Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

742.5/11–551

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, 5 November 1951.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The matter of an agreement with Canada regarding the use of Canadian bases and overflights of Canadian territory in connection with operations of the Strategic Air Command has been, as you know, the subject of some discussion during the past several months. Your letter of 7 August 1951¹ points out that views expressed from time to time by Canadian officials in discussions of the subject have indicated their disinclination to give prior consent to the use of Canadian territory for strike operations by SAC.

The subject of SAC operations over Canada was discussed on 1 and 2 August 1951 between General Bradley² and two Canadian officials—General Foulkes,³ Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Claxton,⁴ Minister of Defense. Subsequent to these discussions the Department of State received a request from Canada that the USAF member of the PJBD talk to the RCAF member concerning SAC operations. The Department of State agreed that these conversations should take place and that they should be exploratory in nature. As a result General Walsh,⁵ USAF member of the PJBD, discussed this subject with Air Vice Marshal Miller,⁶ RCAF member, during the course of the 20 to 25 August meetings of the PJBD. Concurrently General Henry,⁷ Chairman of the U.S. Section, explored the subject with General McNaughton,⁸ Chairman of the Canadian Section of the PJBD.

The memorandum for record of the Walsh-Miller conversations and of the Henry-McNaughton conversations is attached.⁹ It is apparent from the views expressed during these conversations that positions previously taken with regard to SAC operations over Canada have been transcended, and it now appears probable that an agreement can be reached which, while not presently authorizing the use of Canadian territory for an actual strike, will authorize its use for non-strike operations and activities preparatory to a strike.

It was understood that the arrangements discussed by the USAF and RCAF participants in the conversations would be bilateral in nature and ex-NATO, leaving any authorizations for SAC operations under the NATO agreement as completely separate and apart from these arrangements.

As a means of clarifying and delineating the problem of SAC operations over Canada, the problem may be divided into the following three elements:

a. Intransit flights not involving strikes. Such intransit flights would include stops at bases in Canadian territory and overflight of Canadian territory on flights to Alaska, European areas or other bases outside Canadian territory.

b. Deployments to Canadian bases in preparation for a strike.

c. Actual strikes from Canadian bases or involving overflight of Canadian territory.

With regard to subparagraph a. above the recent conversations indicate the Canadian Government is prepared to grant a blanket authorization for such activities. It is understood, of course, that in connection with this authorization a mutually satisfactory prior notification procedure would be developed, preferably on a Service-to-Service level. It appears that this element of the SAC operations problem has now become a matter for confirmation at the political level rather than a matter for further negotiation.

With respect to subparagraph b. above the Canadians have not specifically indicated a willingness to grant a blanket prior authorization for deployment in preparation for a strike. However, it is believed that this matter should be the subject of further conversations at the political level with the Canadians with a view toward acquiring such authorization together with a mutually satisfactory prior notification procedure. The United States should give the Canadians positive assurance that, if authorization is given for such preparatory deployments, no strikes will be undertaken from Canadian bases without prior approval of the Canadian Government through Government-to-Government channels.

With respect to the SAC activities mentioned in subparagraph c. above it appears that this is a matter for confirmation at the political level rather than for further negotiation. The Department of Defense is prepared to accept the Canadian requirement that initial strikes from Canadian bases or overflying of Canadian territory on strike operations will not be undertaken without prior approval of the Canadian Government through Government-to-Government channels. Thereafter the procedure should be on the basis of Service-to-Service notification.

In your letter of 14 June 1951¹⁰ the suggestion was made that frequent consultations should be held between appropriate officials of the Departments of State and Defense on the one hand and the Canadian Ambassador on the other, such consultations being directed toward a mutual examination of the developing world situations that may or may not necessitate the use of atomic weapons. I appreciate the intention behind the proposal and agree that frequent consultations with the Canadian Ambassador should be helpful in developing the maximum amount of confidence among the Canadians. I suggest, however, that our proposal be for consultations directed toward a mutual examination of developing world situations which may lead to war, in order that the Canadian Government may not assume that it is intended to discuss matters such as the time and place for employment of atomic weapons.

Use of the PJBD is not particularly urged as a channel for the negotiation of the high-level political agreement or for the subsequent development of details related to the notification procedure. The PJBD was recommended initially because it has representation from the three Services and the Department of State and because it has been successful in accomplishing somewhat similar arrangements in the past. As is indicated above, it appears that two of the three elements of the SAC operations problem now require only confirmation at the political level, and this confirmation could be given and secured in the course of conversations at the political level regarding authorization for deployments to Canadian bases in preparation for a strike. Once political agreement with the Canadians is reached or the basic principles of the agreement have been determined, the Department of Defense is agreeable to the use of any appropriate agency for analyzing specific requirements and determining details of the notification procedure, provided of course that there is suitable technical representation.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of Defense:

Marshall S. Carter

Brigadier General, USA
Director, Executive Ofc

1. Acheson’s letter of August 7, 1951, to Marshall, not printed, was in reply to a letter from Lovett to Acheson, July 28, 1951, not printed, setting forth objections by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the procedures outlined in Acheson’s letter of June 14 to Marshall (p. 843). Lovett’s letter stated that the JCS could perceive no justification for the Canadian Government’s refusal to give prior consent to the use of Canadian bases in the event of a war entered into by the NATO nations and that the JCS believed it would be possible to develop a service-to-service procedure to notify the Canadian Government when flights of aircraft bearing atomic weapons from the United States to bases in Canada were planned. The JCS recommended, with Lovett’s concurrence, that the Department of State should obtain Canadian consent to refer the matter to the PJBD (711.56342/7–2851). In his letter of August 7, Acheson stated that previous conversations had made it entirely clear that the Canadian Government would not give prior consent to the use of its territory for SAC operations and that he had no reason to believe that the PJBD would be acceptable to the Canadian Government either for the discussion of the general problem or as a channel of notification; he urged that the JCS should be requested to reconsider its position (711.56342/7–2851).
2. General Bradley visited Ottawa on August 1 and 2 and held discussions with a number of Canadian officials. No record of the discussions under reference has been found in Department of State files.
3. Lt. Gen. Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.
4. Brooke Claxton, Canadian Minister of National Defence.
5. Maj. Gen. Robert L. Walsh.
6. Air Vice Marshal F. R. Miller.
7. Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, Acting Chairman of the U.S. Section of the PJBD.
8. Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton.
9. The attachment does not accompany the source text. A copy of the memorandum, signed by Walsh and dated September 4, 1951, not printed, is in file 700.5611/9–451.
10. Ante, p. 843.