upon the international information and educational exchange program will depend primarily upon the propaganda and psychological activities carried out under Public Law 402 and the Public Affairs Programs for Germany, Austria and Japan. Responsibility for the conduct of the latter, now that the Peace Treaty⁴ has been signed, will pass from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. The German and Austrian programs, already closely integrated with the global program, will be moved into the Public Law 402 program in fiscal 1953.

20. The recommended program under Public Law 402 for FY 1953 and FY 1954 contemplates the following major activities and developments over and above the program currently authorized.

21. Public Law 402 Program:

a. Radio Broadcasting. The rapid completion of the radio ring, involving the construction of four additional megawatt shortwave transmitters in the United States, bringing the total of super-high-powered transmitters in this country to 6 (plus the 38 lower-powered transmitters now in use).

The origination of radio programming at Munich, for Eastern Germany, Eastern Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; at Salonika, for the southern Balkans and Southeastern Russia, using splinter languages of the region, such as Armenian, Uzbek, and Azerbaijani; and at Okinawa (or equivalent), for China and Southeast Asia.

The provision of low-cost receivers for distribution behind the Iron Curtain and in other strategic areas where receivers are generally unavailable to target groups.

The substantial step-up of the purchase of time on and the preparation of programs for local broadcasting stations in foreign countries.

These measures are designed to assure: first, a signal strong enough to reach all areas behind the Iron Curtain and to overcome present jamming to the maximum extent possible; second, programs closely tailored, with the help of defectors, to local requirements; third, a widespread audience; and fourth, the presentation of programs over indigenous channels and lacking identification of the United States as the source.

If appropriations for the completion of the ring plan are made not later than the middle of FY 1952, the facilities can be in full operation within approximately eighteen months thereafter. The completion of the ring plan and the execution of other measures outlined above will provide the most effective, and indeed the only overt, means of applying psychological deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism through open military action. They will also provide the most effective and only overt means of stimulating hope of ultimate liberation among the peoples held captive by Soviet Communism.

b. Press and Publications. A heavy increase in the preparation of material for pamphlets, posters, publications and exhibits, directed toward specific target groups, to be locally adopted and produced abroad and distributed, either by overt or covert means, without attribution to the United States Government.

The opening of regional contracting offices to obtain the propaganda advantages of foreign production under conditions that will assure technical excellence and economy.

An intensification of the purchase overseas of research, writing, translation and art work from local sources, particularly where such purchase will facilitate the utilization of the press and publication output.

Under the appropriation for the current fiscal year, the preparation of such materials at the level reached by the end of fiscal year 1951 must be curtailed. The recommended program would provide not simply for maintaining production at the level reached in FY 1951 but for increasing it to the point where maximum use can be made of the printed word and picture as instrumentalities in: (a) creating psychological deterrents to aggression, whether by armed force or by civil subversion; (b) in building confidence among the peoples of the free world; (c) in combatting extremist forces threatening stability and cohesion; and (d) in stimulating hope of ultimate liberation.

c. Motion Pictures. An increase of 300% in the production of documentary motion pictures and newsreels adapted to the interests of local audiences and designed for distribution through all available channels, including those in the commercial field.

Intensive efforts to utilize theatrical and commercial film production, which has not been possible under a limited budget.

Substantial overseas film production, both regional and on a country basis, including production without attribution to the United States.

Particularly in underdeveloped countries and among audiences with limited literacy, but also among industrial workers, farmers and youth in more advanced countries, motion pictures are a prime instrumentality for building confidence, exposing the threat of aggression and combatting tendencies toward neutralism.

d. Information Centers. Increasing the number of information centers, particularly in the Near and Middle East. There are now 109 centers in operation, with an increase of up to 20% anticipated in the current fiscal year. At least two hundred centers could be effectively used in the projected all-out campaign.

Increasing by ten-fold the number of United States books translated and published in local languages, particularly in Near and Middle East, Far East and South Asia.

