Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)

secret

Paris, November 19, 1951.

Subject: Tripartite Disarmament Proposals in the UN

Participants: Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson (Canada)¹
The Secretary (US)
Mr. Philip C. Jessup (US)

At lunch the Secretary discussed with Mr. Pearson the possible developments relative to our disarmament proposals. Mr. Pearson raised the question whether, if the Soviets oppose the resolution,² it was worthwhile continuing in the Commission to elaborate the disarmament plan. The Secretary said that the same point had been raised by the British and he himself had wondered whether the proper type of person could be induced to serve on the Commission if the Soviets showed no sign of cooperation. He said that Mr. Jessup had pointed out that there would be a considerable letdown if the sponsoring powers abandoned the proposal in the face of the Soviet negative vote. He thought it might be possible to begin on the work of the Commission and if after a reasonable length of time there was no Soviet participation or attitude of acquiescence then it might be possible to slaken the effort and perhaps to put in alternates. Mr. Pearson did not dissent from this suggestion.

Mr. Pearson indicated that he had thought of speaking in the First Committee before he left for Rome,³ but he now doubted after the Secretary’s speech⁴ whether there was anything he could add. He said he had thought of going into the matter at the NATO meeting in Rome to develop the idea that there was no inconsistency between proceeding with the NATO defense plans and that of the disarmament proposals. After some discussion in which it was noted that the Soviets would undoubtedly continue to charge the three powers with bad faith for continuing their rearmament while urging disarmament, it was concluded that it would be very useful if Mr. Pearson would anticipate the Soviet attack by speaking to this point in the First Committee probably tomorrow.⁵ Mr. Pearson accepted this idea agreeing that we should not wait to be put on the defensive but should advance our thesis before we were attacked. It was also suggested that the Soviets might have one of the satellites speak in the Committee tomorrow⁶ to pick holes in the tripartite proposal while Vishinsky was waiting for instructions from Moscow on the line which they should take regarding the proposal as a whole.

Philip C. Jessup

1. Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the General Assembly.
2. Reference is to tripartite resolution A/C.1/667, p. 584.
3. For documentation on the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Rome, November 24–28, see vol. iii, pp. 693 ff.
4. Regarding Acheson’s speech in the First Committee, see editorial note, supra.
5. For the summary record of Pearson’s remarks in the First Committee on November 21, see GA (VI), First Committee, p. 14.
6. For the summary record of the remarks of Mrs. Sekaninova-Cakrtova, representative of Czechoslovakia, in the First Committee on November 21, see ibid., p. 13.