Office of the Historian

Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444

Minutes of Tripartite Ministerial Meeting, Paris, November 6, 1951, 10:30 a. m.1

Paris, November 6, 1951, 10:30 a.m.
[Extract]
top secret

Present:

  • France—Foreign Minister Schuman, M. Parodi, M. de la Tournelle, Ambassadors Bonnet, Massigli2 and Chauvel, M. Broustra, M. Maurice Schumann,3 M. de Bourbon Busset,4 and for part of the meeting, M. Lacoste.5
  • United Kingdom—Foreign Secretary Eden, Messrs. Lloyd, Dixon, Schuckburgh, Bowker, Jebb, Parrott, and U.K. Ambassador to France.6
  • United States—Secretary, Ambassadors Bruce, Gifford and Jessup, Assistant Secretary Perkins, Mr. Raynor. For portions of meeting, Messrs. Ridgway Knight,7 Lewis Jones and Wainhouse.8

[Page 580]

General

Mr. Schuman opened the meeting by stating that this was not a conference, but an informal meeting for a frank exchange of views. He suggested that we commence with the urgent problems now coming up in the U.N.

Tripartite Declaration on Disarmament9

The Secretary said that while we had planned to publish the declaration tomorrow, he thought that in view of the increasing reports in the press, both accurate and inaccurate, it would be advisable to expedite publication and make it today. He suggested, and it was agreed, that publication take place today, 10 p. m. Paris time.

Mr. Schuman raised questions about the first two sentences of paragraph 6, feeling that they set conditions and therefore detracted from the propaganda value of the proposal as they made it appear “theoretical”.

Mr. Acheson said that he was sorry to be unable to agree with these observations. He said that we had to look at this statement both from the angle of propaganda and from the angle of what would happen if the plan should be accepted. He said that in his view the sentences constituted essential conditions which could not be eliminated without impairment of our world wide security position. He said this was not a question only of Korea, but that our position would be weakened in the Far and Middle East, as well, for example, more specifically in Indochina and Yugoslavia. He said if we found ourselves in a position in which we did not have troops available to send to distant parts of the world, in the event of trouble, that this in effect would mean turning over the control of a large part of the world to other powers. In this connection he referred to the 5–5–3 Naval ratio agreed with Japan in the twenties as a great mistake. He said that we must not allow the propaganda part of the program to get us into a dangerous situation.

Mr. Eden said he agreed with Mr. Acheson, feeling he had made a strong case for the retention of the original language.

Mr. Schuman maintained his position, making the point that in his view the value of this operation is largely psychological. He thought the present text gave the impression of unduly restricting our initiative. He said he quite agreed that outstanding political questions must be settled prior to disarmament becoming a fact, but he thought the present wording gave too rigid an impression.

Mr. Acheson said he thought Mr. Schuman’s points were covered by the provision that discussions should be started now and the invitation to the Soviets to settle outstanding issues.

[Page 581]

Mr. Eden suggested that perhaps Mr. Schuman’s point could be met if the last sentence of the sixth paragraph was made the first sentence of that paragraph. This was agreed and the declaration revised accordingly.

In paragraph seven it was agreed to eliminate the suggested U.S. addition referring to the U.N.’s becoming an effective, collective security organization.

Mr. Schuman indicated that he did not like this because of the impression it would give to the Russians that we contemplated carrying out this proposal in an organization in which the Soviets were in a minority position. Officials were requested to prepare a clear text taking account of the above suggestions.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

  1. This discussion concerned itself with questions facing the General Assembly, Middle Eastern questions, and the matter of a future tripartite foreign ministers meeting.↩
  2. Rene Massigli, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom.↩
  3. French Deputy Foreign Minister; Member of the French Delegation to the General Assembly.↩
  4. Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, Director, Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs; Consultative Adviser, French Delegation to the General Assembly.↩
  5. Francis Lacoste, Deputy French Representative on the Security Council; Consultative Adviser, French Delegation to the General Assembly.↩
  6. Sir Oliver Charles Harvey.↩
  7. Acting Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs.↩
  8. David W. Wainhouse, Director, Office of United Nations Affairs.↩
  9. For text of the declaration released by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France on November 7, see telegram Delga 72, infra.↩