These measures are designed to further, particularly among intellectuals, public leaders, teachers and officials, the development of confidence, the combatting of extremism and the cultivation of the sense of mutual interdependence.

e. Exchange of Persons. An increase from 3900 to 10,000 in the number of public opinion leaders, trade union leaders, farm leaders and youth leaders brought to the United States, particularly from Asia, the Near and Middle East and Western Europe.

Improvement in the facilities for dealing with such leaders during their visits to the United States.

Personal contact and observation is a prime means of developing confidence, fostering a sense of mutual interdependence and combatting neutralism. The proposed measure will significantly increase the effectiveness of this means of affecting psychological attitudes.

f. Overseas Missions. The information program overseas missions, attached to the United States Embassies, Legation and major consular establishments, are the instrumentalities through which the media elements of the psychological program are carried out. Intensification of the media activities, therefore, although it does not mean a proportional increase, does require a considerable strengthening of the overseas missions—both quantitatively and qualitatively. The program outlined above must be reflected in the field organizations in these ways:

(1) The addition to existing public affairs staffs of media specialists and technicians to provide a balanced propaganda team.

(2) The recruitment and assignment to the field of more highly skilled, top-level information specialists.

(3) The opening of a substantial number of “decentralized” operations, relatively small in size, shrewdly staffed, and strategically placed in the natural centers of target groups, such as industrial and agricultural centers, particularly in Western Europe, the Middle East and South Asia.
This field program would mean an increase of about 50% in both American and local employees, to make a total of about 1300 American and 6500 local employees throughout the world.

22. The Public Affairs Program for Austria.⁵ During the current fiscal year, the program now being carried on will be increased somewhat in size and to a larger extent in emphasis. By the end of the year, the program, which essentially involves the same media and techniques as the Public Law 402 program in other countries, will be geared to achievement of the aims of the United States psychological offensive in Austria and will be carried forward at about the same rate in fiscal 1953.

23. The current change in the emphasis of the program involves particular attention to specific priority target groups, such as labor and the so-called “middle class” which have historically been the victims of totalitarian ideologies. This involves especially the use of the United States newspaper in Vienna, the development of a specialized news file for Austrian newspapers, the U.S. operated radio network, and a stepped-up pamphlet and leaflet operation.

24. The Public Affairs Program for Japan. The present Civil Information and Education Program in Japan is conducted under SCAP, with the authority of the Occupation directives as a basis. It is in part directed toward internal reform and reconstruction, and in part to Japanese acceptance of the foreign policy goals of the United States. With the recognition of Japan as a sovereign nation, the present program is being revised to aim primarily at the latter objective.

25. The revised public affairs program will represent about the maximum overt operation that can be conducted profitably in Japan, and will be continued in fiscal year 1953 if funds are available. The revised program will place particular emphasis on:

a. Maintenance of the 23 information centers established under the Occupation as focal points for the adaptation to local needs of all information and educational exchange operations.

b. Continuation of a large-scale exchange of persons operation.

c. Developing press materials directed specifically to target groups within the country.

d. Establishment of a cooperative radio program using both Voice of America broadcasts and local broadcasting arrangements made through the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan and local commercial radio stations.

e. Widespread use of documentary films throughout all areas of Japan.

26. The Public Affairs Program for Germany⁶ This program, because of the particular problems involved in the occupation of Germany, and the availability of local currency for program purposes, is now carried on at approximately the level required for an optimum overt information and educational exchange program. If this scale operation is to be continued, however, it will be necessary to substitute dollar funds for an anticipated reduction in local currency resources, particularly ECA counterpart funds. Of the $44 million projected for the current year program, only $14.5 is from appropriated dollars.

27. Changes in the content and organization of the program are planned to adapt it to the anticipated political relationships with the German Federal Republic. The principal changes are:

a. Extension of the program as a whole to all of Western Germany including the British and French zones, thus reducing its concentration in the U.S. Zone;

b. Enlistment of a greater degree of German participation in the program and its administration including participation by German Governmental and private agencies; and

c. Withdrawal from most of the activities now being carried on at the local community level under the direct initiative of HICOG.

