Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

320/11–2351: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret
priority

Washington, November 24, 1951—6:31 p. m.

Gadel 243. For Jessup. Re Delga 333, Nov. 23,¹ in view reports unconciliatory vein Vyshinsky speech, Nov. 24,² Dept presumes pressure on USGADel to particularize on disclosure, verification shld be much lessened. Accordingly, pending Dept’s receipt Sov amendments, Dept feels USGADel shld not reveal in debate or discuss steps in reftel with other Dels for following reasons:

1. No matter how carefully steps identified as illustrative and not committing us, we see as most difficult US redefine them later without Sov charges bad faith, and reservations and doubts expressed by friendly Dels re care, thoughtfulness behind US disarmament proposals.

2. In view above, US public elaboration steps shld result only after careful US Govt consideration and clearance, which unlikely within next few weeks.

3. As we see it, elaboration steps can best be undertaken in new comm and not in course gen debate, where US proposals re steps might be seized upon by other Dels and possibly adopted, or modified to our detriment, leaving new comm with endorsed definition of disclosure, verification steps as guidance or part its terms reference.

4. We assume tripartite res will be adopted by substantial majority. Accordingly, unless suggested elaboration steps necessary insure majority we believe above reasons outweigh desirability detailing steps this stage in order indicate US sincerity, good faith.

Dept suggests ref to part Pres Truman’s Nov. 7 speech and See’s Nov. 19³ speech re steps most satisfactory answer to inquiring Dels. Further comments may follow after receipt Sov amendments.

Webb

1. Telegram Delga 333, from Jessup for Hickerson, Chase, and Ferguson, not printed, advanced the proposition that it might be necessary to provide friendly delegations with some specific idea of the United States position on stages of disclosure and verification, particularly should Vyshinsky’s impending address in the First Committee prove to be conciliatory (320/11–2351).
2. During the course of his remarks, Vyshinsky asked six specific questions regarding the tripartite proposals. He also introduced amendments to the tripartite draft resolution (A/C.1/667, November 17, p. 584). For the summary record of Vyshinsky’s address, see GA (VI), First Committee, pp. 23–25. The Soviet amendments, contained in document A/C.1/688, appear in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951 (New York, United Nations Publications, 1952), pp. 163–164.
3. See editorial notes, pp. 582 and 587.