IO Files, Lot 71 D 440
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper)1
Subject: CMC and Uniting for Peace Resolution
|UNA—Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary|
|Mr. Harding F. Bancroft, Deputy U.S. Representative on the CMC|
|Mr. John Dickey, President, Dartmouth College2|
|UNP—Mr. David H. Popper, Deputy Director|
An appointment was made with the Secretary to brief him on the work of the CMC and on the problems confronting us in the preparation of the report of the Committee and in subsequent action at the Paris General Assembly.
In outlining for the Secretary the work accomplished thus far, we mentioned our operating problems with the Defense Department and, with greater emphasis, our difficulties in persuading the British and French to go along with us on the basic conception of the Uniting for Peace program as a means of building effective collective security. We recalled the resistance we had met from the British and French in negotiating the Uniting for Peace Resolution at the Assembly last fall. We noted that their concern over the possibility of irresponsible Assembly action had not abated and that they still professed to fear that a vigorous Uniting for Peace program might have the effect of driving the Soviets out of the United Nations and breaking up the Organization. We also stressed the real importance, from a strict national interest point of view, of the collective measures program as a means of putting a United Nations umbrella over a NATO operation against Soviet aggression and of providing supplementary increments of strength in such a contest. It was suggested that the program for next year should include continuation of the work of the Collective Measures Committee, further efforts to stimulate the earmarking of national armed force units for possible United Nations action, and in particular efforts to encourage arrangements for granting rights of passage to forces acting pursuant to United Nations recommendation.
Dr. Dickey remarked that the work on collective measures would come to a focus first in the preparation of the CMC report and then [Page 659]in the Paris General Assembly debate. He felt that a great many people would be surprised if the program launched by the Secretary last year with such fanfare should not be energetically pursued by us now. He referred to the possibility that the British and French might work through General Eisenhower3 to dissuade us, as they would put it, from complicating the development of strength in NATO by injecting consideration of the theoretical relationship between NATO and the United Nations. Dr. Dickey thought that if we were to let this problem of relationships slide, we might one day find that we were engaged in a NATO operation without the great moral and psychological benefits which the United Nations program provides.
The Secretary appreciated the problem confronting us with regard to the British and French and the question of NATO–UN relationships. He had the feeling that the hesitation of the British might arise from the possibility that they might some day use force unilaterally—for example, in Egypt or Iran—in such a way that the General Assembly might be ranged against them. The Secretary said that he thought we were on the right track and that if we would give him the necessary papers, he would study them and take the matter up with the British Foreign Minister in their conversations next month.4
- Circulated as USUN document US/A/AC.43/69 on August 30, 1951.↩
- Consultant to the Department of State regarding the Collective Measures Committee.↩
- General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.↩
- Herbert Morrison, British Foreign Secretary, participated in the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Washington, September 10–14, 1951. Secretary Acheson and Foreign Secretary Morrison apparently did not discuss the Collective Measures Committee and related matters during that period.↩