Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Barrett Files, Lot 52 D 432¹

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Barrett)²

secret

[Washington,] January 29, 1951.

Combatting the Crisis of Confidence

1. An important psychological advantage has within recent weeks accrued to the Soviet Union. The initial brusque rejection by the Chinese Communists of the proposal of the United Nations for a cease-fire in Korea³ seemed to provide a psychological opportunity for uniting the free world. Instead, it provoked division more open, more formal and hence more potentially dangerous than had previously existed. This is manifested in the attitude of the Arab-Asian states in the United Nations, the broadcast by the Prime Minister of India, the diplomatic activities of the Prime Minister of Canada and the parliamentary statement of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The result has been to leave the United States with few firm supporters, chiefly the nations of Latin America. At the moment, therefore, the United States, without having consciously decided upon such a course, finds itself being pushed toward the position of hemispheric isolation that Mr. Hoover proposed for it.⁴

2. To put the United States in this position has been a major political and psychological objective of the Soviet Union.⁵ The political activity and the propaganda of international communism have unquestionably contributed to the creation of the situation now existing. They will be diligently employed to exacerbate it. But they cannot be said to be totally responsible for it. On the contrary, the evidence would seem to be that the United States has by its own actions contributed materially to the creation of the situation in which it now Stands.

3. Other governments and other peoples are fearful of becoming involved at the present time in a global war with the Soviet Union. Their fear arises from an unwillingness to fight without hope of victory, of which pacifism, “neutralism” and “autonomisin” are expressions. Such hope is lacking because other governments and other peoples are sharply aware that neither they nor the United States commands at the present time military strength in being sufficient to impose a military decision on the forces of international communism.

4. Therefore, they cannot in the existing circumstances bring themselves to support a line of action that in their judgment is likely to precipitate a general war. The question for them is not resistance to or appeasement of aggressive international communism. It is rather a question of resistance that is effective or resistance that is futile. They do not contend that Communist China is not an aggressor in Korea. They do contend that, if formal condemnation by the United Nations of Communist China⁶ is to be a first step toward early involvement in a general war, then condemnation will not further but will be adverse to the interests of the free world. And the United States has not yet succeeded in convincing other governments and other peoples that it recognizes the limitations that wisdom and prudence would in the circumstances impose on efforts to counter the actions of the Chinese Communists in Asia.

5. The consequences of this fear and the divisions resulting from it extend beyond Asia. They affect the attitudes and the relationships existing among the United States, the United Kingdom and France as they move toward negotiations with the USSR. They affect the resolution and the confidence of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as they undertake to build a common defense of freedom in Europe.⁷ If not overcome, they can render nugatory all the costly efforts of this critical year to create strength and confidence in the free world.

6. The basic objectives of the United States are not essentially different from those of other governments and peoples of the free world. To build strength, to gain time and to postpone war if it cannot be prevented are common aims. In seeking their achievement, however, the United States has appeared to many of its potential allies to have denied these objectives. The United States has put heavy pressure on its allies in connection with its desire for a condemnation of the Chinese Communists. It has commented for itself on developments in ways seemingly designed to commit the United Nations. It has seemed to be dogmatic in debate and stubborn in consultation. It has appeared willing to act unilaterally. It has seemed to show small regard for the sentiments and even the interests of others. It has revealed itself to be disunited and disagreed within itself. These actions reflect conditions within the United States the correction of which is essential to the revival of confidence and the restoration of confident vitality to the alliance.

7. The present situation is not lacking in elements that, if properly exploited, can contribute materially to arresting the trend now psychologically advantageous to the Soviet Union, if not to winning for the United States the psychological initiative. Among these elements are:

a. The general support being given by the people of the United States to the program of building military strength in the United States and among its allies and support to such ancillary programs as universal military training and service, price and wage control, high taxation, and a shift in production from civilian to military goods.

b. The evidence found by General Eisenhower⁸ of a willingness on the part of Europeans to defend themselves if reasonably assured that defense based on mutual strength can be successful.

c. The opportunity provided by the probably forthcoming conferences of the Foreign Ministers⁹ to establish the moral position of the United States in the present situation.

d. The continuing opportunity in the United Nations to reveal the true character and purpose of the United States in the present situation.

e. The revolutionary potential existing among the peoples now dominated by the Soviet Union.

8. Psychological measures can help to exploit these elements, but they can do so most effectively only if certain essential conditions exist. The condition now affecting most adversely the successful psychological exploitation of favorable elements in the situation is the absence of an effective relationship between the Congress and the Executive Branch of the Government, particularly the Department of State. Because of this lack, the Executive Branch often finds itself at the mercy of an inadequately informed and irresponsibly led congressional majority, whose fears and passions deeply color, when they do not control, the development of foreign policy. As a result, Congress can in one and the same breath denounce “appeasement” in Asia and agitate for the abandonment of national responsibilities in Europe.

9. Although public opinion in the United States has generally shown itself to be steadier, calmer and having a surer grasp on the basic requirements than congressional opinion, it is deeply affected by uncertainties and doubts stemming from the congressional situation. The principles upon which the declaration of a national emergency¹⁰ and the message on the State of the Union¹¹ are based thus are gravely jeopardized.

