Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr)/213

Minutes of the Twenty-sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Hotel Astoria, Paris, December 5, 1951

Paris, December 5, 1951

secret

[Here follow a list of those present (43), the agenda of the meeting, and discussion of the first agenda item.]

2. Ambassador Jessup described to the Delegation the nature of the discussions in the Sub-committee on armaments. The central point of the Soviets had been made quite clear during the course of the discussions so far. They were making every effort to have attention directed to their proposal for beginning by obtaining an unconditional declaration by the General Assembly that atomic bombs were against the conscience of mankind, and against the Charter, and Should be abolished forthwith. In regard to control, and the simultaneity thereof, Vyshinsky had said that prohibition would come first, by way of the above-mentioned unconditional declaration. Thereafter, a Convention would be drawn up for the effective international control of atomic energy. The implication was that these two would be virtually simultaneous, with perhaps a simple Convention being drawn up almost at once. Then later, Vyshinsky admitted that it might take some while to draft and gain acceptance for this Convention. He was quite inconsistent on the time elements involved. He was quite firm however in rejecting the “UN plan”. He suggested that the West put forward a simple plan acceptable to the USSR, after the Western representatives had asked him what he had in mind for this “simple Convention”. So far he had given no indication that the Russians would be willing to accept even a minimum of control.

In regard to the problem of inspection, Vyshinsky had said that the USSR advocated a program of effective inspection immediately after the General Assembly declaration outlawing the Bomb. This was the line he had given to the press. In the Sub-Commission he had said that of course this couldn’t happen at once. Everything he said seemed to add up to the same old line: outlaw the bomb, then discuss control and inspection later in detail.

In the field of conventional armaments, Vyshinsky had indicated rejection of the balanced reduction formula, insisting on an across-the-board one-third reduction. He had argued a long time on the necessity for defining the meaning of “substantial” contained in the tripartite language. At the same time he used the term “substantial” in his own proposal. As for the parties to the Atomic Energy Convention, Vyshinsky insisted on including states like Belgium and others who had uranium ore at their disposal, while insisting that only the Big Five need reduce their conventional arms. In this way he brushed off Rumania and Italy.

Some constructive elements had come out of the discussions so far. The Soviets had agreed to the idea of a new commission to take the place of the two other ones, and had agreed on its composition. The Soviet-proposed name had been accepted, while the word “Disarmament” was dropped from the title. This tallied with the position of the Department of State, so we had no trouble accepting it. Vyshinsky stated his unwillingness to “note the Report of the Committee of Twelve” since the Soviets had voted against it. However, he was willing to “note the recommendations” contained in the report.

Ambassador Jessup stated that while the above agreements were in a sense inconsequential, they were still an important element in indicating that the Soviets were agreeing to discuss the two problems together. They could still “slide out” over the terms of reference, but he felt that they would agree to work in the Commission. He was certain that they were working primarily for the General Assembly declaration outlawing the bomb, and working very hard for that objective. He felt it would not be difficult to get the General Assembly to agree to the interconnection of the two fields. Today in the Sub-Commission the discussions would go ahead to the operative parts of the tripartite proposal and to the terms of reference for the Commission.

Mrs. Roosevelt had gathered that the United States military thought that it was essential not to do anything in the Atomic Energy field without including conventional armaments. She wondered whether it would be possible to agree in principle on separate fields with the understanding that neither would go into effect until a whole scheme had been accepted. Ambassador Jessup said that this idea had appealed very much to Mr. Lloyd of the United Kingdom. The reply of the Department to this pointed out the difficulties involved. The primary point was that Vyshinsky was not willing to compromise anyway. It would also be very difficult to find any other words which would avoid the immediate imposition of a moral stigma. We favored abolishing the bomb but only when an effective system of international control and inspection had been put into effect. Vyshinsky wanted simple abolition.

Mr. McKeever¹ urged that the name of the new commission not be changed by dropping all reference to “disarmament”. He felt that the propaganda advantage and initiative we had obtained by the tripartite proposal came largely from the use of this term. It had a quality which made it very difficult for the Soviets to oppose. Ambassador Jessup said that “disarmament” could mean less than total disarmament, as used in the title for the Commission. The reason for acceding on the matter of the name was to avoid giving the Soviets ammunition for claiming that the West would not yield on a single matter. He suggested that perhaps we could have a small state propose in Committee One that the report of the Sub-Committee be amended to change the name in the manner indicated by Mr. McKeever.

Ambassador Gross suggested that the new group be called the Commission for Control and Reduction of Armaments, without using the word “atomic”. Ambassador Jessup said we could not avoid using “atomic”.

Mr. Maktos² proposed agreeing to announce the prohibition of atomic bombs subject to a condition subsequent, without attaching any moral stigma to the abolition. The condition would be complete agreement upon a program for effective control and inspection, without which the abolition declaration would not go into effect. Mrs. Roosevelt suggested that the precise wording of such matters could better be worked out privately. Ambassador Gross then returned to his second point, which became apparent after a conversation with Mr. Lloyd. Ambassador Gross wondered if our objection to the GA declaration of abolition of the bomb was not more fundamental than we had so far indicated. The simple fact of the matter was that to abolish atomic weapons left the Soviets in a position of superiority with their arsenal of conventional armaments. The indications from this conversation were that there were many people who were not so aware of this fact as we were inclined to assume. Mrs. Roosevelt thought that the necessity of educating the public on this point was appearing on all sides. Ambassador Gross had received the same impression from a conversation with Dr. Politis.³

Mr. Vorys felt that we should do everything possible to awaken the public to the folly of submitting only atomic energy to international control so long as conventional armaments could remain untouched.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

1. Porter McKeever, Director of Information, United States Mission at the United Nations; Adviser, U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly.
2. John Maktos, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Adviser, United States Delegation to the General Assembly.
3. Jean Politis, Greek Permanent Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the Greek Delegation to the General Assembly.