28. Tentative plans call for the accomplishment of these changes through establishment of 15 regional centers, each center being the site of an information center. The centers will be distributed throughout all three zones of Western Germany. Staff based at such centers will be concerned with the administration of the exchange program, cultural and education activities, film distribution and use, servicing of press and publications, dissemination of pamphlets and other informational materials, liaison with German radio stations, etc.

29. Assumptions and Policies on Which the Program is Based. The projected program can be achieved by the middle of calendar year 1953 if:

a. a supplemental appropriation for operational expansion is available in January 1952. About $44.5 million will be required;

b. a supplemental appropriation to complete the “ring plan” for radio facilities within 18 months, requiring about $100 million in cash or contract authorization, is available in January 1952.

30. It is assumed that the information program set forth in this document, and the estimate of required funds, represents the total worldwide overt propaganda program of the United States Government, and that any other public information activities, such as those in connection with foreign economic and military assistance, will be confined to the promotion of the limited objectives of the respective programs under which they are authorized.

31. It is assumed that the administrator of the outlined program will have wide operating flexibility and that funds will be available for stated purposes without restrictive limitations.

32. Estimate of the Cost of the Program for Fiscal Tear 1953. There follows an estimate of fund requirements to attain in fiscal year 1953 the level of operation to meet the needs of the situation as outlined above. It will be noted that:

a. The amount provided in the estimate for activities under Public Law 402 is substantially the same as projected in Annex V to NSC 68, prepared in October 1950, with an increase of 15 percent to provide for price rises since that time and the addition of $8 million to provide for a program in Japan which is financed this year from appropriations to the Department of the Army.

b. There are no significant new technical developments susceptible of employment in the overseas information program during fiscal year 1953 which were not anticipated in Annex V of NSC 68. Opportunities for strengthening the program in 1953 lie, therefore, in better use of known methods rather than in new devices. Progress in technical research indicates, however, that certain new developments in radio broadcasting may be available by fiscal year 1954. Financial provision must be made for continued research for the development of new methods in all media fields. The sum of $10 million for this purpose and for construction necessary to make immediate application on at least a pilot model basis of new developments has been included in the estimate.

c. Successful attainment of a maximum effort in fiscal year 1953 will require a supplemental appropriation for the current fiscal year of $44.5 million for operating purposes and $100 million for construction of radio facilities. The operating budget must be expanded to permit the recruitment of staff and the preparation of working materials to be utilized next fiscal year. Completion of the radio facilities ring, which will require in the neighborhood of 18 months, has already been jeopardized by the delay in enactment of appropriations for this purpose.

Estimate of Fund Requirements for Fiscal Year 1953

Program		Amount (Dollars)
USIE—Public Law 402
a. Operations	$226,000,000
b. Development and Capital Investment	10,000,000
		$236,000,000
Public Affairs Program for Germany		44,000,000*
Public Affairs Program for Austria		4,800,000*
Chinese Assistance Program		900,000†
Fulbright Program		9,400,000‡
Finnish Program		398,000§
Iranian Trust Fund Program		35,000║
India Grain Program (Exchange of Persons)		1,000,000¶
Total		$296,533,000

Relationship of Recommended Program to the Needs of National Defense and Factors which Limit the Program.

33. Relationship of Program to National Defense. The present struggle between the forces of freedom and the forces of slavery is being prosecuted as actively on the psychological front as on the military. The Kremlin has taken the initiative in this matter. Communist strategy relies heavily on propaganda as a device for fomenting discord and dissatisfaction, for bringing the Communist party into power with the assistance of internal and external forces and for retaining its hold over captive peoples who are frequently basically hostile to the whole concept. Military preparedness alone cannot cope with the threat of Communism. It cannot preserve the peace nor win the victory in the event of war unless there exists the will to resist and a conviction in the basic principles for which the free world stands.

34. The U.S. position in the present crisis is that war is not inevitable, that the peace can be maintained if the free nations are strong physically and economically, if they cooperate and have the will to resist. The USIE program seeks to make this position clear to large numbers of people on both sides of the iron curtain. East of the curtain the expression of America’s confidence that these goods are attainable serves to deter further physical aggression by the Kremlin. West of the curtain it encourages and inspires greater effort.