10. The establishment of effective relationships between the Congress and the Executive Branch is the essential prerequisite to a strong and confident domestic public opinion, to assurance on the part of its allies of the constancy of purpose and steadiness of direction of the United States and to the most vigorous psychological exploitation of all favorable elements in the present situation.

11. Immediate psychological activities can be conducted along the following lines:

a. To demonstrate that the United States is building up the military strength of itself and of its allies not because it regards war with the Soviet Union to be inevitable but because it is convinced that as the result of such measures the Soviet Union can be deterred from further aggression and general war averted.

b. To demonstrate that the primary objectives and the most vital interests of the United States are common to and shared by other governments and other peoples bent on freedom, including the people of the areas now dominated by the Kremlin.

c. To demonstrate how the policies advocated by the United States further these interests and support these objectives.

12. Psychological activities along such lines will be successful to the extent that they can be implemented by words and deeds. The President, the Secretary of State and other responsible public officials should be encouraged to seek every appropriate opportunity to restate the basic policy objectives of United States in terms which make clear that its aims, like those of its allies, are to deter further aggression and avert general war. Such statements should stress the interests shared by the United States and other governments and peoples, and underline the ways in which the policies advocated by the United States in the United Nations and elsewhere further these common interests. At the same time, all executive officials, civilian and military, should be again reminded, or if necessary officially instructed, to refrain from public statements that create a contrary impression. With the establishment of an effective relationship between the Congress and the Executive, congressional statements may contribute significantly to the desired end.

13. Words must be accompanied by confirming actions. These include not only the positions taken by the United States in the United Nations, but the manner in which they are put forward, argued and negotiated, the temper in which the United States approaches the discussions with the United Kingdom, France and the USSR for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, the spirit in which the United States leads and supports the rearmament of Europe, and the way in which General Eisenhower is enabled to carry out his mission at SHAPE.

14. Specific psychological activities to further the objectives sought include, among others:

a. Taking the initiative in framing a resolution, perhaps to be introduced in the Senate, expressing on behalf of the Government and people of the United States their friendship for the peoples, especially the Chinese and the Russian, now dominated by the Kremlin, the resolution to initiate a popular but unofficial movement for signatures and other manifestations of good-will.¹²

b. Capitalization of the psychological success of the tour of General Eisenhower by the multilateral exchange of persons, artists, films and literature among the nations testifying to their faith in and hope for the common effort to defend freedom.

c. The exploitation of NATO through indigenous channels as an expression of Europe and its future.

d. Indirect appeals for defection from the USSR.

15. The crisis of confidence requires vigorous and determined action by the United States, first to restore the unity of the United States and its potential allies, second, to open an offensive directed at the Kremlin itself. The second, to be effective, depends upon the achievement of the first. Neither can succeed unless the necessary preconditions are established within the United States itself. That is the first order of business in the psychological field.

1. Files of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Edward W. Barrett for the year 1951.
2. The memorandum was discussed on February 6 by the Under Secretary’s Advisory Committee, a small group including several of the principal officers of the Department of State, who met weekly to discuss major policy problems. According to the record of the February 6 meeting, those present included Webb; Deputy Under Secretary H. Freeman Matthews; Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup; the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul H. Nitze; the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Willard L. Thorp; and the Legal Adviser, Adrian S. Fisher (Under Secretary’s Meetings, Lot 53 D 250). Barrett recorded in a memorandum of February 6 that the committee had been in general agreement with the memorandum (Barrett Files, Lot 52 D 432).
3. Documentation relating to the conflict in Korea is in volume vii.
4. Former President Herbert Hoover had declared in a radio address on December 20, 1950, “The foundation of our national policies must be to preserve for the world this Western Hemisphere Gibraltar of Western Civilization.” The text of the speech is printed in Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, 1950–1955 (Stanford, California. Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 3–10. For documentation relating to the “Great Debate” over sending U.S. ground troops to Europe, which Hoover had opposed in this address, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
5. Documentation concerning United States relations with the Soviet Union may be found in volume iv.
6. Documentation relating to the United Nations General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951, declaring that the People’s Republic of China had engaged in aggression in Korea, is printed in volume vii.
7. For documentation concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
8. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, had just returned from a tour of North Atlantic Treaty Organization capitals. For documentation concerning his tour, see vol. iii, pp. 392 ff.
9. For documentation on discussions with the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union concerning a possible meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see ibid., pp. 1048 ff.
10. For the text of President Truman’s proclamation of December 16, 1950, declaring the existence of a national emergency, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, pp. 746–747.
11. The text of President Truman’s annual message to Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1951, is printed ibid., 1951, pp. 6–13.
12. Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut had consulted the Department of State concerning the advisability of introducing such a resolution, a copy of which he had given to the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Jack K. McFall (511.6/1–2651). The McMahon–Ribicoff “Friendship Resolution,” or Senate Concurrent Resolution 11, was approved by Congress on June 26, 1951, and transmitted by President Truman on July 7 to Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Voice of America broadcast the text of the resolution to the Soviet Union and subsequently called attention to the fact that the Soviet Government had not made it public. For information concerning the Voice of America broadcasts, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1951, p. 87; July 23, 1951, pp. 144–145; and September 3, 1951, pp. 379–381. Documentation concerning the resolution and the Soviet reply may be found in the compilation on United States relations with the Soviet Union in volume iv.