Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

320/6–2251: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices ¹

confidential

Washington, June 22, 1951—6 p. m.

831. Six UN Members have submitted responses to Para 8 of GA Uniting for Peace Res (See Deptel 914 to USUN, May 9, rptd to you via airgram).

UK, France, Canada and US’s responses² fol same general pattern, referring to present use forces Korea pursuant to UN res, efforts to build defense in NATO Area in support Principles and Purposes of Charter, and in some cases referring to maintenance forces other parts of world in manner upholding UN Charter. (Copies UK, Fr, Can replies being sent you by air FYI.) India’s response declared Indian forces are maintained solely for internal defense and that India proposes take no steps implementing Uniting for Peace Res. Pakistan stated that so long as Kashmir impasse³ continues, it cannot specify elements within its armed forces for service as UN units.

Dept believes important discuss further with other UN Members responses they may make to Para 8 of Res. Pls raise question of responses with FonOff. In addition to stressing views outlined Deptel 914, you may wish mention fol factors:

(a) UK, Fr, Can, and US responses show fundamental consistency of attitude in support objectives of Uniting for Peace Res which we hope will be embodied in other responses, particularly from NATO’s UN Members. UK, Fr, and US responses refer to availability of their NATO forces to UN for action to maintain or restore peace in NATO Area. Dept realizes that for security reasons NATO’s Eur members may not desire to enumerate their NATO forces. However, Dept believes general formulation of availability NATO troops in support of UN action is desirable. As noted Deptel 914, such statement does not cast doubt upon autonomy of NATO to act independently regardless of whether UN has acted or will act and does not imply definite obligation to use integrated forces in support of UN action.

(b) Wld be helpful if responses from NAT members which have not yet replied will also refer to respective govt’s contribution UN Kor action as being in furtherance of Uniting for Peace objectives of collective security through UN.

(c) Even if particular members may be unable refer to specific units or types of units for UN action, it is important that general tone of response to Para 8 be affirmative in supporting common security efforts. Last clause of final para Can response provides good example.⁴

Acheson

1. Sent to Oslo, Copenhagen, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Brussels and repeated for information to London for Spofford, Paris for MacArthur, and USUN. During late June and July, similar communications were sent to United States posts in many nations outside of the Soviet bloc.
2. For the United States response, June 8, see p. 644. The other communications under reference may be found in United Nations document A/1822, June 25, 1951, comprising the texts of responses received, not printed (IO Files, Lot 60 D 463, A/1822). For a tabular summary of responses received by September 30, 1951, see the Report of the Collective Measures Committee, GA (VI), Suppl. No. 13, Annex II.
3. For documentation on the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, see vol. vi, Part 2, pp. 1699 ff.
4. The final paragraph of the Canadian response reads as follows: “While, in view of its commitments in Korea and its obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Canadian Government does not at present contemplate the recruitment and organization of further units of its armed forces specifically for service with the United Nations, the Secretary-General may be assured that Canada will continue, to the extent that its military resources and its existing defence obligations permit, to co-operate with other Member States of the United Nations in collective action against breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.” (IO Files, Lot 60 D 463, A/1822)