35. If world war should come the USIE program provides an operation which can quickly be transformed into a psychological warfare weapon. To the extent that planning must prepare for this eventuality the development of an adequate staff—trained and equipped for the job—is a must. Equally important is the completion of the radio facilities ring to provide a communications system which can reach around the world and overcome both artificial jamming and the natural interference of atmospheric phenomena.

36. Analysis of Limiting Factors. Successful implementation of this program to exert maximum overt psychological pressure on peoples overseas required the removal of several serious obstacles:

a. Congressional leaders, particularly the appropriations committees, must understand the relationship of this program to the defense effort and the need for adequate appropriations. The Department alone cannot put this message across. Endorsement and active support by appropriate agencies in the defense field and the Bureau of the Budget is required.

b. Restrictive limitations which bind the administrator to the use of funds for one particular media activity or which virtually prohibit the use of funds for certain essential purposes must be eliminated from appropriation acts.

c. Recognition at both Congressional and executive levels must be given to the fact that many overseas information activities require a period of months to initiate and that once begun they must continue for a period of time if they are to be effective. An annual appropriation system which permits the amount of funds available to vary widely from year to year is not conducive to good management or successful operation. Moreover, the delays in enacting annual appropriations make it very difficult to plan effectively.

d. Greater attention must be given to the overseas propaganda implications of public pronouncements by public officials in all branches of government. There is a positive as well as a negative side to this problem. Much can be done to strengthen U.S. foreign policy by an appropriate speech at the proper time. USIE is limited in its basic charter and appropriation solely to overseas activities and must rely on the public relations staffs of the executive departments to prepare materials for domestic use.

37. Although a year’s time has been lost in implementing the program first set forth in Annex V to NSC 68/3, the program can still be highly effective in promoting the achievement of the national objectives, if prompt legislative action is taken. If a supplemental appropriation is voted shortly after January 1, 1952, for the radio ring, it can be in full operation within approximately eighteen months. If another supplemental for the program operations is voted at approximately the same time, the effect of the current appropriation in narrowing the base of program operation other than radio broadcasting can be offset and overcome. The expectation is justified that, given those appropriations, the expanded program can go forward in FY 1953 with hardly a break in tempo and reach a performance peak by the end of FY 1953. If the supplementals are not voted, the reductions necessitated by the current appropriation will make impossible the achievement of effectiveness before the end of FY 1954.

1. This study constituted Annex 5 to National Security Council report 114/2, “United States Programs for National Security,” October 12, 1951, printed in part, p. 182. A slightly revised version of Annex 5 was circulated among the regional bureaus of the Department of State with a covering memorandum by Barrett, November 15, 1951 (511.00/11–1551).
2. For text of NSC 68/3, Annex 5, “The Foreign Information Programs,” see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, p. 452.
3. The India Emergency Food Aid Act of 1951, which authorized a loan of $190 million to India, provided for the use of the interest on the loan for purposes of educational exchange (Public Law 48, approved June 15, 1951; 65 Stat. 69). For documentation concerning U.S. relations with India, see vol.vi, Part 2, pp. 2085 ff.
4. The Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed September 8, 1951, and entered into force April 28, 1952; for text, see 3 UST (pt. 3) 3169. For documentation concerning U.S. relations with Japan, see vol.vi, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.
5. Documentation concerning United States policy with regard to Austria may be found in volumeiv.
6. For documentation concerning U.S. policy with regard to Germany, see vol. iii, pp. 1317 ff.
7. Cross requirements. Will be offset in part by local revenues. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Cross requirements. Will be offset in part by local revenues. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. Balance remaining in current appropriations. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. Value of foreign currencies owed to U.S. No appropriation required. [Footnote in the source text.]
11. Payment due from Finland on World War I debt. No appropriation required. [Footnote in the source text.]
12. Estimated expenditure from Trust Fund. [Footnote in the source text.]
13. Estimated amount to be available from interest payments by the Government of India. No appropriation required. [Footnote in the source text.]